Nuclear disarmament and Non-Proliferation

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The NPT was concluded in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, establishing an international framework for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Its membership is almost universal with the exception of Israel, India, Pakistan and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. The DPRK withdrew from the Treaty in 2003.

South Africa became a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 July 1991, and has emerged as a major-role player within the Treaty. Prior to its accession to the NPT, South Africa had developed a nuclear weapon capability and was regarded as one of the so-called “Threshold States”. This only came to light on 24 March 1993 when then State President de Klerk, in an address to Parliament, admitted that South Africa had possessed a “limited nuclear deterrent capability” and that the nuclear weapons programme had been voluntarily dismantled prior to accession to the NPT.

The broad objectives of the NPT are to:

prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to States other than the five recognised as nuclear weapon States in 1968 - namely the United States, the Soviet Union (Russia has since acceded to these obligations), the United Kingdom, France and China. All other States Parties are required to conclude fullscope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify the peaceful nature of their nuclear programmes;
facilitate peaceful nuclear co-operation between Treaty members; and
provide the foundation for nuclear disarmament.

The South African accession occurred just prior to, and during the preparations for, a decision by the NPT States Parties on whether or not to extend the life of the Treaty. The provisions of Article X of the Treaty mandated that 25 years after entry into force (1995), a conference be convened to decide by majority vote of all NPT States Parties “whether the treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods”. This in effect meant that if a decision was not taken to extend the life of the Treaty, it would cease to have effect.

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

The South African delegation to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was led by Foreign Minister Nzo, who in his speech to the conference outlined a plan for the indefinite extension of the Treaty conditioned by a series of yardsticks in the form of principles applicable to the five nuclear weapon States (NWS) and other States Parties so that progress on nuclear disarmament and other facets of the implementation of the treaty's provisions could be measured and accomplished. The second element in Minister Nzo's address provided for the strengthening of the review process for the Treaty. These elements provided the bridge across the wide divide that existed between the nuclear weapon States and the non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) and provided a bargain which enabled the Conference to take a unanimous decision on indefinite extension, the adoption of the¹ “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” and “Strengthening The Review Process of Treaty”, along with a Resolution on the Middle East.

South Africa 's strategy and tactics for the Conference were finalised a fortnight before the start of the Conference in New York at a meeting at the Diplomatic Guest House in Pretoria . Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President of South Africa guided the discussions that concluded that the Treaty was too valuable for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to put it into jeopardy by only permitting a limited extension of time. The then Deputy President Mbeki is in fact believed to have argued that non-proliferation, disarmament and the right of all the peoples of the world not to be threatened by the annihilation inherent in all weapons of mass destruction could be equated to a basic human right and that South Africa consequently had no other option but to support the indefinite extension of the Treaty. It was, however, agreed that such an extension should not be agreed to without the reciprocal agreements on the accomplishment of the provisions of the Treaty. The task of giving definition to these broad directives was handed over to the Department of Foreign Affairs and to the officials working on these issues. Based on the proposal from the Foreign Affairs officials, Deputy President Mbeki subsequently wrote a letter to Vice President Al Gore of the United States setting out the position that would be adopted by South Africa at the Conference.

Foreign Minister Nzo's seminal statement to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was held in New York during April/May 1995 was prepared by the officials on the basis of this letter. In summary, South Africa presented a set of “Principles of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” to the Conference covering all aspects of the Treaty, and, inter alia, committing the nuclear weapon States to nuclear disarmament and providing freer access to nuclear technology by non-nuclear weapon States along with a proposal on a “Strengthened Review Process”. These proposals, presented by Minister Nzo, and the wording of the documents which outlined the details, drawn up by the Minister's diplomatic support team, survived – reasonably intact – throughout the successive redrafts and negotiations that took place at the 1995 Conference.

Due only to the South African proposals, a basis was found for the decision on 5 May 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely. The decision to do so was however not taken in isolation, but as part of on integral package of decisions presented by the President of the Conference, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala from Sri Lanka . Many States, in particular those from the NAM, including South Africa, were concerned that by extending the Treaty indefinitely, the leverage built into the Treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament, would be lost. The package of decisions provided a way for all State Parties to support the indefinite decision while providing for both the means in which, and the means through which progress toward achieving nuclear disarmament could be achieved. Decision I on “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty”, based on South African proposals provided the means to measure progress towards this goal, while Decision II “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Disarmament” based primarily on the proposal made by Minister Nzo, provided the yardsticks to accomplish the goals of the Treaty, including through a programme of action on nuclear disarmament. Finally, as a result of the Arab States' insistence, the Conference also adopted a Resolution on the Middle East calling for the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in that region. Only after adopting decisions I & II and the resolution on the Middle East , was the Conference able to take the decision to indefinitely extend the Treaty.

Conference President Dhanapala in recognition of South Africa's central role stated after the Conference that the second most important factor that resulted in the indefinite extension of the Treaty (the first being that all States wanted the treaty to be extended in some form or the other) was that “South Africa came up with the very imaginative proposal of having a statement of principles and a strengthening of the review process. This enabled us to have the seed of an idea that led to the other two parallel decisions that were taken together with the decisions on the extension.” ²

The following extracts from media articles demonstrate how the work that was done at, and in the run-up to, the NPT Conference provided a foundation for the expectations that were placed on South Africa and the role that it would play on the international stage. The approach of South African disarmament policy is to seek the realistic middle ground and to provide the bridge for the disparate views that had deadlocked years of disarmament initiatives still characterises the South African approach in the disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control arenas today.

“Hats off, please, to President Nelson Mandela, his Cabinet and diplomats to whom are due the laurels for last Thursday's unanimous decision by the 175 signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to renew the pact in perpetuity. Not since Jan Smuts, if even then, have South Africans played such a critical, or productive, role on the world stage”, Business Day , 16 May 1995.
“'The result was better than almost anyone expected prior to the conference, and a large degree of credit goes to the South African Government,' Thomas Graham, US Ambassador to the NPT negotiations…'As a result of the role played during the NPT Conference, South Africa now has emerged as a major player in arms control and disarmament, and perhaps other areas of international diplomacy as well,' Graham said. ‘I think they will be a very important country in the world community in the future…. They will have a strong voice, especially in Africa , but also throughout the developing world.'” Defense News , 12-18 June 1995.

The establishment of the New Agenda Coalition and the preparatory process leading to the 2000 NPT Review Conference

South Africa continued to maintain its pre-eminent role in the newly established strengthened review process for the NPT, which it had been so instrumental in creating, in the post 1995 period. In the Preparatory Committee meetings for the 2000 Review Conference South Africa 's participation focussed on ensuring that the accomplishments that it had achieved in 1995 were not undermined and that greater definition was given to the 1995 decisions. One of the significant accomplishments achieved by South Africa in this period, and which later played a critical role in ensuring the success of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, was its proposal that specific time should be allocated in the strengthened NPT review process to consider single issues that were of particular importance to the NPT. Its initial proposal for specific time on security assurance to non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and its later proposal for specific time on nuclear disarmament not only led to pressure by the Non-Aligned Movement within the NPT system to substantively address the nuclear disarmament issue but also led to the establishment of the mechanism at the 2000 Review Conference that delivered the agreements on nuclear disarmament that were achieved.

The growing role of South Africa in the NPT process, the success that it was achieving and (paradoxically) the alliance that it had helped create in the campaign for a total ban on anti-personnel mines led to the formation of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). The concept of the NAC arose out of the close relationship that had developed between the disarmament diplomats of South Africa and the Republic of Ireland . The initial work on the NAC was then taken to other potential partners and resulted in the NAC Declaration that was simultaneously issued by Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden on 9 June 1998. The NAC's first major interaction with the international community at large took place during the meeting of the First Committee of the 53 rd session of the UN General Assembly, when the group submitted a draft resolution to the committee which had been negotiated under the stewardship of South African disarmament diplomats. The NAC's impact on the nuclear disarmament debate was immediately apparent, receiving widespread support from non-nuclear weapon States and civil society. The nuclear weapon States reacted with vociferous opposition applying considerable pressure on their military alliance partners and on the individual members of the NAC. Slovenia 's vulnerability to pressure as a consequence of its desire to become a member of the EU and NATO led to its withdrawal from the coalition. The resolution, however, proved to be a remarkable success in drawing together the disparate supporters of the goal of nuclear disarmament and laid the foundation for the pressure that was built up within the UN and NPT systems to achieve a genuine vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and to demand an unequivocal commitment by the NWS to the nuclear disarmament obligation contained in the NPT. The NAC reinforced these positions by introducing papers on nuclear disarmament at the NPT PrepComs and resolutions to the First Committee in the run up to the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

The 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference

The Sixth Review Conference of the NPT that was held in New York from 14 April to 19 May 2000 concluded its work after intensive negotiations and near breakdown on 20 May 2000. The Conference was regarded as a major success because it was the first time since the Treaty's entry-into-force that the States Parties had achieved a negotiated Final Document. It was also the first time that the States Parties had agreed on a substantive forward-looking agenda for the implementation of the Treaty, including on the controversial issue of nuclear disarmament. The agreements that were reached in the Final Document substantially build on the South African inspired “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” and the decision on “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty” that were adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

South Africa again played a decisive and crucial role in negotiating the substantive outcome of the Review Conference. South Africa 's instrumental role at the Conference has been widely recognised and complimented, including by the President of the Conference and in the international media. The President of the Conference, Ambassador Abdallah Baali of Algeria , wrote to South Africa 's Permanent Representative in New York stating:

“After the conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, I would like to express to you, and to your delegation, my most sincere thanks for your valuable co-operation, without which the Conference could not have ended with such a historic and successful outcome. The active role played by your delegation…has been instrumental in achieving this outcome.”

Expectations for a successful outcome of the Conference had been extremely bleak, primarily due to the lack of any real progress that had been achieved since 1995 in the area of nuclear disarmament and because of the significant setback that the 1998 nuclear test explosions by India and Pakistan represented to the international goals of preventing the proliferation and promoting the elimination of nuclear weapons. The increasing emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons in the defence policies of the nuclear weapon States as well as the proposals by the United States to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) so as to develop a national missile defence (NMD) were also seen as major causes for the negative expectations for the Review Conference. This negative atmosphere was finally overcome as a result of the acceptance by particularly the nuclear weapon States of the necessity to agree to the proposal that was being advocated by South Africa and its partners in the NAC for an “unequivocal commitment” to nuclear disarmament and the acceptance of “… a new international agenda to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, through the pursuit in parallel, of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels”. While there was initially a strong resistance to these proposals, the determination of the NAC to achieve what was generally seen as moderate and achievable proposals, and which had the support of a broad spectrum of the States Parties, in particular those from the NAM , provided the platform for the Conference's successful outcome. Final agreement on the difficult issue of nuclear disarmament was only achieved on the basis of direct negotiations between South Africa , its NAC partners and the nuclear weapon States , due to the inability of the Conference as a whole to reach agreement. The nuclear disarmament issue was one of the most difficult parts of the agreement reached at the Conference.

Despite concerns about an early deadlock at the NPT Review Conference over the issue of nuclear disarmament and the question of the Middle East (i.e. Israel's suspected nuclear weapons programme and its impact on the region), the Conference started smoothly. This smooth start was achieved primarily as a consequence of an agreement that was brokered by South Africa and that was reached on the establishment of two subsidiary bodies at the Conference to have a focused consideration of the nuclear disarmament issue and of the implementation of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference Resolution on the Middle East . Direct bilateral negotiations between the delegations of South Africa and the United States resulted on a mandate being agreed for the nuclear disarmament subsidiary body (Subsidiary Body 1), which focused its work on the future agenda for nuclear disarmament. The agreement for the establishment of the second subsidiary body on the Middle East was reportedly only achieved after the personal interventions of President Clinton of the United States and President Mubarak of Egypt . The Agreement between Egypt and the United States was only made possible by the understanding that the latter subsidiary body would consider the 1995 Middle East Resolution in the context of all regional issues. This meant that the situation in South Asia following the 1998 nuclear test explosions conducted by India and Pakistan , and the issues of non-compliance with Treaty obligations in Iraq (Middle East) and North Korea ( North East Asia ) would also be covered by the mandate of Subsidiary Body 2. In terms of this agreement the United States had also for the first time agreed to the direct naming of Israel , on condition that the other States would also be mentioned by name.

It was clearly apparent from very early in the Conference that it was only South Africa and its NAC partners that had come to the Conference with a clear message and with the necessary political will to have its new agenda for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world included in the outcome of the Conference. As a consequence, the debate at the Conference was generally one between the five nuclear weapon States and the NAC, in which South Africa played a key and leading role. The NAM , which had also submitted substantive position papers to the Conference, supported South Africa and the NAC in its initiatives. This NAM support for South Africa and the NAC was based on the recognition that while the NAM 's traditional positions clearly identified their principled opposition to nuclear weapons, these positions did not provide the basis upon which a consensus in the Conference would be reached. South Africa and the NAC's position on the other hand was able to serve as the bridge upon which the wider agreement that was achieved could be built.

While the Conference and its three Main Committees took up their work, it was readily apparent that the differences that existed would not easily be resolved. The biggest differences that existed, with the States Parties adopting more and more entrenched positions, revolved around the issues of:

Nuclear disarmament.
The situation in the Middle East, and more particularly Iraq's refusal to have itself identified as a State Party in non-compliance with its Treaty obligations, as well as the position of the United States that criticism of Israel should not be too strong.
Access to nuclear technology and the role of non-proliferation controls.

As it became more apparent that the Conference was confronting a real possibility of deadlock and failure, direct negotiations between the five nuclear weapon States and South Africa as well as its other NAC partners, became the only possible method of finding grounds for agreement. Following a number of informal consultations between these two groups of States Parties, the President of the Conference, recognizing the inability of the Conference as a whole to reach an agreement, requested South Africa , its NAC partners and the nuclear weapon States to continue their negotiations in an attempt to ensure a substantive and successful outcome of the Conference.

In addition to the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon States to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" the Final Report of the Review Conference reflects a commitment by the NPT States Parties to the necessity of achieving the early entry into force of the CTBT and prompt negotiations on a fissile material production ban, presently deadlocked in the Conference on Disarmament. While supporting the full implementation of START II, ratified by the Russian Duma in April 2000, the Parties also urged the United States and Russia to conclude START III. Raising concerns that the nuclear weapon States had not been taking their disarmament obligations seriously enough and that progress had stalled since the end of the Cold War, several important steps which had to be pursued over the next five years in addition to the bilateral strategic arms reductions underway, were identified. Furthermore, the programme of next steps for nuclear disarmament called for a moratorium on nuclear testing pending entry into force of the CTBT, and emphasised the 'principle of irreversibility' in nuclear arms control. This is important because of the current tendency among some of the nuclear weapon States to recycle the plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or other components from dismantled nuclear weapons so that they can again be used to make new or refurbished nuclear warheads.

According to the programme of action contained in the agreement negotiated between South Africa , its other NAC partners and the nuclear weapon States on these steps, the nuclear weapon States undertook to:

Make further unilateral efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Unilateral efforts can be very important when bilateral or multilateral negotiations are stalled, and act as a useful complement to disarmament agreements.
Provide more information on their nuclear capabilities and the implementation of disarmament agreements. Although the UK , Russia and the US have already moved some way towards greater transparency, France and particularly China have resisted revealing nuclear related information, the first step towards accountability and effective verification.
Reduce their non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia continues to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in large numbers, and the US retains them in its arsenals, including tactical weapons based in seven NATO countries in Europe .
Take concrete measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems. The NAM and the NAC had been pressing for nuclear weapons to be taken off alert, de-activated and for the warheads to be separated from their delivery vehicles.
Diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. A concern raised over and over again by the non-nuclear weapon States during the Conference was the fear that NATO and Russia retain policies of deterrence based on the potential first use of nuclear weapons and an extended role linking the use of nuclear weapons to the threat or use of biological or chemical weapons, both of which are banned.
Involve all five nuclear weapon States "as soon as appropriate" in nuclear reduction and disarmament negotiations. At present the UK , China and France are not included in the bilateral agreements between the US and Russia to make much deeper cuts in the numbers of their nuclear weapons before they get involved in strategic arms reduction and elimination.

Other than the unequivocal undertaking obtained at the 2000 Review Conference, one of the most significant accomplishments was the agreed to division between the two elements contained in Article VI of the Treaty, namely nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Article VI language was previously used by nuclear weapon States in an ambiguous fashion where some attempted to argue that nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons was to be done in the context of general and complete disarmament. Due to South African and NAC insistence, the 2000 NPT Review Conference outcome makes it clear that nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament are two separate goals, and that nuclear disarmament is to be accomplished in a separate process from general and complete disarmament. It also makes it clear that general and complete disarmament is the ultimate goal and that nuclear disarmament will have to be accomplished on the way to general and complete disarmament. The realisation of the effect of this agreement has been the primary focus of attempts by certain nuclear weapon States to roll back the agreed to outcome of the 2000 Review Conference.

At the 2000 Review Conference South Africa was able to reinforce the critical role that it played at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference by once again being at the forefront of ensuring that the Conference did not only reach a successful conclusion, but was also able to agree on a substantive agenda for future action. This agenda reinforced and built upon, the 1995 South African inspired “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”.

The preparatory process leading to the 2005 Review Conference

South Africa and the New Agenda Coalition have continued in their active participation in the preparatory committee meetings that have been taking place for the 2005 Review Conference. In this work it will be essential for South Africa to ensure that the work undertaken at the 2005 Review Conference and the way in which this work is organised does not have the potential to undermine or roll back any of the accomplishments of the 2000 Conference. The 2000 outcome should also not be the subject of any negotiation and that the work that is to be done builds on what has already been accomplished.

It is also noteworthy that the NAC has adopted the South African approach to the question of security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. The NAC submitted a working paper and a draft text of a protocol and/or separate agreement on security assurances to the 2003 Preparatory Committee meeting, which is based on similar papers that South Africa had submitted in the 1999 Preparatory Committee meeting in the run-up to the 2000 Conference. South Africa 's success in persuading the NAC and also the NAM to pick up on this issue is a significant accomplishment. The current international climate would seem to forestall any significant progress on the nuclear disarmament issue. This climate and the security doctrines that have been adopted by the nuclear weapon States would, however, appear to make the security assurances issue the key question for the 2005 Review Conference. Security assurances and the debate that revolves around them go to the heart of nuclear state doctrines for expanded uses of nuclear weapons. It also raises the issue of the bargain that is inherent in the NPT whereby NNWS gave up nuclear weapons and therefore have the right not to be threatened in a stark fashion.

The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

South Africa played an active role in the negotiation of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty. The Treaty is also known as the "Pelindaba Treaty", named after the Pelindaba headquarters of the then Atomic Energy Corporation (now known as The Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa, NECSA) in South Africa. The final text was adopted in a Johannesburg hotel on 2 June 1995 by the Group of Experts who drafted it. The name "Pelindaba" was particularly appropriate when the draft was adopted as the name originates from the Zulu words "phelile indaba", which roughly translate into "the matter/discussion is closed/settled". The headquarters of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) envisaged by the Treaty is to be situated in South Africa.

Although the ANWFZ has been a longstanding objective of African States since the early 1960's, negotiations on the draft treaty text only gained momentum after South Africa joined the NPT and announced that it had dismantled its nuclear weapons programme. South African participation in the final rounds of negotiations played an instrumental role in reaching consensus among African States as well as with the nuclear weapon States. In terms of the Treaty, the nuclear weapon States are required to sign and ratify Protocols to the Treaty declaring, inter alia, that they will not place or test nuclear weapons on African territories nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against members of the Zone.

The Treaty was approved at the 31 st Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government during June 1995 in Addis Ababa , and was endorsed at the 50 th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York later that year. It was signed by more than forty African States on 11 April 1996 in Cairo , whilst the Protocols to the Treaty were signed by four of the five nuclear weapon States (the exception being the Russian Federation who signed later). It will enter into force upon the date of deposit of the twenty-eighth Instrument of Ratification.

a) The Protocols to the Treaty

For a nuclear-weapon-free zone to be optimally effective it is important that two criteria be met i.e. that all (or at least most) of the countries inside the zone of application become parties and, secondly, that the nuclear weapon States should become parties to any relevant Protocols to the legal instrument establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone.

In terms of the Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba, the nuclear weapon States should, inter alia, undertake not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against Parties to the Treaty (Protocol I), and not to test any nuclear explosive devices within the African nuclear-weapon-free-zone (Protocol II).

Protocol III of the Treaty was open for signature by France and Spain as non-African countries which are " de jure or de facto " internationally responsible for a territory within the African nuclear-weapon-free-zone". Spain is the only country which has yet to sign this Protocol. The most important Articles in Protocol III are Articles 1 and 2 which stipulate that:

ARTICLE I:

de jure or de facto

ARTICLE 2:

The resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its fiftieth session on the final text of a Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, inter alia, calls upon the nuclear weapon States contemplated in Protocol III to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty. It also calls on these States "to bring the necessary support to the Pelindaba Treaty by signing the Protocols that concern them as soon as the Treaty becomes available for signature".

At the signing ceremony on 11 April 1996, the United States , France , the United Kingdom and China signed Protocols I and II of the Treaty. These Protocols were signed also by the Russian Federation during the same year.

b) The African Commission on Nuclear Energy

To ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, Article 12 of the ANWFZ Treaty provides for the establishment of an African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE).

The Commission will, inter alia, be responsible for collating the reports and the exchange of information required by the Treaty and for reviewing the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It will also encourage regional and sub-regional programmes for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology and be responsible for promoting international co-operation with extra-zonal States for the peaceful uses in the aforementioned field.
The AFCONE will be composed of twelve Members elected by Parties to the Treaty for a period of three years, bearing in mind the need for equitable geographical distribution, as well as the need to include Members with advanced nuclear programmes. The Commission will have a Bureau consisting of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and an Executive Secretary. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman will be elected by the Commission itself, whilst the Executive Secretary will be designated by the Secretary-General of the OAU (now the African Union (AU)) in consultation with the Commission's Chairman.

The budget of the Commission is to be funded by the Parties to the Treaty in accordance with a scale of assessment still to be determined by the Parties. The Commission may, however, also accept additional funds from other sources provided that such donations are consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Treaty.

South Africa 's offer to act as the host for the Commission was accepted, and the headquarters of AFCONE will be situated in South Africa once the Commission is established. Dr Sola Ogunbanwo, the Legal advisor to the negotiators of the Treaty, visited South Africa in March 1998 and discussions were held with relevant officials with a view to ironing out the structure and functions of AFCONE.

A nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty differs from the NPT insofar as it allows region-specific security interests and concerns to be reflected. This may be noted, inter alia, in the Pelindaba Treaty, which makes provision for the dismantling and destruction of nuclear explosive devices manufactured by a Party prior to the entry into force of the Treaty. This provision, of course, is aimed at South Africa's previous nuclear-weapons capability, which for many years had been a stumbling block preventing the establishment of an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone. The presence, or suspected presence, of nuclear weapons within a region undermines efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, much as South Africa 's nuclear capabilities did in the case of the ANWFZ.

According to the latest information, the following African countries have ratified the Pelindaba Treaty:

Algeria , Botswana , Burkina Faso , Côte d' Ivoire , Gambia , Mali , Mauritania , Mauritius , South Africa , Tanzania and Zimbabwe .

While the establishment of an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone had been regarded a priority in the decades of the sixties through to the mid-nineties, the relatively low number of ratifications thus far reflects a lower priority to the issue after the South African threat disappeared and the continent faced more pressing problems on the political, social and economic front. Furthermore implementation of the demining aspects of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty and more recent focus on combating the illicit circulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons have taken centre stage in the continent's efforts to focus on the weapons that are in reality causing death and destruction. In this regard, the latter two issues have been taken up in the New Partnership for Africa 's Development (NEPAD) while the issue of an ANWFZ specifically and the issue of weapons of mass destruction in general, has not been referred to in NEPAD.

International efforts to have all the protocols ratified have met with mixed success. Spain participated in the negotiation process of the Treaty but has subsequently expressed its dissatisfaction with regard to its territorial claims on the African continent and has yet to sign or ratify Protocol III. In the case of the United States (which has not yet ratified Protocols I and II), it would appear as though the reluctance to ratify the Protocols was due to the suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities of Libya. However, on 19 December 2003, Libya announced that it would halt its WMD programmes and eliminate any stockpiles of weapons or materials under full verification by the international community. It was also announced that Libya intends to sign an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, which would allow the Agency to conduct short-notice inspections of nuclear sites in Libya . On 10 March 2004 Libya agreed to give IAEA inspectors access to its nuclear sites. It is possible that Libya 's announcement and co-operation with the IAEA and international community may encourage the USA to ratify the Pelindaba Protocols in the near future.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

South Africa , despite its observer status at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva during the negotiations to conclude the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), participated actively. One of the primary issues that South Africa advocated in respect of the NPT's Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, was a call for the early conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Despite not having been entirely satisfied with all aspects of the Treaty negotiated at the CD, South Africa believed that it provided the best opportunity the international community had in securing a Treaty that would rid the world of the testing of nuclear weapons. South Africa signed the Treaty on 24 September 1996 and deposited its instrument of ratification at the UN on 30 March 1999.

South Africa's growing stature in the international disarmament and non-proliferation arena after the success at the 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference was recognised when Ambassador JS Selebi, then South Africa's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, was elected as chairperson of the first meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty Organisation (CTBTO). This first meeting was particularly important as it had the task of laying the foundations for the structure and staffing of the Organisation to implement the Treaty. It required a delicate balancing of the desire of the nuclear weapon States to have the structure and staffing engineered to accommodate their national interests - especially in the field of monitoring, verification and on-site inspection aspects - and the wider interests of States that did not have nuclear weapons but also had to have ownership of the Treaty.

In terms of the CTBT, a global verification regime – the so-called International Monitoring System (IMS) – is being established to monitor compliance with the Treaty. The IMS uses seismic, hydro-acoustic, infrasound and radionuclide monitoring technologies to detect nuclear explosions and consists of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories across the world. South Africa will host five monitoring stations and one radionuclide laboratory. The building and operating costs of the monitoring stations are borne by the CTBTO. In establishing the monitoring stations in South Africa , the Council for Geoscience interacts with the CTBTO on a technical level regarding the specifications for the stations, the installation of equipment and the testing of the stations.

South Africa hosted an African Workshop in Pretoria from 22 to 24 April 1997 on the implementation of the International Monitoring System (IMS) as envisaged in the CTBT. The Workshop was attended by representatives from eleven African countries and international speakers from a further eleven countries also participated. The aim was to foster awareness in Africa for the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a CTBT and to promote participation among African countries which would or could have components of the International Seismological Monitoring System (IMS) in their countries and to ensure the smooth transition from experimentation to the entry into force of the CTBT.

The Second Session of the CTBTO Preparatory Committee was held in Vienna from 12-16 May 1997. Detailed milestones for establishing aspects of a verification regime that would meet the Treaty's requirements at entry into force, produced during intensive meetings of the experts group in April, were approved by the Commission. So too was a plan for concrete investments in 1997 in 18 stations that would form the backbone of the International Monitoring System, as well as major investments for the initial commissioning of the International Data Centre in Vienna (which would receive and process the data collected by the IMS). The meeting was the last Preparatory Committee meeting to be chaired by Ambassador Selebi during his six-month term and it was widely felt that he had made a very significant contribution to the start-up process in the implementation of the Treaty.

The first non-Executive Secretarial visit of the CTBTO to South Africa took place in July 1997. South Africa also hosted an African IMS Training Programme in December 1997 and may again do so in 2004.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

South Africa is a founder member of the IAEA, an autonomous intergovernmental organisation founded by the United Nations in 1957 with the mandate "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". South Africa, as the most advanced country in the nuclear field on the African continent, held the designated seat for Africa on the Agency's Board of Governors (the Agency's principal policy-making body) until 1977, when the country lost its seat to Egypt due to its policy of “apartheid”. However, at the June meeting of the Board in 1995, South Africa was again designated to resume this seat on the Board. This decision was affirmed by the IAEA's General Conference in September. Mr A S Minty, currently Deputy Director-General (Multilateral) at the Department of Foreign Affairs assumed the designated seat on the Board on 25 September 1995 as South Africa 's Governor on the Board.

Shortly after becoming a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 July 1991, South Africa concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on 16 September 1991. The Safeguards Agreement, which is legally required under Article III of the NPT, extends to all peaceful nuclear activities and nuclear material in a State. By signing the Agreement, South Africa demonstrated its resolve to comply with international obligations to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Agreement requires periodic declarations from States on the nature and scope of its peaceful nuclear facilities. In addition to periodic on-site technical inspections conducted by the Agency's safeguards inspectors, verification is carried out to ensure that nuclear materials and installations are applied for peaceful purposes and use.

Responding to its failures to discover Iraq 's clandestine nuclear weapons programme and North Korea 's hidden reprocessing facility, and to close the “undeclared facilities” loophole, the IAEA in 1993 drafted a safeguards improvement programme known as “93+2.” The programme was later expanded into a legal mandate in the form of an Additional Protocol to an individual State's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. The IAEA's experience in verifying the dismantlement of South Africa 's nuclear weapons programme, contributed greatly to the establishment of this enhanced verification mechanism. The essence of the Additional Protocol is to reshape the IAEA's safeguards regime from a quantitative system focused on accounting for known quantities of materials and monitoring declared activities to a qualitative system gathering a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear and nuclear related activities, including nuclear related imports and exports. The Additional Protocol also substantially expands the IAEA's ability to check for clandestine nuclear facilities by providing the agency with authority to visit any facility – declared or not – to investigate questions or inconsistencies in a State's nuclear declarations . South Africa concluded the Additional Protocol with the IAEA on 13 September 2002. South Africa 's obligations under its safeguards agreements are implemented by the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) i n terms of the Nuclear Energy Act (Act No. 46 of 1999).

South Africa is currently also participating actively in the IAEA's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programme. The mission of the IAEA Technical Co-operation Department relates to the promotion of tangible socio-economic impact through Technical Co-operation with member States.

On the African continent, the application of nuclear technology has in many instances, brought viable solutions to common problems. Africa has greatly succeeded in tailoring a communal approach to the utilization of the peaceful uses of nuclear science through the work and activities of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Science and Technology (AFRA).

A large number of South African experts participate in AFRA Specialized Teams which deal with, inter alia , the conditioning and safe storage of spent radium sources, dam leakage detection, and the auditing of radiotherapy and nuclear medicine facilities. For example, with AFRA's assistance, a project aimed at emerging cattle farmers has been established in South Africa and success has been achieved in the use of radioimmunoassay techniques to increase the success rate of artificial insemination and to diagnose pregnancy.

South Africa also continues to play an important role in the development of improved crops using mutation breeding and a number of training and technical meetings were held in South Africa in 2002 and 2003. Efforts also continue to intensify research on the Sterile Insect Technique (SIT), which has already achieved remarkable success in eradicating the fruit fly pest in the Western Cape Province , including its application for the eradication of Malaria.

Negotiating a fissile material treaty (FMT)

The question of fissile material that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons (primarily, highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium) has long been a matter of concern for the international community. How the international community is to deal with future production of fissile material for military purposes, the fissile material stockpiles currently in nuclear weapons programmes and the fissile material that becomes available from dismantled nuclear weapons are all issues that have a direct impact on how the international community addresses nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

In 1995, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva was able to reach an agreement after extensive consultations on how to address the question of fissile material on the basis of a report compiled by the then Ambassador of Canada (Gerald E. Shannon) and the mandate for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Divisions within the Conference on whether such a negotiation should only address future production or whether stockpiles of existing material should also be included are reflected in the decision taken by the CD in document CD/1299 of 24 March 2004. While the mandate refers to future production, the report makes it clear that the scope of such a treaty (i.e. if it would include existing stockpiles) is left open for consideration during the negotiations themselves. In a reflection of “disarmament-speak”, the opposing views on the scope of such a treaty is reflected in the name that is used by delegations: those using the term “fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT)” do not favour the inclusion of “stocks”, while those (including South Africa) that refer to the “fissile material treaty (FMT)” do favour the inclusion of “stocks” in the treaty negotiations.

In essence, while the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein reflected an agreement, it in fact papered over a significant disagreement between strongly held views as to the scope of the negotiations that were to be undertaken. What the Shannon report and mandate was able to achieve in 1995 was for the negotiations to commence and for the disagreement on scope to be resolved in the course of the negotiations. However, the commencement of the negotiations were delayed because the Conference was at that time focused on the completion of the negotiations for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In the period that followed, and with the exception of a few months in 1998, the CD, however, became deadlocked on its programme of work and an agreement on the actual commencement of the fissile material treaty negotiations has to date eluded the Conference.

In order to facilitate an agreement on negotiations for a fissile material treaty and to identify the middle ground on the disagreement on the scope of the treaty, South Africa introduced an innovative proposal in the CD on 23 May 2002 that attempted to find a solution to the scope question and to provide a framework where the scope of application of such a treaty could be built on in the future ³(CD/1671). The paper has been acknowledged as a realistic approach to resolve the scope issue and has been drawing increasing support. The question as to whether it will resolve a definition of scope will, however, only become apparent once CD negotiations have commenced.

In introducing the paper to the CD, it was stated that “(t)he South African working paper attempts to deal with some of the most vexing issues that negotiations on a fissile material treaty presents. South Africa has, due to its own unique historical experience with the destruction of its limited nuclear weapons programme and the completeness investigation undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency, acquired some practical insights that may be of some benefit to Member States. This is particularly the case regarding stocks, where we underline the difficulties associated with this issue and offer, what we consider to be a practical, achievable and effective manner of dealing with the issue in a manner that fulfils nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.”

Footnotes

1. See documents section for Foreign Minister Nzo's address plus the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” and the “Strengthened Review Process”.
2. “Delegate Perspective on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference” a series of interviews by Susan B Welsh, Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1995
3. See documentation section for the Working Paper

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