Policy Framework on ASF and MSC Part One

Chapter 2

Requirements, issues and options for the conceptual framework of the ASF

Generic Components of a Peace Operations Capability

The generic components of a valid multidimensional peace support operations capability comprise the following:
1. A legitimate political capacity to mandate a mission under the UN Charter.
2. A multidimensional strategic level management capability.
3. A mission HQ level multidimensional management capability.
4. Mission components for multidimensional peace operations.
Mandating Authority
As noted in the Chapter 3 of this Policy Framework dealing with African Goals, and particularly with regard to the provisions of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the AU PSC is a legitimate mandating authority under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This view is consistent with the endorsed recommendations of the Second African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) (of the Central Organ) Meeting, Harare 1997. ¹However, due regard needs to be taken of the provisions of the UN Charter (Chapter VII Article 51) on the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, subject to such measures being reported to the UN Security Council, as well as the provisions of Chapter VIII on enforcement action by Regional Arrangements, in particular subject to authorisation by the Security Council, which shall also be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies (Articles 53-54). In this context, it is to be expected that while the AU will seek UN Security Council authorisation of its enforcement's actions, African Regions similarly will seek AU authorisation of their interventions.

Multidimensional Strategic Level Management Capability
Based on UN advice, instructive experiences of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution, the Meeting recommends a series of strategic level HQ structures for the AU needed to manage operations for each of the Scenarios. These are provided at Annex C to this Report. These structures could be adapted by a Region, if it were authorised to manage an operation.

Mission HQ Level Multidimensional Management Capability
Given the goal contained in the Protocol establishing the PSC to involve the UN in the conduct of missions in Africa , any mission HQ level structure should be able to be handed over to, or incorporated into, a UN PSO with relative ease. UN structures are subject to rigorous consideration within the Secretariat and in various UN legislative and budgetary bodies. For this reason the Meeting has based its advice on structures used in UN Missions. This approach is consistent with the endorsed recommendations of the Second ACDS Meeting. With the exception of Scenario 6 (intervention) the structures are shown at Annex D.
Based on the level of coherence required at the field HQ level for an intervention mission, particularly those involving an opposed early deployment, such operations are best conducted by a coalition under a lead nation. The initial entry may best be undertaken by the lead nation with rapid follow-up by the other nations in the coalition. This would mean that the lead nation HQ would need to deploy “as is”, with limited change to its existing structure to cater for multinational representation. For this reason a proposed structure for a mission HQ for Scenario 6 (intervention) is not shown. As a long term goal, the ASF should be capable of conducting such interventions without reliance on lead nations. This would require a standing AU multinational military HQ at above brigade level, plus the capability to assemble and deploy rapidly well prepared and capable military contingents.

Mission Components
Military. The Meeting endorses the recognition, contained in the recommendations of the Second ACDS Meeting, of the importance of the brigade level as the basis for a viable peace operations capability. The brigade is the first level of military command where multiple arms and services are grouped under one HQ. It is also the first level that is genuinely self-contained and capable of sustained independent operations. In addition, the number of manoeuvre units can be easily adjusted depending on the situation. It is a sound building block for the military component of Scenarios 4 and 5 [traditional and complex AU/Regional peacekeeping forces (PKF's)]. A reduced version of a brigade HQ can also provide the HQ for Scenarios 2 and 3 (co-deployed and standalone observer missions). Structures for the military component for each Scenario are shown at Annex D together with indicative strengths. The military component of Scenario 4 (AU/Regional PKF) is a model structure for a brigade deployed in the field.
Other Components. Scenario 5 (complex PKF) involves components other than the military. The UN is the most experienced Organisation in these types of activities. Examples of typical UN mission structures for police, human rights, governance, DDR, and reconstruction components are shown at Annex D.

Goals, Priorities and Deployment Timelines
The speed with which forces will be required to deploy has particular implications for standby force structures and arrangements. Linked to this is the type of conflict into which they will deploy. Given the fluid and uncertain nature of conflict, particularly in Africa , coherence on deployment will be critical. This demands that units and HQ staff will have trained together prior to deployment. Significant implications of varying readiness levels are:
1. At 14 days readiness collective training involving field exercises with all units is essential prior to activation. At this level of readiness there is also a clear requirement for a standing fully staffed brigade HQ and HQ support. There is also a requirement for an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the entire brigade. Apart from large military alliances such as NATO, individual Member States may be best placed to provide this capability.
2. At 30 days readiness collective training at least involving HQ command post exercises must occur prior to activation. At this level of readiness there is also a clear requirement for at least a standing nucleus of a brigade HQ with its attendant HQ support as well as an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the entire brigade. SHIRBRIG provides a good example of the HQ structure. In its system, contingents deploy fully self sustained for 60 days. This is not normally the case with African contingents. In the African context ASF owned logistics bases will be required.
3. At 90 days readiness there may be time available to conduct collective training to develop a level of coherence prior to deployment. There is also time to establish a HQ and logistics stocks. A requirement does exist, however, for a small full time staff to manage the standby system, and to standardise procedures and doctrine.
Bearing this in mind, the Meeting recommends the following long-term deployment targets for the ASF (all timings are from an AU mandate resolution):
1. Scenario 1-4 should be able to deploy in 30 days (possible only if pre-mandate actions have been taken).
2. Scenario 5 should complete deployment in 90 days, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days (possible only if pre-mandate actions have been undertaken; and
3. Due to the nature of situations demanding intervention operations, Scenario 6, it will be important the AU can deploy a robust military force in 14 days.
The AU possesses a limited capability of deploying in Scenarios 1 and 2. The UN would normally be able to deploy in Scenarios 3 and 4 and Scenario 6 requires a capable nation that is prepared to assume leadership. Given this, development of the ASF should concentrate on Scenario 5, in particular the military component of this Scenario. The building block of this capability is robust coherence at brigade group level.
The Meeting emphasised that the issue of resource constraints was a key considerations in the achievement of the long-term deployment targets listed in paragraph 2.9.

Doctrine
To be effective, a multinational peace operations capability requires standardised doctrine. As in other areas of African capability, the Meeting endorses the recommendation of the Second ACDS Meeting that peacekeeping doctrine used by the ASF should be consistent with doctrine produced and used by the UN, and complemented by African specificity. In this respect, the Meeting notes that the UN has almost completed a Multidimensional Peacekeeping Handbook, with publication slated for August 2003 at the latest, which will serve as the base document for all UN peacekeeping doctrine. Doctrine for the ASF should be based on this UN document when it enters into circulation and use. The Meeting also notes that peace operations SOPs have already been drafted by the AU, as well as by ECOWAS. In this sense, the two Organisations are ahead of the UN. The UN has indicated that it will comment on the AU SOPs and the outcome of this Report will affect the scope and content of the draft SOP. It is logical to suggest that draft Regional SOPs will have to be harmonised with that of the AU.
In the UN context, production of detailed doctrine for how units will complete normal military tasks, e.g. conduct of a reconnaissance patrol, is a national responsibility. The UN has produced policy for subjects that are common in a multinational peacekeeping environment, such as civil-military co-ordination. These should be adopted by the AU. Doctrine for what could be termed multinational war fighting tasks is not available from the UN. Production of this type of publication is a major task for military alliances such as NATO, where there is a significant standardisation structure in NATO HQ. In the case of intervention, the AU may wish to seek NATO and European advice.

Training
Training for peace operations has a number of elements, both military and civilian. As far as peace operations are concerned, a basis for the military component is sound capability in the full range of normal military tasks. While this cannot be over stressed, training in these tasks is a national responsibility. Even in large military alliances, there is limited standardisation of this type of training, as a result of differing national doctrines, tactics, techniques and procedures. It may be impractical to try to develop standardised training at this level in the African context.
On the other hand, there is some degree of standardisation on issues specific to peace operations. In addition to doctrine, Africa should use UN training standards and material, modified as necessary, for Africa . The UN has made significant effort in recent months in this direction, particularly as part of its Standardised Generic Training Modules Project.² Because African Member States have been, and will continue to be involved, this Project will be useful and should inform African peace operations training.
The relevant AU and regional training framework should provide for some amount of co-ordination of AU, Regional and national training, as well as for the establishment and designation of centres of excellence for peacekeeping training at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. An example of this is that, within ECOWAS, broad thinking is to designate the Zambakro PKTC (Côte d'Ivoire ) as a tactical institution; the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana) as an operational level centre; the National War College ( Nigeria ) as the strategic level institution. Other regions have their own training centres and institutions, both nationally and regionally, including the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Zimbabwe , the PSTC Kenya and the Cairo International PK Training Centre. Regionally the establishment, through the Training for Peace project of an African Chapter of African peacekeeping training centres may be useful in the pursuit of doctrinal harmonization and sharing of lessons learnt.
While this arrangement does not seek to micro-manage issues of standardisation of doctrine and training, it provides a practical framework for standardisation based on UN doctrine and training standards, and the promotion of cohesion.
It is also to be recalled that national military training frameworks provide for training cycles normally incorporating progressive training activities. AU and sub-regional training should therefore be designed on the basis of a cycle that dovetails into these national arrangements. In this respect, there will be the need for some degree of harmonisation among Member States signing up to the standby arrangements. Such harmonised training cycles, if synchronised with UN and other external initiatives such as ACRI (as well as Operation Focus Relief and African Crisis Operations and Training Assistance - ACOTA), RECAMP, BPST, the Norwegian funded Training for Peace program, etc, should help to harness support for AU training for PSO by channeling external assistance towards quality support at the centres of excellence. This will enhance African peacekeeping capacities, as well as provide a framework for joint tactical and operational field training exercises (FTX), command post exercises (CPX) and telephone battles to practice common doctrine and techniques and test readiness. It will be particularly useful if training is focused towards structures established as part of the ASF.
Troops that participate in peace support operations are placed under particular scrutiny regarding their adherence to the highest standards of international humanitarian law/Law of armed conflict. This subject should be covered in national training as well as by any regional peacekeeping training institutions. Reference could here be made to bulletin issued by the UNSG in 1999 on international humanitarian law.

Brahimi Issues
The recommendations of the Brahimi Panel ³ have made collaboration with the UN System even more fundamental. It is instructive to call to attention the Brahimi Panel's view:
The Brahimi Panel's Report and Recommendations raise serious challenges that have far-reaching implications for AU and Regional peace support efforts, especially in the areas of organisation, equipment, training, operational doctrine, and capacities for mandate accomplishment, including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), as well as for Quick Impact Projects (QIP). In operationalizing the ASF, the AU should borrow extensively from the relevant lessons drawn in the Brahimi Report and give serious consideration to those issues relating to mission-capable forces within the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) for regional training, standardisation and organic logistical support. The rationale for this view is that the relevant recommendations impose a higher premium on standards and capacities that, if met, will facilitate the full participation of African countries in UN peace operations.

Issue of AU/Regional Consultations and Co-ordination
The need for consultations, harmonisation and co-ordination of the security mechanisms of the AU and Regions is predicated on the framework of the CAAU and relevant decisions of the Durban Summit (July 2002). Within the framework of the PSC Protocol, Regional security mechanisms should be envisioned as a crucial part of the regional security architecture.
Another pertinent reason for closer AU-Regional collaboration stems from the fact that there is a limit to the burden that sub-regions can bear for their own security, and the lack of sub-regional capacity may tend to prolong conflicts. The AU has provided diplomatic support for sub-regional interventions, but its financial and logistical contributions to such Regional efforts ⁴ has been limited.
The lack of fully coordinated and harmonised regional security mechanisms and intervention efforts has also created competition among and between African regional organisations for external assistance, to the detriment of concerted efforts at building African and regional capabilities.
In reality, the more ambitious objectives of the PSC Protocol and the ACDS recommendations which envisage sub-regional components of the ASF demand the full participation of the Regions. Their respective security mechanisms need to be harmonised with that of the AU, in order to synergise African security efforts.
To achieve effective consultations between the AU and Regions on these subjects, as well as with external Partners, there is the need for clearly designated focal points at all levels.

Issue of Collaboration with the International Community
AU co-operation with the international community occurs in the areas of diplomatic, political and economic activities, in addition to resource (financial and material) mobilisation in support of its peace and security agenda. In the context of building African capacity for peacekeeping, the AU is expected to continue to be the recipient and beneficiary of external support programmes, such as support for the establishment of the Conflict Management Centre (CMC), and financial support for the establishment and sustainment of peace operations. In addition, the Union and Regions have benefited from other financial and material assistance programmes such as the ACRI (US), RECAMP (France), as well as support from the British (BPST), Norwegian, Canadian, Danish and other Nordic countries. These have helped to enhance skills, further doctrinal standardisation, and improve the logistics capacity for African peacekeeping.
Nevertheless, while external initiatives have helped to improve some African peace support capacities, the level of external assistance has been lower than expected, and has not always focused on key African concerns. In particular, the OAU/AU has not been fully involved in determining the nature and scope of the initiatives.

Sustainability and Logistical Support Requirements
In order to develop advice regarding sustainability, logistic support and funding, the Meeting adopted assumptions regarding rapid deployment, periods of self-sustainability and methods of providing logistic support. These are that:
1. Scenarios 1 to 3 will deploy with self sustainability for 30 days.
2. Scenarios 4 to 6 should ideally involve contingents deploying with self sustainability for 90 days.
The identification of broad sustainability, logistical support, and funding requirements are key components for the deployment of any peace operations. The UN has developed a number of documents which are used to establish these requirements. Examples are shown at Annex F. Past experience has indicated that the rates used by the UN may be too high for adoption by the AU. It is therefore recommended that the AU use the information in these documents as a guide and build on this information, making changes as appropriate in the scales of reimbursement, the consumption rates, etc., to fit the African environment. The resulting documents, formatted to fit AU parameters, will provide valuable planning tools to determine the sustainability, logistical support and funding requirements needed for peace operations. This will also assist a smooth transition to UN operations, if necessary.

AU Logistical Infrastructure for PSO
Considering that poor equipment and logistics have often undermined effectiveness of African PSO's, the AU should initiate an investigation into an appropriate concept for logistical infrastructure and resupply system, including ASF Military Logistical Depots (AMLD), for Phase 2. During Phase 1 Member States should focus on national readiness (own reserves and stocks) while an appropriate and cost-effective concept for Phase 2 is investigated. In general, when involved in peace support operations, force projection and sustainment should be executed by outsourcing strategic lift capabilities from the international environment.

Equipment Standardisation
While standardisation of doctrine and procedures are both desirable and possible, it should be clear that due to different development processes of Member State defence forces, equipment standardisation will not be possible across the whole spectrum of ASF military equipment. However, the clear identification of key areas where interoperability is essential, such as inter-unit communications, is urgent. The issue of standardisation policy and the development of suitable technical solutions, where necessary, should be centrally managed at the AU. Apart from the possible impact that this could have on national government procurement practices, interoperability is also an issue to be taken on board by the various external capacity building initiatives listed elsewhere in this document.

Funding and Reimbursement
The parameters for financing the peace operations of the ASF and other operational activities related to peace and security (Article 21) provide for the establishment of the AU Peace Fund, subject to relevant AU Financial Rules and Regulations. The Peace Fund also receives additional contributions from African and international partners. Excepting the regular budgetary appropriations that could be guaranteed, the AU has no guaranteed control over the other sources. The PSC therefore needs to be aware of the responsibility of making available such financial resources as are requisite for ASF mission accomplishment. In this regard, however, it is recalled that the Second Meeting of the ACDS made the following recommendations on funding:
1. Initiating an annual fund raising week.
2. Increasing contributions of Member States to the Regular Budget; increasing the percentage of the budget dedicated to the Peace Fund, that is, from six (6) to ten (10) percent.
3. Soliciting for individual donations in cash or kind, and involving insurance corporations.
The issue of reimbursement for troop commitments, movements and airlifts, and logistical, as well as other operational costs incurred by Member States, is one that needs careful consideration. Except for some coalition interventions, particularly in West, Central and Southern Africa , lack of central funding and reimbursement for peacekeeping costs have severely inhibited the full participation of less endowed Member States. This situation has undermined multinational efforts of Regions and engendered sub-regional polarisation.
An appropriate policy decision is required on reimbursement rates for Member State commitments to the ASF. In addition to reimbursement of Member States, the contribution of the Region itself needs to be considered when formulating a system of reimbursement.

Command, Control and Communication Considerations
Multinational brigades raise legal as well as technical command and control issues that need to be resolved prior to deployment. This could be achieved through appropriate AU command and control policies ⁵, Letters of Exchange (LOE's), Letters of Intent (LI's) or MOU's. In general, the command of the brigades will need to reflect the multinational nature of the formation, and be combined with a system of rotation of staff appointments, having regard to the capacities, contributions, and professional competence levels in the respective defence forces of Member State .
Skeleton Rapid Deployment Headquarters. For rapid deployment of a multinational force, UN, African and other experience clearly indicate the need for an effective mission HQ to be functioning very early. As mentioned above for readiness at 30 days or less, experience indicates that this can only be achieved by the core of such a HQ already existing full time which is trained and competent in the appropriate command procedures. Standby procedures similar to the SHIRBRIG concept and the UNSAS “on call” HQ described in Annex E will assist development of such a capacity.
Status of Affiliation of Contingents. It is likely that not all the units contributed to the ASF will be self-sufficient, and that some will lack adequate operational resources. Such units will have to be regrouped with much stronger contingents of the ASF. This may engender some amount of political and legal implications in placing units under command of foreign officers and practical issues at the tactical level that will need close attention.
Communications. The Meeting pointed out that deployed missions and operational activities require effective communications. This is one area requiring close examination to achieve a required level of standardization and interoperability. While the use of satellite communications may be convenient in limited observer missions and between missions and the Commission/Secretariats, they are expensive and are not ideal for communications internal to peacekeeping force operations. Careful consideration therefore needs to be given to the types and mix of communications proposed for the respective mission scenarios.

Notes

In 1995, the ACDS proposed that each Member State earmarked peacekeeping-trained standby forces. Subsequently in 1996 ( Addis Ababa ) and 1997 ( Harare ), they made further substantive proposals for the establishment of an OAU observer force of 500 standby personnel, with 100 drawn from each of the 5 sub-regions, within the framework of the UNSAS. In addition, the ACDS recommended the formation of sub-regional standby brigades consisting of bilateral or multilateral national contingents.
The Standardized Generic Training Module (SGTM) Project is being conducted by DPKO, in close collaboration with Member States, to produce recommended training modules and content. Sixteen SGTM's have been distributed covering a range of peacekeeping training.
The Brahimi Panel on United Nations Peace Operations was convened by the United Nations Secretary General in March 2000 to “assess the shortcomings of the existing [UN] system and make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change . ” The Report of the Panel which was submitted on 21 August 2000 (United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809). The panel was led by Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister.
It is estimated that the total AU funding for ECOWAS peace support efforts, as of October 2001, stands at about $750,000 as follows: 1) $300,000 from General peace Fund towards projected ECOWAS deployment on the Guinea-Liberia border -- it was in lieu of a specific ECOWAS request for logistical support and equipment for that purpose; 2) $200,000 in December 1995; and 3) $250,000 in August 2000 for disbursement to the Government of Sierra Leone for the DDR program ($100,000), another $100,000 to alleviate the plight of amputees, and $50,000 to ECOWAS for the operationalisation of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace in Sierra Leone within the framework of the Lomé Agreement (1999).
The UN has issued guidance on UN Command and Control authority that may assist development of AU Policy. See DPKO Paper of October 2001 titled “Command and Control of Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions”.