Stockpile Management
Stockpile management refers to all measues relating to the management of SALW in both state and non-state possession. In its narrowest sense, stockpile management refers to the physical security of national SALW stockpiles.
Stockpile management is also the method used to ensure that the quantity and type of firearms in the State armoury is sufficient to meet its needs both currently and in the future. Stockpile management is a process that ensure that the State does not have an over or under supply of firearms. Effective stockpile management entails the joint planning of the utilisation of the current stock and the forecasting of future SALW needs, the appropriate regulation of the process of acquiring SALW for the national inventory and the physical improvement of national stockpile security. Any identified surplus, redundant or obsolete stock should be disposed of, preferably by means of destruction.
Recordkeeping
A fundamental aspect of managing SALW is the maintenance of reliable records of legal SALW – including both weapons in both the possession of civilians and the state. A SALW database allows SALW to be traced to their origins, as it provides an accurate record of all legal firearms. A critical component of record-keeping is the development, maintenance and verification of a national database of SALW. The provisions for the database should be made within the national SALW legislation, and a centralised authority appointed as the Registrar of SALW. The SALW Register is responsible for the processes and administration of the database. The SALW database should be accessible on a 24 hour basis to investigating offices of the police, and contain all relevant information pertaining to the person in whose name the firearm is registered and the firearm, such as the type of firearm, the type of action, the make, model, serial number, calibre, and any other relevant markings of the firearm.
Destruction
SaferAfrica deals with both the monitoring of arms destruction and the provision of technical capacity to undertake actual arms destructions. SaferAfrica assists governments with the destruction of all weapons that become the responsibility of the Government through legal acquisition, seizure, forfeiture, voluntary surrender and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. Destruction is the preferred method of disposal utilised by SaferAfrica, in this manner rendering the weapon both permanently disabled and physically damaged beyond recognition.
While it is recognized that the continued proliferation of SALW is one of the major threats to the socio-economic development of countries in Africa this recognition is tempered by the knowledge that the threat also exists in existing stocks, both licit and illicit. While the problem of those SALW in licit stock are being addressed through improved stockpile management those from illicit stocks present different problems. One solution that is gaining momentum and popularity is to destroy these stocks. SaferAfrica has supported this method of disposal as it represents a very concrete manner in reducing the availability of SALW.
One finds references encouraging states to destroy illicit stocks in practically all the international and regional instruments governing SALW. For an overview of where the mandate for arms destruction stems from, click here. The UNPoA paragraph II calls for the destruction of all confiscated, seized or collected SALW. Under Article 6 of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, there are calls for the destruction of illicitly trafficked or manufactured SALW. In Africa, both the SADC Firearms Protocol and the Nairobi Protocols encourage the destruction of SALW as a responsible means of disposing of them.
The concept of destroying surplus, redundant and illicit SALW has become an accepted strategy in a number of countries in Africa. The best known of these programmes is Operation Rachel a joint operation between the police of Mozambique and South Africa. This programme has been going on for some 12 years with spectacular results. SaferAfrica has been supporting this process for the last four years financially. South Africa has itself destroyed thousands of SALW either recovered from criminals or redundant stock. Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda have destroyed or are in the process of destroying redundant stocks. These and other countries, such as Botswana, are now adopting destruction as part of their policy in reducing the availability of SALW in their countries.
Arms destructions listed by country where SaferAfrica is involved:
Physical stockpile management
Physical Stockpile Management refers to the joint planning and forecasting, acquisition, possession, record keeping, safe storage (ie stockpile security), control (including recordkeeping), maintenance, refurbishment, production (including marking) and disposal of the small arms and light weapons stockpile in state and non-state possession.
Stockpile management is a regime of interrelated activities that ensure that weapons within a national territory are regulated in all their aspects. It scopes across the full spectrum of activities that ensure the weapon is used for its intended purpose as determined by the state, and upon redundancy of function, disposed of.
The physical stockpile management entails those specific procedures which hinder the unlawful removal of any items within a stockpile. These procedures extend to include the physical security mechanisms such as the location of the stockpile, the barriers to entry, the management of the security personnel and the development of regulated procedures for the utilisation of the infrastructure and personnel.
A key component of stockpile management is a comprehensive knowledge of the existing stock to ensure that the curator responsible for holding the stock is aware of the extent of their commitments. This extends to having indepth knowledge of the stock and its status, as well as the duration of the commitment. The physical security of the stockpile should not be seen in isolation of the broader national context and security requirements. Joint planning and forecasting is required to ensure that compatibility exists between the stockpile and these broader requirements. Should surpluses or deficits arise between the existing stock profile and the planning forecasts, the process of acquisition of new or refurbished stocks, or the disposal of these stocks is required.
There are a number of procedures and measures employed to ensure that proper national control is exercised over stockpiles, which include:
- Regulations for stockpile locations
- Transport security measures
- Access control measures
- Emergency situations
- Lock-and-key and other physical security measures
- Inventory management and accounting control procedures
- The sanctions, and procedures for the reporting, to be applied in the event of loss or theft
- The selection and security training of stockpile staff
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