Lessons Learned

The mapping and NAP methodology is the first such comprehensive national approach to the small arms issue of its kind. The nature and scope of the project are also very broad and encompass a huge number of different actors, at different levels, across a large geographical area and cover a vast array of different factors and issues, many of which are sensitive in nature. Consequently, in the course of the practical application of this methodology we have encountered a large number of challenges and learnt a number of valuable lessons that have contributed to the further development and refinement of the mapping and NAP methodology. These lessons learnt follow below.

a. Political environment:

Commitment in itself is not enough: Many governments have agreed in the various international, regional and subregional initiatives to deal with the problem of small arms and light weapons on the political level, without having the real resolve to fully implement these agreements. For example, in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa, ten states negotiated and signed the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa in March 2000. The first Ministerial Review took place in August 2002, and the ten state parties agreed upon a revised Implementation Plan. Yet to date, only half of the signatories have started with the implementation of the Co-ordinated Agenda for Action, which has effectively hampered progress and the co-ordination of action in the region. Developing a NAP in circumstances of little or no active support is almost unthinkable, since it requires more than just political commitment to address the problem in a practical and effective manner. It is crucial to the successful creation and implementation of a NAP that there is considerable practical commitment and that the government contributes its own resources. In the case of both Tanzania and Kenya the commitment of the government to the creation of the NAP has been exemplary. The Tanzanian Government's commitment to the NAP and the willingness of donors to support the process have ensured the NAPs comprehensive and sustainable implementation. There is currently no reason to believe that the same will not be true in the case of Kenya. Elsewhere, however, the road has been substantially more difficult.
Knowledge is the key: Understanding the implications of, and requirements for, implementation is imperative for a successful NAP. Knowledge of the basic tenets of the various small arms initiatives, agreements and protocols, as well as the basics of the substantive issues governing arms management, can assist greatly in creating a conducive environment for action in those government agencies involved with implementation. Taking the existence of such a knowledge-base for granted from the outset of the mapping process can be a costly mistake. Establishing or confirming the basic knowledge-base through seminars and discussion sessions during the pre-mapping phase has proved invaluable in keeping the process on track and within reasonable time limits.
Inclusiveness is essential: It was quite clear that following the agreement of the international and different regional initiatives, any process dealing with the small arms problem would have to include a broad range of actors from both government and, crucially, civil society. In most of the mapping activities that have taken place to date such an inclusive approach has been taken from the start, involving all relevant government departments and agencies, civil society and the donor community. This has ensured the effective engagement of all the key stakeholders and has enhanced the ability of the NFPs and the Mapping Team to fully understand the problem and consequently develop effective small arms initiatives. In one specific country though, where a feasibility study was conducted, the inclusion of functional civil society organisations and non-security related government agencies was not possible because of the prevailing political environment and no real progress could be made.

b. Security environment

There is a need for practical governance on the ground: Developing a NAP requires basic governance structures to be in place on the ground. During the mapping phase, gathering information on the experiences and needs of law enforcement agencies, social and welfare departments and local government structures in dealing with the small arms problem, is important in shaping the NAP and is dependent on two main factors. Firstly, these agencies, departments and structures must actually be present on the ground and working in the local communities. And secondly, these actors must be fully engaged and in-touch with the local environments in which they are working. Effective governance structures are also crucial to the implementation of a NAP. It will, for example, be very difficult to implement improved import and export regulations without a government presence at a border post or entry point. The security situation can also prevent effective governance and therefore make the mapping activity and the implementation of a NAP impossible. In such cases it will be advisable to postpone the development of a NAP until effective governance is established. Countries or areas engulfed in more serious conflict, or those devoid of governance structures on the ground, are therefore not really suitable for this type of methodology which deals with the problem in a structured and logical manner.
There must be visible government support: Small arms and light weapons have exclusively been the realm of the state and security agencies for a very long time in the developing world. Research and discussion of small arms and their impact on society was therefore not widely undertaken and this situation is only beginning to change now. Consequently, given the sensitivity of the issue, having visible government support for the mapping activity, and specifically the information gathering activities, is imperative. Survey teams and individual researchers have been refused freedom of action and in some cases actively harassed and prevented from doing their work. It was only following the direct involvement of the government that they were able to continue their work unimpeded. Visible and vocal political support for the process from the outset has also greatly assisted the smooth conduct of mapping activities and in ensuring support from security agencies and governance structures, at all levels. Given the importance of government support to the mapping process, it is prudent to allow enough time for formal instructions and guidelines to be passed down to all levels of government before the information gathering phase begins.
Dealing with volatile areas: Information gathering and interaction with the population is sometimes impossible in areas affected by conflict and insecurity. Yet it is the dynamics in these areas that are major contributors to the existing small arms problems. Avoiding affected areas will invariably impact on the integrity of the research data and will mean that a full and wholly accurate assessment of the current situation is not always possible from the field research alone. It is therefore important to work with other agencies, such as relief operators and international organisations who normally have access to such areas, to collect as much information from them as possible and fill in those gaps in knowledge arising from an inability to conduct field research. The implementation of NAP activities may also have to be deferred until the situation is more stable in a specific area. Nonetheless, it is important that difficult areas are not avoided if some interaction is possible. In some cases the act of engagement itself, in crime and violence-ridden neighbourhoods, has led to the improvement of access and has helped to start to resolve the problems that are causing the insecurity.

c. Mapping and plan creation

It is important to have clear objectives: Once the nature and scale of the information gathering process becomes apparent to the parties involved, the process can easily become a 'collect all' serving different purposes. To ensure that the original purpose of the mapping is achieved, it is imperative that the objectives of the surveys and workshops are agreed upon before the information gathering phase and that they are subsequently adhered to. Time consuming diversions that do not contribute to the main objective of the mapping activity should be avoided. Similarly, objectives and priority areas for action should also be agreed on according to the information and analysis at hand. Implementation of activities in the home-area of some or other dignitary just for the sake of political gain can drain resources and impair implementation.
Co-ordination and communication are vital: Effective co-ordination across the many government agencies and departments involved in mapping and implementation, and with civil society organisations and the Mapping Team, is essential from the start of the process. It becomes difficult to determine and achieve the priorities for mapping and implementation and guidelines for policy development if all participants are not kept informed and on board throughout the process. It is essential that regular briefings to the full NFP are held and that effective communication between all stakeholders is maintained throughout the entire mapping process and the implementation of the NAP.
There must be full time commitment on the part of key government stakeholders: This is particularly important with regard to the Head of the NFP. Changes of personnel often mean that many activities have to be started again from afresh, as the process of building mutual trust and understanding of the issues is a lengthy process. To avoid an unnecessary loss of time and knowledge, it is better to have one person dealing with the co-ordination of the mapping activity.

d. Implementation

A logical step approach needs to be taken: It is important to resist the temptation to try to achieve quick results before the foundations for a sustainable programme to control the small arms problem have been put in place. High-profile operations such as weapons collection and burnings have a useful role to play but they must not be pursued in isolation. Usually the NAP implementation works much better if the first projects to be implemented are those that provide the general institutional and legal framework, provide intensive capacity building for both governmental structures and civil society organisations, and raise public awareness. Once the right mechanisms, laws and fully trained and operational personnel are in place, and detailed research has been undertaken to target development projects, then sustainable weapons collection and destruction initiatives, and programmes to reduce the demand for arms, can be effectively implemented. The logical step approach guarantees the strengthening of institutions and civil society while at the same time creating the crucial sense of ownership and responsibility for the future management and reduction of arms flows in and out of the country.
Co-ordination is key: Just as the illicit trade in small arms cannot be combated by any one country alone, nor can a single government agency or civil society actor inside a country fully prevent, combat and eradicate the small arms problem. For a NAP to be truly effective it is crucial that all the government agencies at the national and provincial levels are committed to co-operating and co-ordinating their activities, both with their sister agencies and departments and with civil society. At the regional level, co-ordination across borders to share information and conduct joint operations is equally crucial. Similarly, due to the complex nature and richness of civil society in any one country, co-ordination and cooperation between civil society actors is very important. Ultimately, the effective implementation of a NAP is all about the efficient and co-ordinated management of scarce resources.
Capacity building is vital: It is imperative that the indigenous actors have the skills and resources to effectively implement the NAP. Of all the issues mentioned here, capacity building is the single most important element. For example, the political creation of an NFP by decree is only as useful as the actual operational capacity of the NFP itself. To operationalise an NFP, training and capacity building need to be provided. The same is true for every level of the implementation of a NAP whether in relation to governmental structures or civil society initiatives.
Monitoring and verification: The implementation of a NAP usually takes place over a five-year period and during this time there are many factors that can change and influence efforts to address the small arms problem. There is also a need to monitor and evaluate the impact of a NAP as it is being implemented. One way in which this important monitoring and verification can take place is by repeating the survey and workshopping activities first undertaken during the assessment phase, three years into the implementation of a NAP. The results of the two sets of surveys and workshops can then be compared, changes in the environment identified and activities under the NAP evaluated and, where necessary, altered accordingly. This monitoring and verification process will enable the NAP to be adapted where necessary, as well as allowing for lessons to be drawn for future small arms projects, and is crucial to ensuring the long term effectiveness of a NAP.