Case study 2: The Kenya Police Force
1. Introduction
From a law enforcement viewpoint, the Kenya Police Force (KPF) is the government's prime enforcer of civil law and order countrywide.1 Its historical foundation has already been pointed out above. Crime prevention by the Kenya Police Force in Nairobi is therefore driven by the force's jealous guardianship of the sole mandate the Kenyan constitution bestows on it as the primary government civil security apparatus.In crime prevention, Kenya Police's leading role is backed by continuous police statistical monitoring of what it sees as the major security threats in Nairobi. Those involved in determining the security needs of the city form a small, tight 'closed shop' of senior police officers sitting at the Provincial Police Office who meet once a month: the Provincial Security Committee, (PSC) or a Special PSC in the case of a particular eventuality. 2
Hitherto the Kenya Police has allowed civil society a severely circumscribed role in crime prevention. However, it is grudgingly accepting the potential contributions of other stakeholders in crime prevention. This `opening up' to the influences of the wider civil society is expected to accelerate since the coming to power of the NARC Government in December 2002.
The following are what the Kenya Police Force regards as Nairobi's security problems. In order of priority, the police's security concerns are:
- The proliferation of small arms
- The influx of Somali refugees who trade in illegal arms
- The involvement of members of the police force in crimes, especially
carjacking and robbery with violence
- The involvement of its CID, Traffic Police and Airport Police “in
corruption with impunity”
- The acquisition of powerful modern arms by criminals
- The lack of equipment in the Police Force
- The destabilising struggle for power among senior
Kenya Police commanders
- Corruption in the Judiciary.
1.1. Role player: Kenya Police Force
The Kenya Police Force holds a strongly ingrained belief that it has the sole mandate in matters of policing in Nairobi specifically and Kenya generally.
The mandate of the Kenya Police Force is as follows:3
- The protection of life and property
- Maintenance of law and order
- Investigation of crime
- Apprehension of offenders
- Prosecution of offenders
- First aid at accident spots
- Teaching the public road safety.
In Nairobi city the Kenya Police Force is a hierarchical organisation under the control of the Provincial Police Office, located in Upper Hill. The legal basis of the Kenya Police is the CAP 84 Laws of Kenya Police Act.
The Provincial Police Office covers the same administrative jurisdiction as the Nairobi City Council and the Nairobi Province (refer to Figure 5).
There are 25 police stations in Nairobi.4 This excludes the police posts at sports grounds and specialist police units found within the city.5 The dispersal of the 25 police stations clearly follows the historic path of Nairobi's development. They are concentrated near the core of the city, where the town first evolved in three distinct corridors: the African townships in present day Madaraka and Kamukunji constituencies; the Asian residential areas, presently the Starehe and parts of the Westlands constituencies; and the European suburbs spreading from Westlands in the north to Langata in the west.
From a spatial perspective there would appear to be a deficit of police stations in the corridors of relatively high population density between Langata-Dagoretti and Westlands, as well as between the Kasarani and Makadara constituencies.
Figure 5: Kenya Police stations in Nairobi
1.1.3. Kenya Police Force image
The self-image and the public image of the Kenya Police Force are extremely negative for a combination of reasons. I start with the Police Force's image of itself and then point out reasons for a similar negative image held by the public.
The Police Force itself is aware of its own negative image and acknowledges this to be true.6 Senior officers inform junior police officers of the negative image held by the public at police fora from time to time. The print and electronic media portray the public image of the police as negative. Adjectives used to describe the force include 'an occupying army', 'brutal', 'confrontational', 'poor relationship with the public', 'poor handling of themselves in public', 'the inadequate handling of prosecution cases' and the like.
Several reasons have been advanced for the overwhelmingly negative image of the Kenya Police Force. First, there is the alleged corruption in the recruitment process, where those with connections, money, and family relationships with those already in the force are recruited. Critics point out that such recruits are not necessarily ideal police material.7 Secondly, it has been noted that the training at the Kenya Police College, Kiganjo, is still run on a curriculum of the 'colonial police framework'.8 A third reason is that there is a real lack of interest on part of the police in letting the public know what the police do.9 A fourth reason that has been put forward is that the policemen's negative attitudes are due to their very poor working conditions.10
An attempt was made to quantify the extent of the generally negative image through a systematic analysis of Internet reportage, but this exercise was abandoned due to time constraints.
Beside itself, the Kenya Police Force today considers the following to be significant role players in crime prevention in Nairobi City. The first is the Nairobi Central Business District Association (The NCBDA), a security and `city beautiful' NGO.11 The NCBDA also features in this report. Second and third in the Kenya Police list are the Manu Chandaria Foundation and Kenya Breweries Limited.12 The press is the fourth role-player, according to the police. The press is held in high esteem by the police, especially when it highlights exemplary police work leading to promotions.
From the above I can assume that the Kenya Police Force views itself as the central, if not the sole, role player in crime prevention in Nairobi. All other crime prevention players mentioned have the common characteristic of recognising the Kenya Police Force's problems and undertaking significant corporate investments to assist the Police.
1.2. Crime prevention mandate
The Kenya Police Force is part of the law enforcement arm of the Government of Kenya, with the mandate to prevent crime.13
As far as the Kenya Police Force is concerned, there are definite links in terms of policy and operations between what happens at the national level and the local policing activities that take place in Nairobi city. From a policing perspective, Nairobi city is privileged in that all the Kenya Police institutions are concentrated in the city, unlike the rest of Kenya, where not all districts have a Kenya Police Force Department. The `national-local' link is especially strong given that the city of Nairobi is the capital of Kenya, the political and commercial hub of the
country.
Within the Kenya Police Force, it is ironic that the internal departmental linkages appear to be weak. The various departments of the Kenya Police Force do not interact or support one another nearly as much as would be expected. Kenya Police Departments tend to operate independently; there is definitely a `silo' mindset.14 In the previous sections I noted that the Kenya Police has been historically solely in-charge of policing; it has not considered the initiatives of civil society in crime prevention to be central to police policies or operations. Therefore, coordination between initiatives within metropolitan Nairobi is absent or very limited.15 The case studies on civil society elsewhere in this report demonstrate the limited extent of the coordination of their crime prevention initiatives with those of the Kenya Police.
1.3. Partnerships
The Kenya Police is in `partnership' with a number of Nairobi city stakeholders. These include (a) the Nairobi City Council, (b) Community crime prevention associations and, indirectly, with vigilante groups.
Existing partnerships are conceptualised and structured in such a way that the Kenya Police Force is the superior partner and other stakeholders are the inferior partners in the cooperation. However, the increasing acceptance of a more open civil society in Kenya, through multi-party politics and the recent NARC victory at the 2002 general elections, emphasises the need for a more equitable partnership.16
The Police Force partnership with the NCC takes place in a limited number of areas. These include court prosecutions, where the police have specific mandates that they carry out on behalf of the NCC. However, I could not discern any partnership in the development of crime prevention policies. The policy divisions are quite clear to both role players; the police maintain law and order and the NCC enforces by-laws.
Partnerships hold together in the areas where the services of one partner reinforce those of the other. Examples in the Kenya Police/NCC partnership include
- The preparation of charge sheets
- Criminal law procedures
- Security backup when the NCC is raiding illicit liquor dens, collecting Council debts, provision of security at Council pay points, and so on.
Partnerships with communities/vigilante groups assume different forms. In middle and high-income residential areas police-community partnerships take the form of the traditional support of enthusiastic Police Reserves, who reside in such areas. There are hardly any partnerships in low-income settlements because these are in essence `no-go' areas for the Police Force, at least those in uniform.
As a general rule, the stakeholders in crime prevention go to the police if they need to communicate or interact with the police. The reverse does not apply. The frequency of meetings is not fixed. Meetings take place when the police need to convey new policies, on national holidays or days of celebration and when there are crises. The police will also meet the private sector stakeholders when, for example, receiving donations.
1.3.6. Resource sharing
The police contribution to resource sharing lies in policing expertise and ideas; otherwise the police are dependent on the goodwill of partners who wish to assist them. The opinion was expressed in the interview that the police budget was inadequate for the police work that needs to be undertaken in Nairobi.
2. Crime prevention approaches
2.1. Crime prevention initiativesAs a force, the Kenya Police's approach to crime prevention assumes traditional police force methodologies. Aside from community policing, on the whole the Police Force is not noted for its initiatives in crime prevention. The picture that emerges is one of crime prevention initiatives originating from civil society and then being adopted by the police.
There are several crime prevention initiatives, some of which may be considered really innovative in the context of Nairobi, and others that are more or less tried and tested police methods that are found in any police force.
Notable examples in the first category include the Police Force's partnership with the Nairobi Central Business District Association (The NCBDA) and We Can Do It (WCDI); the latter an amalgamation of Nairobi residential associations. Closely allied to these NGOs are the nonprofit/charity club organisations that openly recognise and reward police work, such as SRIC, already mentioned above.
A crime prevention initiative perhaps in a category of its own is the `Christian Police'. This is an organisation within the Police Force, which aims to extend partnership to the general public through the word of God.17 The more traditional police initiatives include:
- Car tracking and the installation of security alarms (the latter covers
all banks and financial institutions in Nairobi city)
- The recruitment and rewarding of informers.
I need to reiterate that most of the innovative crime prevention initiatives are founded outside of the police force. The NCBDA works with the confines of the central business district of Nairobi city. WCDI, on the other hand, is localized in middle- and high-income residential areas. The clubs/charities initiatives operate with or plan to work with the Kenya Police Force citywide in the near future.
The crime prevention approach by the Kenya Police is made up of a number of traditional initiatives as already mentioned. Crime prevention on the whole leans heavily towards `law enforcement'.
Crime prevention though situational prevention and social transformational initiatives falls in the docket of the NCC and other national community development institutions. As a general rule the Police Force does not seriously concern itself with these alternative crime prevention approaches.
2.2. Philosophy on crime and crime prevention
The philosophy of the Kenya Police Force as regards crime, as opposed to crime prevention, is that the Kenya Police is the supreme organ of civilian law and order. Arising from its traditional evolution as a 'police force' the body is largely a reactive rather than a crime prevention organ.
The beliefs and attitudes of the Kenya Police seem to be that society will look to the Police Force to take care of the criminal elements in society. Furthermore, it is not really anybody's business to probe into the police's efficiency in executing its constitutional mandate or enter into a partnership with it on an equal footing.
This strong stance is, however, softening now that the Police Force has begun to see the positive inputs and benefits of crime prevention efforts by NGOs and charity and residential associations.
2.3. The approach
The crime prevention approaches which are operative in the Kenya Police Force include:
- The exchange of information on transnational crimes
- Arrests and extradition of criminals below the levels of diplomats
- Encouraging the public to make arrests and call the police to collect
the apprehended suspects
- Involving grass-roots administrators in prevention of crime
- Making impromptu swoops on suspected criminal dens
- Recruitment of supervisors or agents.
2.3.1. Adoption of crime prevention approach
The above are traditional Police Force crime prevention initiatives, which have
been in force for a considerable time in the organisation.
'Community Policing' was seen as a new idea by the Police Force. Consequently it is in its early stages of establishing itself as the new crime prevention approach.
These Police Force crime prevention models are basically those of the British Colonial Police. Even the current attempt to introduce Community Policing in Nairobi has its origins in the experimentation of the British Police Service in the past two decades.18
2.4. Jurisdiction
2.4.1. Crime target groups
The Kenya Police adopts different approaches to targeting different types of criminals in its crime prevention work. These are the six main approaches and targets:
- Transnational initiatives target international criminals.
- Extraditions also target international criminals. In both cases the
criminals may be operating within or outside the police's Nairobi jurisdiction.
- Public arrests as an approach targets criminals operating locally.
- Grass-roots administrators also work to target local criminals in the
cooperation between police and civil society or the community.
- Impromptu police swoops target known criminal hideouts.
- Supervisors or agents target 'no-go' areas on behalf of the police.
It is felt that domestic violence, rape and child abuse are overlooked by these current crime prevention approaches.
The NCC has confined itself to policing the city's by-laws. There is no crime prevention vision offered by the Nairobi City Council.
The police believe that the beneficiaries of the above crime prevention approaches include (a) the international community and law enforcement agencies worldwide,19 and (b) the ordinary public in any part of the city.
Please refer to Figure 5 for the location of Kenya Police Stations in Nairobi. As can be worked out, the crime prevention approaches not only cover all parts of Nairobi as a city but are also countrywide and international in scope.
3. Crime prevention strategy
3.1. ProcessAs previously noted, the crime prevention approaches are a mixed bag of traditional policing tools and methodologies that are found in most parts of the former British Empire. The majority of these are 'foreign' in that they originated from a British policing tradition. Hardly any approach is home-grown.
As there are no other significant role players, the 'policing' in the Police Force relates to the force itself. Community Policing may change this outlook.
The catalyst for the acceptance of the potential role of other stakeholders was the wave of challenges that came with the introduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s, when the police could not handle the new dimensions raised by political dispensations through their traditional approaches. The introduction of Community Policing has been another catalyst.
3.1.1.3. The conceptualisation of the crime prevention approach
Only senior police officers and members of the National Intelligence Security Services, the latter technically no longer part of the Kenya Police Force, are involved in the conceptualisation of crime prevention methodologies. Not every police member takes part in such exercises.
The choice of crime prevention priorities is basically undertaken by ranking the statistical occurrences of the returns on crime. Such reported crime is kept on a daily basis by each police station. It is mandatory that a station keeps this information.
Most new initiatives took place in the early 1990s. It would appear that multiparty politics forced an 'opening up' of the political climate, while the previous single-party environment had suited a 'colonial' police operational system.
3.1.1.6. Origins of the initiatives
It is a certainty that the few initiatives that have penetrated the Police were basically pushed through for adoption by learned, experienced and well-traveled senior police officers.
The development of community policing has been incremental and in the opinion of the police is still very limited in its application in Nairobi.
3.2. Description of strategy
3.2.1. Actual crime prevention strategies
- The exchange of information on transnational crimes. Under this strategy
the Kenya Police Force compares notes with other crime prevention services at the international
level, basically Interpol, as well as comparing countrywide and Nairobi Province crime information.
- Arrests and extradition of criminals below the levels of diplomats.
This facilitates ease of arrest by treaty, in which the police force undertakes the required tasks on
behalf of a partner state. It takes place under the umbrella of extradition treaties which
Kenya has signed with a great number of countries and regional bodies. The Eastern Africa
regional exceptions to extradition treaties include the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.
- Encouraging the public to make arrests and call the police to collect
the apprehended persons. The strategy falls under the Public Order Act which empowers any person
to make a citizen's arrest.
- The involvement of grass-roots administrators in the prevention of
crime. This crime prevention approach incorporates the work of clusters of crime prevention groups,
which are essential for enlightening Nairobi's citizens' associations,
NGOs and good police officers.
- Making impromptu swoops on suspected criminal dens. This strategy encourages
the public and informers to report suspects, suspicious circumstances or known criminals
to the authorities.
- The recruitment of supervisors or agents. In this approach the police plants informers in given situations. Often the informer is a former criminal, who now has to volunteer information to the police.
A detailed breakdown of the above crime prevention strategies was not available, but the overall desired outcome was the containment and reduction of crime.
The strategies of containment and reduction are carried out on a continuous basis, because stopping the processes of crime prevention would result in an uncontrollable crime situation.
As noted above, there are six major crime prevention strategies practiced by the Kenya Police Force.
- In transnational crimes, the emphasis is on criminals involved in financial
fraud and the proliferation of small arms, and success is measured through the number of successful extraditions. Information is obtained through the handing over of Kenya Police
suspects and those on the 'most wanted' list.
- On the strategy of extraditions itself, the police's emphasis
is on rapid communication in order to get hold of their targeted criminals. The police strategy is also aided
by the voluntary surrender of wanted persons.
- With regard to public arrests, the emphasis is on successful arrests
or repeat arrests of criminals and the success is rated by successful prosecutions.
- Cooperation of grass-roots administrators is seen and emphasised by
the police as a 'public relations' exercise with the people. The surrender of criminals and the
voluntary return of stolen goods are evidence of informed decision making by the police.
- Frequency of occurrence is emphasised in impromptu arrests. Success
is measured by the frequency of arrests of wanted criminals.
- The emphasis with regard to agents is that they should pass on correct information to the force and not plant false evidence. The police rate their success on the consistency of a particular supervisor or agent.
- Transnational crime and extraditions as strategies both face a high
likelihood of collusion with corrupt elements in local and international police forces.
- Public arrests are an easy strategy. However, they encounter the hostility
of the general public, who are understandably tired of criminals. There is the danger of arrests
getting out of hand, resulting perhaps in mob lynching of suspects.
- Grass-roots administration is a relatively 'soft' strategy
in that what is basically required is to hold barazas or public meetings.
- Impromptu arrests and the use of agents are difficult to implement as these involve movement into dangerous 'no-go' areas for the police, while agents face real danger as they operate on behalf of the Police Force.
4. Implementation
4.1. The implementation of the strategiesThese are fairly self-evident:
- The exchange of information on transnational crimes and known criminals
- Arrests and extradition of criminals below the
levels of diplomats, i.e. those without diplomatic
immunity
- Citizens' arrests, by encouraging the public to make arrests
and call the police to collect the apprehended persons
- The involvement of grass-roots administrators in prevention of crime
- Making impromptu swoops on suspected criminal dens
- Recruitment of agents and training them to become reliable in their tasks
These are undertaken as follows:
- In transnational crimes the monitoring is on a daily basis during the
morning call-up, as well as routine international border-post checks. Those responsible for this in the
police force are the Airport Police, Immigration Departments and the Police Headquarters
Operational Units. To ensure that the strategy is carried out there are routine police checks.
- Extraditions are monitored at the diplomatic level through their security
attaches. Interpol is also involved. Responsibility for extraditions lies with the diplomatic corps.
Routine checks by the Police Force ensure that these systems are functioning properly.
- Public arrests are monitored by daily data gathered at each police
station. Officers commanding stations are responsible for this. Again routine checks are in place
to ensure execution of the strategy.
- District Commissioners and District Officers are responsible for monitoring grass-roots administration as a crime prevention strategy. Impromptu arrests and the operations of agents are monitored on a daily basis by police stations and OCS. Routine checks are in place to ensure strategy execution.
With regard to transnational crimes and extraditions, the main resources involved are financial resources and information technology and communications. The resources for public arrests and impromptu swoops focus on the availability of vehicles and good communications equipment. The greatest resource need for grass-roots administrators is their 'training'. All of the above are run on a continuous basis; the milestones are the delivery of the targeted 'product' and there is no 'end date' for any of the strategies.
It is difficult to access Interpol and its resources. The limited government budgetary resources are shared by the police with the rest of society.
4.3.2. Cost considerations
The budgets of the Police Force are allocated by
the central government in its annual budgets. The
graph in Figure 6 shows the government grant for
the Nairobi Police Command from 1990/91 to 2002/03.
I note in that the allocations to Nairobi rose from
KShs 162 million in 1990/91 to 651 million in 2002/03.
This is a fourfold increase in approximately ten
years. The Kenya Police's financial, communications
and information technology resources are the scarcest.
Except for Interpol training, which may take place
overseas, the rest of police training takes place
within Nairobi and elsewhere in Kenya. The government
has carried the full weight of funding the police
force through parliament approved allocations. However,
the Kenya Police has begun to benefit from financial
and material contributions by individual well-wishers,
private companies, charities and other nonprofit
organisations such as residents' associations.
Figure 6: Nairobi Police Command recurrent budget allocations
4.4. Organisational outline
The documentation of the organisation and the actual implementation roll-out
details of the Kenya Police work could not be accessed.
4.5. Effectiveness of strategies
It was the opinion of the Kenya Police that the current range of strategies
was more or less effective in crime prevention in Nairobi.
5. Best practice and lessons learnt
5.1. Best practiceThe Kenya Police felt that best practice in crime prevention arose out of a judicious combination of existing strategies for any given set of situations.
5.2. Lessons learnt
The police consider the many constraints that make their work difficult to include (i) financial limitations; (ii) limitations in the applications of modern technology; (iii) obsolete communications equipment and practices; (iv) severe transportation constraints; (v) and the length of time it often takes to make decisions in the force.
5.3. Planning considerations
There is no long-term Development Plan for the city of Nairobi. The last Metropolitan plan was in 1972 and since then there has not been any citywide plan although a number of very sound proposals have been made.
Perhaps with the entry of the NARC Government at the end of 2002 and the planned reorganisation of local government, the Nairobi City Council and the Government Security Services, a holistic approach to crime prevention strategy may emerge for Nairobi. Only time will tell.
As it stands now, the Kenya police crime prevention initiatives, as is the case in all the case studies presented in this report, are on the whole stand-alone initiatives, with some limited coordination with selective stakeholders.
When the stakeholders in crime prevention in Nairobi gradually and finally accept the necessity of working together, and the tendency to insularity and guarded territoriality comes to an end; planning departments may have to play a coordinating role because of their spatial concerns for the whole city.
5.3.3. Crime prevention and planning departments
From a historical perspective and in view of its current institutional mandates and organisation,there is no fit between the Kenya Police Force and the city planning department. A substantial restructuring and shift in the mind sets of both society and the police as a whole would be a prerequisite for attaining the desirable imputed levels of coexistence and cooperation.
5.4. Benefits for local government
Kenya local government is on the verge of drastic reorganisation with the incoming of the NARC Government, after two decades of a down-spiral of local government institutions. So far the new government has shown willingness to listen and appears prepared to implement radical solutions to make local government functional.
The Police Force felt that the local government could benefit from this study as it points out the dynamics of the Kenya Police Force and also the work of the other crime prevention stakeholders in the largest local authority in Kenya. The local government in Nairobi is not the only dysfunctional local authority in Kenya; lessons learnt in this study are more or less applicable to the other local governments in Kenya.
5.4.2. Local authority benefits from this study
The NCC might benefit from this study as it provides a basis of understanding of what the Kenya Police Force and other stakeholders are doing towards crime prevention. The Kenya Police, with the prime mandate for crime prevention in Nairobi city, is central to any NCC strategies in crime prevention. This study, which looks at the wider scope of crime prevention in Nairobi, will benefit the NCC in pointing out the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats existing in the present disaggregated crime prevention situation.
The local authority needs all the support that would be required for a complete rethink of crime prevention in Nairobi. Nothing short of a participatory consultation with its stakeholders and citizens, such as 'The Nairobi We Want', which took place almost twenty years ago, is in order. The City Fathers, like the police, do not appear to be aware that a safe city in which all its citizens have a stake is one of the bases of attracting investments in a globalising world.
Notes
To put it over-simply, the Kenya Police Force is made up of(i) the General Service Unit, a paramilitary organisation;
(ii) Administrative Police; and
(iii) the Kenya Police. This study focuses on the latter part of the force.
This consists of the Nairobi Provincial Security Chairman, who is the Provincial Commissioner, the Regional Coordinator from the National Security Intelligence Service and the Provincial CID Officer, Nairobi Area. No public or press is involved in these transactions.
These fall under Chapter 84 of the Laws of Kenya; Police Practical and Administration Work.
The following are the police stations in Nairobi. Central Division
(i) Kamukunji Police Station,
(ii) Central Police Station,
(iii) Kenyatta International Conference Center Police Station. In Kasarani Division there are
(i) Kasarani Police Station,
(ii) The President’s Lounge,
(iii) Pangani Police Station,
(iv) Muthaiga Police Station,
(v) Ruaraka Police Station. In Embakasi Division there are
(i) Embakasi Police Station and
(ii) Industrial Area Police Station. In the Parklands Division are
(i) Parklands Police Station,
(ii) Kabete Police Station,
(iii) Spring Valley Police Station and
(iv) Riruta Police Station. In Langata Division are
(i) Langata Police Station,
(ii) Karen Police Station and
(iii) Hardley Police Station. In Kilimani Division are
(i) Kilimani Police Station,
(ii) Muthangari Police Station,
(iii) Kileleshwa Police Station and
(iv) Kenya National Hospital police Station. Finally in Buru Buru Division are
(i) Buru Buru Police Station,
(ii) Shauri Moyo Police Station,
(iii) Jogooo Road Police Station and
(iv) Makongeni Police Station.
Reference is made specifically to units such as
(i) The General Service Unit at Ruaraka,
(ii) the Presidential Escort at State House,
(iii) The Kenya Airports Police Unit at the two international airports,
(iv) Kenya Railways Police Unit,
(v) The traffic Department at Pangani,
(vi) The Criminal Investigation Training School,
(vii) Kenya Police band,
(viii) The Dog Unit at Langata,
(ix) Anti-Corruption Police Unit and
(x) The Kenya Police Air Wing at Wilson Airport.
The latest authority to confirm this negative image is no less a person than Edwin Nyaseda, the current Police Commissioner himself.
See http://www.eaststanard.net/archives/April/Sat12042003/headlines/news 12042003003.htm.
Persons who are recruited corruptly present difficulties to the Police Force because they rise in the force in an erratic manner, are incompetent to perform prescribed duties and often opt out of dangerous police work. Of these categories of police recruits the Commissioner warned in April 2003 that ‘any person who attempts to bribe his way into the Force during the forthcoming recruitment exercise, will be dealt with firmly’. Ibid.
It was however noted that the infusion of tertiary level graduates had made some limited transformations in the directions of a friendlier disposition towards the public.
However, it is claimed that with the opening up of the civil society in the multi-party era in the early 1990s and especially the role of the Inter Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) made inroads into new freedoms such as Police not having to issue Public Meeting Licenses, under the Public Order Act, for meetings of three or more people. This changed to the need to just inform of planned events. The Public Order Act as can be imagined was abused by the Government Administration to stifle the opposition in the single party era.
These poor working conditions include low incomes (often paid late by several weeks or months), shared accommodation, the loss of privileges (eg travel, night out, risk allowances), low medical allowances, an orthodox leave allowance, the lack of a police union etc. Also read – News Spotlight `Poor Pay, lack of facilities undermine crime war’ at http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/Today/News/Sportlight2.html.
The NCBDA was highly regarded by the Kenya Police Force because it has in the past provided the force with ‘boots, communications equipment and facilitated the making of monetary awards to hard working police officers’.
The Manu Chandaria Foundation is a charity of the Chandaria family of businesses and industry. Kenya Breweries is a very large industrial brewer in Nairobi. Both of these organisations have been instrumental in giving out when the occasion arose ‘Braver Awards’ and the ‘Guinness Bravery Award respectively.
The Law Enforcement Departments consist of The Kenya Police Force, Customs Exercise Department, Immigration Department and Provincial Administration (Administrative Wing).
At the higher administrative levels Kenya Police officers do cooperate as at crucial security meetings. However at the lower echelons, non-cooperation and support is the norm, eg traffic police would not normally involve themselves in other crime prevention duties as in patrols or beats. Traffic police performs only traffic duties.
Members of the civil society linked to the Police Force such as informers and the reservists are known to abuse their privileged relationship with the Police.
This aspect of the need for equity in partnerships came through strongly in our interviews of crime prevention stakeholders.
Given Kenya Police’s track record and the public perception of the force, ‘Christian Police’ is indeed an innovative concept. However, some of the Nairobi public may be sceptical of the exercise. At open-air congregations, whereas a certain few faithful would close their eyes and kneel in prayer, as is the Christian practice, others do not do so because they feel that this may be a new police trick to arrest innocent bystanders.
‘Merseyside Community Police’. Daily Nation.
This is especially useful, given that Nairobi has become one of the criminal hubs of Africa.
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