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Case study 3: Nairobi city council inspectorate

1. Introduction

1.1. Role player: Nairobi City Council Inspectorate

The Nairobi City Council Inspectorate is the arm of the City Council which is mandated to prevent crime against Council property and personnel. It is therefore the closest the Nairobi City Council gets to 'policing' Nairobi. The Nairobi City Council in turn is the local authority which is mandated to manage the City of Nairobi.

1.1.1. Role players' mandate

The Local Government Authority Act determines the mandate of the NCCI, which falls under the Nairobi City Council Cap 265, which is an Act of Parliament. The Kenya Police Force's mandate has been described in the relevant section above. The mandates of the NCC Inspectorate are (i) to enforce the Council's by-laws; (ii) to protect Council property; (iii) to investigate crime against Council property and employees (if the offences are committed against public property the NCCI is also involved); and (iv) to prosecute offenders.

1.1.2. Structure and tasks

The NCCI organogram shown in Figure 7 summarises the tasks of the City Inspectorate within the Nairobi City Council structure.

Figure 7: The structure of the Nairobi City Council Inspectorate



This shows a clear division between administrative and operations departments, with the latter taking on the bulk of crime prevention functions. The crime prevention cluster consists of the following departments:
  • Enforcement Department
  • Traffic Department
  • Security Department
  • Animal Pounds Department
  • Monitoring Department
The other impression conveyed by the NCCI organogram is that of a cumbersome bureaucracy. What is depicted in Figure 7 is just part of the larger Nairobi City Council structure. The figure excludes other NCC technical departments and its political wings.

1.1.3. Area of jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of the NCCI and the NCC falls within the city of Nairobi boundaries, which happen to correspond with those of the Nairobi Provincial boundary.

Figure 8: Nairobi city constituencies



Within the city boundaries are eight constituencies, namely (i) Dagoretti, (ii) Langata, (iii) Westlands, (iv) Starehe, (v) Kamukunji, (vi) Makadara, (vii) Kasarani and (viii) Embakasi. These divisions are illustrated in Figure 8. The client base also falls within the City of Nairobi boundary. However the NCC's functional boundaries go beyond the provincial boundaries. Examples of these include the ownership of water resources such as dams, water sub-stations and water pipes, which are in the water catchment basins.

1.1.4. Image

The NCCI said that it was not satisfied with its own image. It felt that its low esteem was the result of constraints put upon it by politicians and politics, which negatively affected the day to- day running of the Council. Furthermore the Nairobi City Council was conscious that the Nairobi public perceived the organisation as a failure.1 The NCC felt that it needed the chance to explain the root causes of its failures.2

1.1.5. Other role players

The NCCI views the main role players in crime prevention in Nairobi as follows: (i) The Nairobi City Council and the NCCI itself, which enforces the city's by-laws. (ii) The Kenya Police Force, including the General Service Unit and Administrative Police. The NCCI's view is that the Kenya Police Force has the ultimate mandate in civilian policing in Nairobi and Kenya.3

1.2. Crime prevention mandate

The NCCI's mandate in crime prevention focuses around the investigation and prosecution of offenders of Nairobi city's by-laws. The mandate is derived from the Local Government Authority Act Cap 265 of the Laws of Kenya.

1.2.1. Links between fighting crime nationally and locally

The NCCI's main crime prevention tasks are limited to by-law enforcement locally within the City of Nairobi. In its endeavours the NCCI links with the Kenya Police Force, which has not only a local, but also a national crime prevention mandate. The fact that Nairobi is the commercial hub of not only Kenya but East Africa as well means that the national and international problems of crime manifest themselves perhaps most intensely in Nairobi. In this way the national problems of crime prevention are also to a great extent Nairobi's problem.

1.2.2. Crime prevention initiatives at a metropolitan level

The NCCI informs us that its efforts at crime prevention in Nairobi are random. The personnel basically respond to a given crime situation which is perceived to be getting out of order. The NCCI focuses only on crime prevention which falls in its city by-law docket. Therefore there are no conscious links with the efforts of other stakeholders.

1.3. Partnership

1.3.1. Structure of partnerships

The NCCI works with the Kenya Police Force,4 private sector non-profit organisations, charities and neighbourhood associations. These partnerships are complex, as each partner in turn is related to other crime prevention stakeholders.

1.3.2. Partnership relationships

The NCC partnership with the Kenya Police Force is mainly ad hoc, due to the needs of security, which vary from time to time. The police are comparatively better equipped than the NCCI. The force's crime prevention operations are integrated at the higher levels and the NCC stated that it could not do without the Kenya Police.

Figure 9: Nairobi City Council crime prevention partnerships



The NCC is the de facto official member of neighbourhood associations. But this only applies to registered associations and this is the only way it relates to civil organisations. The NCC's relationship with the NCBDA is similar to that of neighbourhood associations. Both the NBCDA and neighbourhood associations are `guided' by the Kenya Police Force in matters of crime prevention.

1.3.3. Functionality of partnerships

The NCC feels that the partnership with the Kenya Police is working very well, as the latter supplements the work of the NCC. The NCC is of the opinion that it is working well with the NCBDA and neighbourhood associations in the following ways:
  • In the gathering of crime and crime prevention intelligence
  • Control of illegal structures in residential areas
  • Information on what the residents' desires are in their areas.
1.3.4. Key elements that hold the partnerships together

The Nairobi City Council elements that hold the partnerships together are as follows. The NCC-Kenya Police Force partnership works because they share and exchange information and skills related to crime prevention. The need for the rule of law draws them together. For example the NCC does not have holding cells and so they have to cooperate
with the Police, who have these facilities at police stations. The partnership holds together at the Law Courts as well. Elements that link the NCC with neighbourhood associations and charitable groups are donations and assistance they pass onto the city. Recent examples were a donation of 27 television sets, which were distributed to NCCI camps in Nairobi.

1.3.5. Frequency of meetings

Most of the crime prevention stakeholders meet on a daily basis through radiotelephone communications. Meetings are as a rule held when the need arises. There are no fixed meeting schedules.

1.3.6. Resource sharing

The NCCI shares police force resources on a continuous basis. The Kenya Police Force's human resources are valued by the NCCI for their skills and expertise. NCCI personnel are often trained by the Police Force, as at the Police College Kiganjo. Also valued is the use of police communications equipment and facilities by the NCCI. Neighbourhood associations as well as the NCBDA share knowledge, information and skills.

2. Crime prevention approach

The NCCI crime prevention initiatives are more or less in the traditional line of approaches found in civic society. They include
  • Patrols and beats, which run on a 24-hour basis
  • Reception of complaints from the public on incidents of crime
The mass media, often very critical of the NCCI, is considered an 'external initiative' which keeps the organisation on its toes.

2.1. Philosophy on crime and crime prevention

The NCCI perceives crime as a phenomenon related to the increased levels of urbanization in the recent past. This especially applies to areas of the city of Nairobi that have unplanned structures or settlements. Therefore the NCCI argues that there is a need to 'replan' and 'plan'.26 Its philosophy around crime prevention thus centres on the need for sensitisation and public awareness, for reducing poverty and the numbers of the unemployed and applying equal justice for all. These the NCCI felt would substantially reduce or eradicate some crime problems.

2.2. Meaning of crime prevention

Crime prevention to the NCC has two important meanings. The first is that Council property, and hence public property, is protected from loss and damage by criminals. It also means that street hawkers are controlled in Nairobi's 'sensitive' areas. Successful crime prevention would also mean that the NCC would not receive complaints from the public regarding its performance.

2.3. Crime prevention approaches

There are two main approaches to crime prevention. The first is visible policing through daytime patrols and night beats. It is claimed that the presence of NCCI police scares the criminal element and reassures the law-abiding citizen.27 The second approach is acting in conjunction with the police for a fast and efficient flow of crime-related information to its operational units. Planning for crime prevention: the case of the City of Nairobi 6

2.4. Adoption of crime prevention approaches

The NCC insists that crime prevention approaches adopted are consistent with the law (i.e. the Local Government Authority Act). Under Section 259 of the Act of 1978, officers of the NCC Inspectorate are `authorized enforcement officers', with powers of arrest without a warrant of persons in breach of the aforementioned Act or the by-laws of the City of Nairobi. The NCC inspectors may detain and then hand over the offender to the Kenya Police

2.4.1. Models considered

Other 'models' of crime prevention really cover the normal range of infrastructure undertaking expected of any local authority. The NCCI mentioned the following as necessary to improve matters; (a) functional street lighting and traffic lights, (b) youth projects which aim to empower the youth and keep them busy and (c) social infrastructure such as social halls, sports stadiums, exposure to the electronic media and others.

2.4.2. Local developments

The above approaches to crime prevention were part and parcel of the local government traditions handed down by the departed British in the early 1960s. Arising from the problems of maintenance, repair and financial non-sustainability, several generations of Nairobi's population have missed exposure to some of the infrastructure intervention types of crime prevention approaches.

The NCCI concedes that latter-day models are basically foreign models that have come back through business people and some Nairobi City Council Officers traveling overseas and copying overseas ideas on crime prevention.

2.5. Jurisdiction

2.5.1. Crimes overlooked

By focusing on by-law enforcement, the NCC has overlooked other types of crimes, such as domestic violence that happens in residential areas, the molestation of street children all over the city and Nairobi's sex workers.

These omissions, the NCCI maintains, are taken care of by other stakeholders. The public has been traditionally sensitised to the undesirability of domestic violence by government chiefs in low-income areas of Nairobi.

Furthermore the NCCI believes that the route of the Juvenile Courts is the best way to deal with prevention of crime by those under age. The root cause of juvenile delinquency and the persistence of sex workers, the NCCI maintains, is the moral decay of Kenyan society.

2.5.2. Crime prevention and the metropolitan vision

The NCCI maintains that there has not been a metropolitan vision by the Council, given the length of time it has taken even to review the 1973 Nairobi Strategic Plan. It is only now that the Safer Cities Program is at hand that Nairobi's City Council may eventually evolve a metropolitan vision on crime prevention.

2.5.3. Beneficiaries of the approach

The beneficiaries of crime prevention are conceptualised by the City of Nairobi as follows: (a) foreign and local investors; (b) the Government of Kenya through the taxes paid by investors; (c) Council property and council employees and (d) law-abiding citizens of Nairobi.

2.6. Process

2.6.1. Role players and the process

As far as the NCCI is concerned the major role-player in crime prevention in Nairobi is the Kenya Police. The NCCI's links with the Kenya Police are clear. Historically, the Kenya Police concentrated in crime and the NCC on the crimes related to breaking the City's by-laws. It was basically a parallel strategy process.

The NCC's involvement with neighbourhood associations in crime prevention came out of a realisation by the Council that the NCC could not manage the city alone, and that mutual understanding and a working relationship would be beneficial to all stakeholders.

Other role players have been drawn into the NCCI's processes because of the NCC's legal obligations to the city and its residents. This has forced the NCCI into the process of interaction with other stakeholders.

2.6.2. The catalyst

According to the NCCI, the catalyst for the evolution of a crime prevention course of action was several factors.

The NCC evaluated itself in terms of what it was achieving and its shortcomings. The behaviour of the Nairobi citizens within their environment was not encouraging. There was an increasingly filthy city, disregard for the law, and a lack of ethics and morality. There was the realisation of a resource handicap facing the NCC in terms of workplace skills and expertise, finances, transport and communications.

The catalyst for the interaction with neighbourhood associations was a realisation of the inadequacies of not only the NCC but also the whole system of service delivery. It was realised, firstly, that the NCC could not carry out all the functions it was mandated to provide and secondly that residents' associations were simply trying to fill the gaps.

2.6.3. Role players involved in the conceptualisation of approaches

As already pointed out, the concept of the Kenya Police Force's crime prevention and that of the Nairobi City Council have historic roots in the separate policing of different facets of the city concurrently.

The neighbourhood associations developed their own concepts as to their major problems, which incidentally encompassed the problems of infrastructure, garbage collection and security. Thus the conceptualisation of crime prevention was sporadic and arose piecemeal.

2.6.4. Mediation of priorities

Different parts of Nairobi, such as the central business district and residential neighbourhoods, had a diversity of needs that required to be addressed. The priorities were put forward by, for example, associations deciding what their priorities were. Once priorities were decided these were related to the NCC to determine how to jointly solve the problems at hand.

2.6.5. Start of initiatives

Crime prevention initiatives and the interaction between the NCC and other stakeholders started in the early 1990s. This is when Nairobi stakeholders realised that there was an extensive breakdown in law and order and that they needed one another to make meaningful incursions into the crime problems of the city.

2.6.6. Origins of the initiatives

The initiatives first came from businesspersons, who tried to convince the NCC and the Kenya Police to accept their ideas. It was then realised by both the political wing, i.e. counselors and the technical sections of the Council, the Chief Officers, that the Council was unable to deliver and hence the decision to take part in partnerships.

In residential associations it was the residents who prompted the initiatives, as I shall see in the neighbourhood association section of this study.

2.6.7. Strategy design and development
    2.6.7.1. Actual strategy development

    When working in crime prevention with neighbourhood associations, the NCC solicited information as regards (i) the background of the residents; (ii) their socioeconomic status; (iii) involvement in crime prevention; and (iv) who was crucial and able and willing to work.

    2.6.7.2. Local models

    There were no local models to rely on as barometers of strategy development.

    2.6.7.3. Case studies that informed the development process

    There were no specific case studies to inform the development of the initiatives. However, senior Council members who went out on international courses in countries such as Pakistan, Japan, Italy and Britain came back with ideas and suggestions which the NCCI attempted to feed into their understanding of the situation.

    Otherwise the NCCI simply looked out for 'indicators' of the 'problems going away'. These included (a) compliments from the public through the media or by word of the mouth; (b) human traffic flowing through markets and streets; (c) fewer cases of reported crime.

    2.6.7.4. Role of the city and other players

    The NCCI attempted to get their closest working constituents, hawkers or street vendors, to work together to try solve some of their problems to mutual advantage. This was done through various forums with the Association of Hawkers. The NCCI conceded that this did not really work out successfully.

2.7. Description of strategy

2.7.1. Crime prevention strategies

NCCI's crime prevention strategies have been biased towards the enforcement of its by-laws. At the time of the field interviews the NCC was amending some of its outdated and ambiguous by-laws through its legal department. In this process, the NCCI has made recommendations in areas where there is laxity.

A second strategy in crime prevention is through the sensitisation of the public. This, for example, takes the form of the NCCI pointing out to hawkers the lack of security in their typical working environments and the opportunities afforded to criminals. The NCC and the Association of Hawkers carried out this aspect of sensitisation, but without much success. A third strategy is visible policing of the NCCI's areas of jurisdiction, where the NCCI inspectors and askaris go on patrols.

2.7.2. The catalyst

The catalysts for initiation of crime prevention strategies were (i) self-evaluation by the NCCI, which was not very favourable; (ii) the generally negative behaviour of the people of Nairobi with regard to NCCI by-law enforcement tasks; (iii) being resource handicapped, as in lacking expertise, skills, finances, and a transportation and communications infrastructure.

2.7.3. The main components of the strategies

There are four basic strategies employed by the NCCI. These include the following.
  • The prime strategy is by-law enforcement, whose objective is that Nairobi's citizens keep the law. The desired outcomes here are that the NCCI enhances its revenue collection; there is environmental cleanliness and fewer public nuisances.
  • A course of public sensitisation is planned, with the three objectives of extending the benefit of services to all; providing alternatives to 'restlessness' within the Nairobi public and persuading the subdued populace to listen to reason. The desired outcome is feedback to the NCC, a change to more 'responsive' behaviour and a more cooperative attitude by Nairobi's population.
  • Visible policing by uniformed officers has three strategy objectives: to communicate with the public; engender positive public associations with uniformed officers; and to undermine the role of criminals. The desired outcome in this strategy is that there should be less resistance to NCC law enforcement, that the public would identify NCC officers with 'order'; that the NCC should receive feedback through word of mouth and that potential public protests should be short-circuited.
  • The objectives of the strategy of financial penalties are revenue collection for NCC coffers; disciplining the population and countering crime. The sole desired outcome is the reduction of specific nuisances.
2.7.4. Implementation of strategies

The different parts of Nairobi face a different range of criminal problems that relate to the NCCI's work. Priorities were mediated by looking at the specific problems of a neighbourhood and the NCCI addressing them, and by suggesting solutions with the stakeholders in the neighbourhood.

2.7.5. Start of initiatives

The thinking on crime prevention initiatives started in the early 1990s. It was at this time that it was realised that there was a general breakdown in law and order and that there was a need for the various stakeholders to communicate with one another.

2.7.6. Emphasis of the strategy

The emphasis in crime prevention has been to review the NCC by-laws and give them some muscle as an effective deterrent in the range of objectives they are supposed to attain. The emphasis in by-law enforcement lies in making sure that offenders feel the force of the law.

2.7.7. Current emphasis of strategies

The current emphasis in crime prevention lies with the removal of illegal hawkers.7 The NCCI states that it has established that a large number or concentrations of hawkers coincide with high records of criminal activities. Enforcement has been undertaken in the CBD by drawing a line where hawkers may and may not operate.

2.7.8. Problems with strategies

The Inspectorate is inclined to believe that the financial penalties for breaking by-laws are very low. Another problem is keeping the offender in place to face the law. Furthermore, it is the Kenya Police that prepares the summons and the Law Courts that execute justice. When loopholes in the criminal justice system are unfairly exploited they compound to make the Inspectorate's crime prevention strategies ineffective.

3. Implementation

3.1. Strategy Implementation

Crime prevention by the NCCI is implemented through three major strategies (i) by-law enforcement; (ii) neighbourhood associations; (iii) links with the Kenya Police Force.

3.2. Monitoring crime prevention

Crime prevention is monitored by conventional policing methods; by-law enforcement in the field is by communication through radiotelephones, which are distributed to NCCI officers. These radiotelephones are set at the same frequency as those of the Kenya Police. By-law infringements are also monitored by a 'daily return' by the officer on the ground. A third method is by a system of 'court returns'.

Monitoring crime prevention with neighbourhood associations involves NCCI's officers' communicating on a more or less daily basis through radiotelephones and as the need arises. Radiotelephone links whereby NCCI officers are able to access police communications is the manner of monitoring crime occurrences and indirectly preventing crime with the Police Force.

3.3. Timeframe

The above initiatives are traditional programmes within the NCCI crime prevention regime. Implementations are not really new initiatives with time frames but are ongoing 24-hour operations.

3.4. Sharing resources

Budgets for the NCCI's crime prevention initiatives are derived, like those of other NCC departments, from the City of Nairobi's budget coming from its revenue collection arm. The Ministry of Local Government, however, approves the City's budgets.

3.5. Implementation of the strategy

3.5.1. The implementation of the crime prevention approach

The NCCI estimates that approximately 60% of Nairobi's by-laws are obsolete, but hitherto there has not been the political will to alter them. However, there was anticipation that the new NARC Government would provide a lead in this direction.

Crime prevention through work with neighbourhood associations was proceeding. This was done at various levels. The NCCI felt that it was easier to work at the higher level, where several associations conglomerated into a zonal branch. However the NCCI noted that there were no legal obligations to force unwilling parties to work together. NCCI strongly felt that some associations were formed specifically to fight the City Council. This particularly applied to the Karengata Association.8

Visible uniformed patrolling and the applications of financial penalties are ongoing and continuous strategies.

3.5.2. Effective crime prevention approaches

There are a number of encouraging strategies that are working presently. These include the following.
  • The NCC collaboration with the NCBDA to rehabilitate public conveniences is working well. These are now clean and continuously maintained. A second benefit is that people are no longer mugged as they leave these conveniences as often occurred in the past.
  • The police are clearly communicating with and giving NCCI feedback when the need arises.
  • With regard to public security firms, the NCCI felt that there was an urgent need to clarify jurisdiction, especially relating to who had the power to arrest suspects.
3.5.3. The work of intra-agency and inter-agency crime prevention

The NCCI was very clear about its efforts at working with other stakeholders in crime prevention. It concluded the following. Relationship with the police
  • Each organisation/stakeholder needed to be aware of its legal boundaries/ jurisdiction.9
  • Crossing over into other stakeholders' mandates was unhealthy for the objectives of cooperation.
  • It was a certainty that stakeholders were fighting the same fight - i.e. against crime, and there was a need to keep this uppermost in the minds of the two stakeholders.
Conclusions relating to the NCCI's experiences with neighbourhood associations were that:
  • There was plenty of goodwill as well as hostility towards the NCC.
  • Their mutual dependence was recognised. In the working relationships with the private security sector, the NCCI concluded that:
  • The private sector empowered the NCC through their material contributions.
  • The legal framework was more or less correct.
  • There was need for the regulation of some of the stakeholders in the private sector.

4. Best practice and lessons learnt

4.1. Best practices: major achievements of the approaches

There are many possible indices that could be applied to gauge the achievements or successes of the Inspectorate's work. However, time did not allow for such an elaborate undertaking. I have instead applied two recent statistical indicators to determine the NCCI's success in crime prevention. The first are criminal cases brought to court related to Nairobi City Council property. There are three main categories: (i) general theft; (ii) fraud; (iii) forgery. The trends between 1995 and 2002 are illustrated in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Criminal cases reported 1995 - 2002



What the figure shows is a general rise in all the three categories of cases, with the category of general theft of Council property being the most significant. The above does not reflect well on the success of crime prevention.

The second indicator of the impact of crime is statistics related to by-law enforcement in the Nairobi CBD. The following six categories are applied in this analysis (i) cases received; (ii) cases fined; (iii) cases discharged; (iv) cases pending; (v) cases resulting in imprisonment and cases where fines were paid. Figure 11 illustrates the trends between January and August 2002.

Figure 11: Nairobi CBD by-law enforcement returns



Figure 11 shows that there are a large number of court returns, which vary from month to month. Charging fines features prominently as the Inspectorate's favoured solution in court cases, fines which, it should be noted, only a fraction are paid. A final observation is that there is a large gap between the total number of cases received and the total number of subsequent actions the Inspectorate can effect. This implies that many cases are neither fined, paid, discharged, pending nor the offenders imprisoned. It is reasonable to conclude that this is a questionable reflection on the efficiency of the Inspectorate.

4.2. Lessons learnt

4.2.1. Shortcomings of the approaches The NCCI considers the following as major shortcomings in crime prevention.
  • Political interference and conflicts of interest in crime prevention occur not only with regard to by-law enforcement but also to the other operational requirements of the NCC.
  • Whilst the NCCI is grateful to the Kenya Police Force for its provision of holding cells for NCCI's lawbreakers, it feels that the Kenya Police has let the NCCI down by many of its decisions. A persistent example is the granting of cash bail to people who cannot be later traced to face court charges.
  • The failure of the Criminal Justice System; Law Court decisions in particular are not encouraging the tasks that the NCCI needs to accomplish and relay to the public.
  • There is disappointment with the moral values of society generally and Nairobians specifically. Examples were given of people quite happy to accept all manner of suspect or stolen goods without question. The degeneration of the society's moral values, the NCCI pointed out, was exemplified by a wave of ruthless and lawless vigilante groups which found space in Nairobi.31
  • Last but not least was the public's perception of the NCC and other public law enforcement officers as 'enemies' and not 'friends' of the public. The NCCI lamented that this did not help their cause.
4.2.2. Lessons learnt

The lessons leant by the Inspectorate with respect to crime prevention revolve around the following five issues; (i) political interference, (ii) working with the Kenya Police, (iii) the Criminal Justice system, (iv) the social morality of Kenyan society and (v) the perception of the Nairobi City Council as 'the enemy' by the Nairobi public. The actual lessons learnt are now outlined. The lessons the Inspectorate has learnt in relationship to political inference are: (i) the NCC technical officers are not in direct contact with its politicians, i.e. the city's counselors and politicians at the national level; (ii) politicians often override and/or on many occasions contradict NCC policy; and (iii) the Council and Inspectorate have yet to find a formula on how to positively influence politicians.

In their work with the Kenya Police Force, the lessons learnt are as follows: (i) there are communication problems (blockages) at different levels of the police organisation; (ii) the Police are allowed to make judgments that may counter NCC's positive intentions and messages to the public; and (iii) there is a definite image problem connected to and brought about by the low esteem Council officers feel they are held in the eyes of the Kenya Police.

With regard to the Criminal Justice system, the Inspectorate has learnt the following lessons: (i) The low penalties (or no penalties) that the CJS imposes on offenders reinforces negative attitudes to NCC laws. It is strongly felt by the Inspectorate that the penalties and punishment meted out are not commensurate with the criminal offences committed.11 (ii) Council by-laws are obsolete and are obstructive to justice. (iii) Prosecution Officers, i.e. the Kenya Police, often frustrate the NCC through their use of loopholes in the law. The Inspectorate's view is that the legal regime needs to be tightened up. The Inspectorate has problems with the decline in the social morality of Kenyans in the past few decades. Lessons arising from these problems include (i) criminals and offenders appear to have become celebrities, if not some sort of heroes or heroines, to society; and (ii) Nairobians crave material property at any cost.

A final set of lessons learnt are those to do with the NCC being perceived as 'the enemy'. These lessons, according to the Inspectorate arise from: (i) the lack within the NCC of a Public Relations Department or office or a Council spokesperson; (ii) the failure of the Council to put across a 'Council Image' or 'Council Vision' to the public and prospective investors;12 and (iii) the difficulties that the public face and the misapprehension of the role of the Council and need for law enforcement means that the image of the council as the 'enemy' persists.

4.3. Planning considerations

4.3.1. Crime prevention strategy within development strategy

Part of the NCCI and NCC's problems is that the City of Nairobi has not had a holistic Development Strategy Plan for three decades. The last attempt at a plan for the city was the Nairobi Strategic Plan of 1973, and even this plan was not fully implemented. Nairobi City has been operating by extending elements of the 1948 Master Plan.

Therefore I can gather that the recent crime prevention initiatives in fact did not have a legal and functional overarching, strategic citywide plan to use as a base. However at the time of the study initiatives towards filling in the strategic plan gaps were on the way. These, it was felt, would be accelerated by the new NARC Government, which is determined to solve the impasse of the last twenty years or so. More specifically the NCCI's crime prevention strategy is evolving under the Safer Cities Program initiative. This initiative is covered elsewhere in this study.

4.3.2. Working with existing metropolitan crime prevention strategy

The City Planning Department is currently working with the Safer Cities Program, and thus crime prevention will now become part of their concerns. However, up to the point of the SCP initiative, the City Planning Department was a traditional planning department concerned with the provision of infrastructure and other council services. Crime did not fall in the docket of the City Council's Planning Department.

4.3.3. Lessons for planning departments

The NCCI was concerned with the erosion of professionalism and poor ethics in planning in Nairobi that had taken place in the past three decades. An example of this affecting crime prevention was the inadequate consideration of basic needs such as access roads for the Inspectorate, police and other life-saving services like fire-engines and ambulances. Access roads are often lacking in Council-approved layouts.

The NCCI also felt that the Planning Department should create space in their plans for existing and new developments for (i) police posts and police booths; (ii) social and recreational amenities.13 The department should also consider in its designs the potential disasters of the gated communities that have become the norm in Nairobi.

4.3.4. Crime prevention and the planning department

Crime prevention was not central to the NCC's Planning Department. In the previous decades the people respected the law generally and the Police Force and council by-laws specifically. However with the growth in Nairobi's population, and increase in unemployment and poverty, lawlessness increased. As mentioned above, however, the Planning Department is now considering crime prevention under the Safer Cities Program.

4.4. Benefits for local government

4.4.1. Local government benefits from this study

The City Inspectorate felt that securer and safer local governments might be the outcome of this study.

4.4.2. Local authority benefits from this study

Several potential benefits were pointed out. These were that the study could:
  • Help the NCC get authentic answers to its problems
  • Encourage an exchange of knowledge, expertise and skills
  • Function as a means for other stakeholders to appreciate the circumstances of the NCC
  • Act as a tool to empower NCC personnel
  • Create good rapport between the NCC and other stakeholders
  • Act as a means to improve the NCC and NCCI crime prevention infrastructure
4.4.3. Required support for local authority in improving crime prevention

The NCCI stated that it required support from stakeholders, present and potential. More specifically, the NCCI felt that support in the following areas would improve crime prevention:
  • The tools and equipment for crime prevention. These included vehicles for transportation, radiotelephones, computers,14 uniforms, and CCTV.
  • Revision and updating of the by-laws. The NCCI felt that the existing legislation was not proactive, that the law should not be used only as a `stick', implying that the `carrot' was missing in the legislation.
  • Human Resources Development for the NCC and the Nairobi public at large. The major concerns were that the recruitment of personnel should be proper and functional. There is a need for specialised 'hands-on' training in crime prevention and the management of cities, and the exchange of 'best practice' experiences.
  • Help was needed with the problems that arose from political interference that threatened and impeded the work of not only the NCCI but also the City Council in general.
  • The sensitisation of the Nairobi public to the need to respect Council property, by-laws and themselves. A stumbling block, the NCCI felt, was the Nairobi `mindset' that desired free or very inexpensive NCC services, whilst the same citizens, in the same income bracket, were quite happy and willing to pay twice as much for equivalent private services, as in rental housing.

Notes

This view coincides with the generally negative media reports of its ongoing activities such as the harassment of physically challenged hawkers in the Nairobi CBD.
The NCC states that factors contributing to its failure were "negative politics leading to bad governance and institutional management". It was claimed that the Local Government Amendment Act of 1985 removed decision making power from the local government to central government. At this point the Chief Officers (the Council"s technocrats) lost control to the political elements.
Although there was subsequent discussion on neighbourhood associations and the public as role players in crime prevention, this was not mentioned at the beginning of my interview.
During an interview conducted for this study, one of the inspector"s radios caught a police alarm of a robbery that was taking place at Nairobi"s city centre. This perhaps demonstrated the good working relationships at the higher level between the NCCI and the Police.
A suggestion presented at one of the interviews was that Nairobi needed to grow vertically in order to absorb the densities of people and activities that had built up over the past few decades.
Despite of this NCCI positive image of itself, media coverage of some of their `atrocities" paint the opposite picture.
An illegal hawker is defined as one who is operating a trade without the required NCC license.
One could sense the bitterness of the NCCI officials, as Karengata Association deprives the NCC of large source of rates earnings. The NCC officials referred to Karengata acting "like the master". There was also fear that the success of the Karengata fight against the NCC through the law courts could encourage other associations to follow this litigation route.
Implicit in this were "political" and "financial" boundaries.
"Is mob justice acceptable?" BBC News. 13 October 2000.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/taking_point/debates/african/965299.stm
An example of this that was narrated at one of my interviews with the Inspectorate is that the fine one pays for having made an illegal water connection and built, for example, a complete large threebedroom home over a period of several months, is less than what it takes to ensure a proper connection. Thus the Inspectorate argues that unscrupulous building contractors follow the logic that it is much cheaper for them to make illegal connection and pay the insignificant fine, if they are found out!
The Nairobi City Council is supposed to have a website, but the project has not taken off. What there is a not very user-friendly website provided by what appears to be an institution of learning. The site requires "authorisation" etc at http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~nairobi/citycouncilintro.html The City Council did not have a website at the time of this survey.
The NCCI believes that social and recreational amenities would keep the "idlers" and the youth busy.
Nairobi City Council operations are not computerised. The few computers that are in place are used as typewriters.



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