Uganda National Focal Point 2004-2008

Main tenets of the Uganda National Action Plan

Through the Uganda National Action Plan the Government of Uganda has adopted a range of measures that are needed to address the demand for weapons and to better regulate their supply.

4.1 Control and Management of Existing Stock

4.1.1 Small Arms and Law Enforcement Capacity Building

Combating and eradicating the illicit trafficking and misuse of SALW is by its very definition a law enforcement activity. Capacity building programmes can be a useful tool in preventing, combating and eradicating the proliferation of SALW at the national level.

The overall aim of law enforcement capacity building activities is to capacitate those agencies (police, the army, immigrations, customs, intelligence, judicial bodies, etc) so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for citizens, while having the technical expertise to deal with SALW proliferation in a comprehensive and effective manner. This should ultimately be understood as the provision of a reasonable and acceptable level of human security to the whole of society regardless of social or financial status.

The National Plan further aims to:

Increase the professionalism within the Law Enforcement Agencies and enhance their capacity to monitor and regulate firearms use through: technical skills training; the upgrading of law enforcement equipment; and strengthening police capacity to guarantee a basic level of human security provision.
Strengthen the rule of law and establish strong and able legal frameworks through: Policy Development, legal review and capacity building for both judiciaries and parliamentarians to allow the system to become more responsive to the current needs and the realities of the country and that of the general public;

4.1.2 SALW stockpile and surplus management

Vast quantities of SALW are held by armed forces, police, and other state departments and agencies. Furthermore, a substantial number of firearms are legally in possession of citizens and other legal persons. These stocks are a key target for criminals, bandits and armed groups wishing to obtain such arms. Losses from state stocks and those in legal private possession, through theft, corruption or neglect represent a major source of illicit weapons, globally.

These losses can take place with the knowledge or collusion of those in possession of, or involved in managing state-owned firearms; they can also occur without the detailed knowledge of the state and its agencies - particularly where accounting systems and procedures for stockpile management are inadequate. Ensuring proper management of and accountability for state-owned stocks of SALW, as well as those in legal private possession is a major challenge requiring significant organisational and financial resources. The National Action Plan establishes the following practice:

All authorities will take full responsibility for all weapons held or issued by them and ensure that they are protected against theft, corruption or neglect. The government will begin by reviewing and assessing the adequacy of current procedures and practices and should repeat this process on a regular basis.
Government will ensure that they have adequate systems and procedures in place relating to inter alia: appropriate locations for SALW stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security of transport for SALW; security and accounting procedures for SALW held by operational units; methods for detecting losses and levying sanctions against those responsible.
Developing policy and legal frameworks that will allow for the destruction of all surplus, redundant and obsolete weapons, parts, components and ammunition rather than re-exportation or internal sale.

Figure 5: Remnants of conflicts long gone.

4.1.3 Establishing a normative framework Having established that it is very important for the state to exercise effective and responsible control over all SALW transfers, a few basic questions immediately present themselves at the national level:

What are the circumstances under which the state ought (or ought not) to authorize a transfer of small arms and light weapons?
How are these decisions to be made?
What factors ought to be taken into account when making these decisions?
The NAP will develop this normative framework through the development of a National Policy on Arms Management, and include the normative aspects in the relevant legislation.

4.1.4 Regulating civilian ownership of SALW

Civilian-owned SALW have contributed to violence, death and injuries throughout the world and are continuing to do so – specifically also in Uganda. It is estimated that worldwide, there are as many small arms in civilian possession as there are under state control. Accordingly, the strict regulation of domestic SALW ownership is a crucial aspect of efforts to tackle the illicit trade in, and use of, these weapons.

The National Action Plan reduces opportunities for civilian-owned weapons being diverted to illicit end-users or being used for illicit purposes. The development of the Policy on Arms Management and the resulting review of domestic legislation will instate stringent regulations governing the domestic ownership and use of SALW. This will include:

Prohibiting the civilian ownership of certain categories of SALW, particularly military-type weapons;
Regulating SALW dealers and ensuring that they are required to fulfil adequate standards for record-keeping;
Maintaining strict licensing requirements so that individuals may not own and use SALW unless they have obtained express
Ensuring high standards of marking and record-keeping for civilian owned SALW;
Imposing strict requirements for safe storage of civilian owned SALW.

4.1.5 Brokering and shipping agents

Arms brokers can be defined as middlemen who organise arms transfers between two or more parties often bringing together buyers, sellers, transporters, financiers and insurers to make a deal. They generally do so for financial gain. Through the National Arms Management Policy and the resulting review of Domestic Legislation the NAP will facilitate:

The introduction of national measures to control brokering. These will apply to the buying, selling and promotion of SALW. All such brokering transactions will require the licensed approval of government and be judged on the same strict export criteria as for direct SALW transfers.
The effective application of such controls means they will apply to all nationals wherever they live, and to any company or individual resident or registered in the country. Such measures would help to ensure that brokers are unable to escape regulation simply by stepping outside the country.
Effective control over brokers as the Policy and legislation will require nationals, who are arms brokers, to register as such and to publish their audited accounts relating to arms trading. Agents who break laws regulating SALW exports or deliberately supply misleading information about their SALW transactions should be prosecuted and banned from any further arms brokering.

4.2 Reduction Activities

4.2.1 Collection and destruction

It is widely recognized that the removal of weapons from society is an important means of reducing the proliferation and misuse of SALW. Weapons collection initiatives can be divided into two broad categories. Firstly, collection activities are pursued within the context of crimeprevention initiatives as a tangible activity to remove a tool of violence and crime from affected communities. Secondly, others have been undertaken within the context of peace-building programmes. Where violent conflict has recently abated, efforts to remove weapons from society must be linked with initiatives to address the root causes of conflict.

Figure 6: Weapons collected from an arms stash prepared for destruction.

In the case of Uganda the collection activities will be a mixture of both approaches. Where excess weapons in society are linked to conflicts which have long-ended, weapons collection initiatives take on a different character. Under these circumstances, holders of weapons may be reluctant to relinquish them where they have grown to rely on their weapons as part of their daily life. Accordingly a range of measures including possible use of incentives or rewards for individuals who surrender SALW and efforts to assure the safety of the civil population will be necessary.

The National Plan will develop policy, procedure and activities to facilitate joint activities between Government and civil society to undertake weapons collection programmes whenever there is an opportunity to do so. Information exchange and capacity-building programmes, including technical and financial assistance, will also be undertaken in order to promote a national understanding of best practice, including the following elements:

Weapons collection initiatives should be coupled with efforts to tackle the root causes of conflicts, through, inter alia, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
Solicit the support of the wider public for weapons collection together with measures to control access to SALW on the part of civilians are important preconditions for a sustainable initiative;
An appropriate balance needs to be struck between the levying of sanctions and the provision of incentives to encourage surrender of SALW;
All weapons seized and surrendered should be destroyed in public and in good time to prevent their re-circulation into society.

4.3 Preventative Action

A prerequisite for effective national action to combat the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons is that Uganda develops a common understanding of what constitutes the “legal” trade and, therefore, what is “illicit”. Failure to exert effective control over the legal trade – which include the manufacturing and sale by the local Defence Industry - opens up possibilities for diversion to illicit markets and end-users and blurs the lines between the legal and illicit trade. In some circumstances inadequate controls on the “state authorised” trade in SALW also results in weapons flowing directly to abusive end users. The nature of the export, import, in-transit licensing and end-use certification requirements imposed by governments, and the rigour with which they are monitored and enforced, are therefore, of great international importance. They have a significant role to play in ensuring that transfers of SALW are not authorised to abusive end-users or diverted to illicit markets.

The NAP through the development of the National Policy on Arms Management will establish effective operating procedure to prevent future proliferation to take place, such as:

4.3.1 Licensing controls and procedures

The procedure developed by the National Plan will ensure that:

All transfers of SALW will be explicitly authorized by the exporting, importing and transit states involved in any transfer.
Exchange of information takes place among all states involved in any transfer of information such as: detailed descriptions of the goods being shipped, including quantities, the final destination and end user of the arms. Information should also be exchanged advising on the dispatch and/or receipt of the shipments of SALW.
No exports should be made without receipt by the exporting authority of the necessary certification from the importing and transit states. Similarly, authorities in transit states should require receipt of official export and import authorizations before allowing onshipment.
Provision is made for exporting states to verify the delivery of SALW, including physical inspection within the importing state (see below).

4.3.2 End-use certification and monitoring

End-use certification and monitoring procedures are vital for the credibility of export control systems. Without them governments, parliaments and the public cannot be sure that the SALW transfers that governments have authorised in accordance with national export criteria are not being misused by the end-user or have not been diverted to illegitimate recipients. False end-use documentation is often used to divert arms - particularly small arms - to the illicit market. Since formats and procedures vary greatly from country to country, end-use assurances and certification are especially liable to abuse and fraud. Forged statements are used to gain export licences for weapons that were never intended for their stated destination or purpose. As few countries physically verify delivery, forgery is a low risk strategy.

Figure 7: Destruction of illicit firearms by burning.

The Following best practices are developed by the National Action Plan:

An effective system for end use control that includes provisions whereby an end-user certificate takes the form of a legally binding contract, which contains a list of prescribed uses and a prohibition on unauthorized re-export or transfer.
Failure to honour the terms of an end-use contract should result in the revocation of the licence and a halt in further supplies, provision of spares, maintenance or training.
Developing a comprehensive system of follow up checks within the contract to ensure that exported goods are not misused by their stated end-user, or are not being diverted, or re-exported. The requisite checks could be carried out by consular or embassy officials based in the country of destination.

4.3.3 Reporting, Transparency and Accountability

Efforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking in, and proliferation and misuse of, small arms and light weapons are hampered by lack of publicly available information. It obstructs inter-agency co-ordination and appropriate regional and international co-operation. Through the proper policy and legal instruments that are developed as part of the National Action Plan the following measures will receive attention:

Review present arrangements for making information public relating to SALW and to the implementation of the UNPoA and the Nairobi Declaration, as appropriate.
Review of existing voluntary commitments on transparency and accountability at the national, regional and global levels, and participation where appropriate.
Review and develop Parliamentary oversight mechanisms that can assist with transparent policy and practice with regards to issues related to control, reduction and prevention of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and related materials.

4.3.4 Marking and Tracing

Firearms and ammunition must be marked with simple inscriptions to show the type of item, serial number, manufacturer and initial purchaser. These elements allow the firearm to be registered and subsequently identified. The process of reconstituting the transfer route followed by a specific weapon over the course of its lifetime is known as “tracing”. Successful tracing is dependent on adequate marking and record keeping. Tracing will assist in identifying illicit trafficking networks to be uncovered and uprooted and for actors involved in the deliberate violation of international arms embargoes to be punished – in theory. In practice, existing marking, record keeping and tracing arrangements are on the whole, inadequate to the task. The following will be discussed as part of the National Policy:

To promote implementation and development of the commitments contained in the UN PoA, a system of information exchange on national marking systems (including country identification marks) needs to be established.
Good practices relating to marking, record-keeping and tracing; to establish guidelines and minimum standards for marking each type of SALW (including ammunition); and to assess and promote reliable marking techniques.

4.4 Institutional Framework

All these objectives, and the activities under the National Action Plan, require a structured institutional framework that is capacitated and which functions within the existing Law Enforcement environment and communication network. It requires effective and comprehensive administrative procedures and regulations, tailor-made for cooperation and coordination on three levels:

Sub-regionally with the Nairobi Secretariat and the National Focal Points in other member states. In Most cases in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa Countries the NFPs are situated within the Police Command Structure, Kenya and Democratic Republic
Nationally with those government departments and agencies that form part of the NFP, and
Regionally with the 12 Regional Task Forces.

Structuring, developing and capacitating of the institutional framework, therefore, is an essential and pre-requisite part of the start-up activities of the National Action Plan. The institutional framework will be structured to function within existing frameworks of Security and Law Enforcement in the country, and will function on the National and Regional level. The institutions that will require institution building, development and capacity building support to facilitate comprehensive and sustainable implementation of the NAP are:

The National Security Committee – the highest policy and decision making body with regards to national security and law enforcement related issues and whose area of responsibility includes all matters pertaining to issues relating to small arms control;
The Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNFP) – an inter-agency executive committee comprising of all government stakeholders who have some role in addressing the small arms issue and which functions as the link between regional and national-level institutions. The UNFP functions as the planning, co-ordinating, fundraising and monitoring body of the National Action Plan. This committee normally also include one or more members from organised Civil Society that functions in support of the NFP on implementation of the NAP and represents the civil society in general on the NFP;
The Regional Task Forces (RTFs) – Twelve (one per region) inter-agency task forces comprising of all government stakeholders who have some role in addressing the small arms issues on Regional level. The RTFs functions as the implementing agents of the NFP on the Regional level and are directly responsible to the NFP for their functions. The RTFs are responsible for the operationalisation of NFP decisions and form the key implementing agents of the National Action Plan on the ground. These task forces normally also include one or more members from organised Civil Society at the Regional level that functions in support of the RTF on implementation of the NAP and represents the civil society in general on the Task Force.