Chapter 3 Conclusions

In the conclusion an attempt is made to draw together findings from the nine case studies in the context of crime and crime prevention in the City of Nairobi. The conclusion highlights some of the salient characteristics of crime prevention in Nairobi as well as the implications for "best practice", given Nairobi"s past and present situation.

In order to arrive at useful and concrete conclusions, four analytical matrices were devised.

An analysis of crime prevention role players
Types of approaches to crime prevention
Range of best practices
Lessons learnt

1. Matrix of crime prevention role players

In this section I analyse what the case study stakeholders mentioned as those they saw as the "other role players" in crime prevention. This is an important reflection of the "cooperative mindset", which is essential if the stakeholders are to effectively pool their collective crime prevention resources.

The rating devised for this exercise was a star if a role player was explicitly mentioned as a stakeholder and a circle if a stakeholder was simply implied in the interviews. A blank space shows where there was no explicit or implicit mention of the stakeholder. A further simplification was that other role players in Nairobi, such as the criminal justice system and charity organisations, are not indicated in the matrix. Also, when a reference to "private security" was made, these were reflected in Figure 23 by the two private security firms that were interviewed in the study.¹

In Figure 20 there are discernable patterns of how the main role players perceive one another in the prevention of crime in Nairobi. The following are worthy of note.

Figure 20: Matrix of other role players

Only the Safer Cities Program held a holistic view with regard to whom it considered as key stakeholders in crime prevention. Except for vigilante groups, the SCP regarded organisations similar to the ones interviewed in this study as legitimate role players.
The Kenya Police Force has the most circumscribed view of the range of 'other' stakeholders in crime prevention. It considers itself, the NCC (grudgingly) and selective private organisations as representing the core of crime prevention in Nairobi. The Nairobi public, vigilante groups and private security, although implied, were not prominent from the police's viewpoint.
However, the Kenya Police Force is the crime prevention organisation most acknowledged by other stakeholders. The Nairobi City Council ran a close second in this regard.
Private sector organisations received a mixed bag of responses. This is not surprising, given their comparatively recent entry into the field.
Vigilante groups, again not unexpectedly, were not thought to be part of the crime prevention scene in Nairobi. This unanimous viewpoint is influenced by the lethal and vicious actions of some of Nairobi's notorious vigilantes such as the Mugiki. This is an irony, given some of the innovative work done by the likes of Zungu Zungu in Shauri Moyo. This situation also places vigilante groups as those with the fewest external linkages.
The 'public' is in an ambivalent position; only the NGOs surveyed and the vigilante groups directly referred to 'the public' as an important role player, and even then some of their references are implicit rather than explicit. More worrying is that the Kenya Police Force and the Nairobi City Council did not refer to the 'public' as part of their crime prevention strategies.
Also remarkable in the survey was the view by all stakeholders of their own importance as crime prevention stakeholders as well as that of others of similar constitution. In other words, security firms felt that other security firms were part of the crime prevention picture and so on.

2. Matrix of appreaches to crime prevention

Under this heading I look back to the predominant route or preference of the various stakeholders in their approaches to crime prevention.

These are classified as 'law enforcement', 'situational prevention' or 'social engineering'. Again a star was allocated to the main approach and circles to what were clearly secondary approaches. Please refer to
Figure 21.

Figure 21: Matrix of stakeholder approaches to crime prevention

Law enforcement is clearly the preferred or the commonest strategy in crime prevention in the organisations studied. This is the case with both institutions such as the Kenya Police or the Nairobi City Council Inspectorate that apply law enforcement as a primary tool, or other stakeholders (private sector security firms, residential associations and even vigilantes) who perceive law enforcement as an important component of crime prevention.
Situational prevention is as important as law enforcement. All stakeholders subscribe to this approach, either through 'visible presence' as in the placement of guards, foot and dog patrols, police information posts, alarm systems, electric fencing and others.

The Nairobi City Council and the two civil associations only directly mention social engineering as an approach to crime prevention. However, it is implicit in the Safer Cities Program and in the emergent Community Policing in the Kenya Police Force.

3. Range of best practices

Although there were a series of questions probing as to which best practices organisations thought had been effective, the answers were not straightforward. Some gave responses such as 'combinations of all existing strategies'. Other stakeholders did not really answer the question. I therefore resorted to picking out both explicit and implicit remarks, for example from their mention of inter-agency collaborations, to find salient pointers to best practices in specific organisations.

I investigated and noted the following range of clusters of 'best practices' derived from the nine case studies. Figure 22 is a compilation of the results. These are crime prevention features of note:

The Safer Cities Program, although in its infancy, has potentially the most comprehensive coverage of the issues raised as components of 'best practice' by the nine stakeholders of the study.
The Kenya Police Force was the most 'self satisfied' crime prevention stakeholder, with the least degree of 'innovative' thinking. This implies that the Police Force employs a more or less 'business as usual' approach.
The most comprehensive set of crime prevention 'best practices' comes from the private sector (WCDI) residents' associations, the NCBDA, commercial security firms and the vigilante group. They imply a broader interpretation of crime and crime prevention.
The Nairobi City Council too has a reasonably wide scope of what needs to be done in terms of 'best practices'. However, it is unique in that it is the only stakeholder that is concerned about the ambiguity of policing boundaries and the problems that emerge from overlapping jurisdictions.
The most consistent score, with 100% mention as 'best practice', emerges in three instances. The first is in 'the exchange of crime information'. Second is 'the need for goodwill and empowerment from the public and stakeholders'. Third is 'visibility through the presence of human, dogs and vehicle patrols'.

Figure 22: Best practices matrix

Scoring 87.7% equally are, firstly, the idea that residents should take it upon themselves to prevent crime, and secondly that there is a need for proper tools to prevent crime and promote policing generally.
A score of 75% was attained by landscaping as a security precaution, as well as the requirement to train both the police and 'non-police' in crime prevention approaches.
On its own at 63% of the scan was the application of security technologies in crime prevention.
At 50% score were the need to inform vulnerable groups in the city, increased manpower technically trained in crime prevention, the sharing of resources, and awareness that all stakeholders are pursuing the same objectives.
At 38% was the need for the police specifically to handle crime prevention with a 'softer public relations' approach.
At 25% was the need to clarify areas of crime prevention that were ambiguous.
Of least concern was the need to be aware of crime prevention boundaries and the overlapping of mandates.

4. Lessons learnt

The individual lessons that we can learn from the crime prevention officers, organisations and the situational dynamics of Nairobi have been pointed out in the individual case studies above. That set of findings informs us on what is necessary to overcome the present impasse. For Nairobi's crime prevention to function properly the following issues require keen attention:

There is a clear need for Nairobi to devise a 'vision' for the city and work on a 'mission' if possible of a 'people-friendly crime-free' city.
There is a need to develop a holistic short-, medium- and long-term crime prevention strategic plan for the city, agreed upon by all the city's stakeholders and its residents.
Possibly there is a need to set up an 'overseer' body which will foster coordinated work of the diverse crime prevention organisations. The sharing of crime prevention intelligence and resources could possibly emanate from such a body.
The funding of the individual organisations, commensurate with the levels of crime prevention tasks they are expected to play, must be thought out.
The mandates and operational objectives of individual organisations in the context of present-day Nairobi and for the foreseeable future must be revised.
Nairobi needs the infusion of and networking with modern communication technologies. This could increase the speed at which decisions are made across the board. The same can be said of the spread of proper equipment for crime prevention at different levels of crime prevention organisations.
Political interests and the Nairobi public need to be attuned to justice in the city. The Criminal Justice System needs to be seen to be just.
The people of Nairobi should be mobilised to openly participate in its crime prevention deliberations. Recognition and appreciation of crime prevention should be given where it is due.
All organisations should strive for a 'win-win' crime prevention mindset and strategies. This would of necessity entail increased levels of training, skills, competence, professionalism and the integrity of all stakeholders.

Notes

This does not necessarily mean that the stakeholder was referring to either Securicor Ltd or Secucenter Ltd.

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