Missiles
South Africa 's missile programmeDespite the international arms embargo South Africa had in its years of isolation managed to build a considerably advanced and sophisticated missile programme that culminated into a space launch vehicle programme designed to launch low orbit satellites. It is estimated that up to R5 billion had gone into the research, development and production processes under the programme. It could, according to officials that had worked on the programme, produce missiles with a re-entry capability and capacity to carry a nuclear warhead although it is also admitted by the same officials that these scenarios were inconceivable and there were no plans to actually do so.
July 1989 marked the first su ccessful test of a South African developed booster rocket, the RSA-3 from the Overberg Test Range near Bredasdorp, 200 km east of Cape Town . This test was part of a space launch programme with t he objective to place a small surveillance satellite of 330kg mass into a low orbit around the earth. Development continued even after South African renunciation of its nuclear weapons. The launcher was, however, found not to be commercially viable and was as a result cancelled in mid-1994. The RSA-3 was developed by the Denel/Houwteq organisation at Grabouw, 30 km east of Cape Town . The missile successfully flew 1,620km southeast toward Prince Edward Island . It is estimated that it had a payload of more than 500kg, and thus fell within the limits of MTCR controls. The engine test facility was at Rooi Els while the missile motors were developed and constructed at Somchem's facility outside Somerset West, close to Cape Town . The first test flight was followed by at least two more tests during July 1989 and November 1990. The RSA-4 ICBM / satellite launcher was a planned follow-on to the RSA-3. A large new first stage optimised the vehicle and more than doubled the payload in comparison to the RSA-3. The RSA-4 was never tested, but its first stage motor was tested on at least one occasion (October 12, 1992) at the static test facility at Hangklip, in the Western Cape .
Following high-level discussions starting in September 1991 between the then South African Government and the first Bush Administration in the US, it was determined that the space launch programme was no longer economically viable. After a year of attempting to make the programme profitable, it was abandoned in 1993.
This timeframe also earmarked the announcement by the Government in November 1992 to promulgate a bill prohibiting development of weapons of mass destruction in South Africa . Soon after the Act was promulgated, the Department of Defence issued Government Notice No. R88 in May 1993, which introduced licensing requirements for all items falling within the limits of the MTCR. South Africa also indicated at the time that it would adhere to the MTCR Guidelines as if it were a full member.
Following former State President FW de Klerk's public acknowledgment of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme in March 1993, negotiations between South African Foreign Affairs and Department of Defence officials and a senior delegation from the United States resulted in a bilateral agreement between South Africa and the United States in October 1994. In return, the United States agreed to support South Africa's membership application for the MTCR with a promise that this could lead to access to the military and high-tech markets of the industrialised nations. T t he RSA-3 and RSA-4 space launch vehicle programmes were also subsequently cancelled.
The United States Department of State agreed to provide US$500,000 to enable the destruction of the programme, including the remaining RSA solid propellants and rocket casings, the engine casting pits and the Hangklip static motor test facility at Rooi Els. These facilities were destroyed by a US based contractor.
1 A Department of Foreign Affairs official, accompanied by officials from the Non-Proliferation Council Secretariat and Denel oversaw the destruction of these programmes, including the remaining RSA solid propellants and rocket casings, the engine casting pits and the Hangklip static motor test facility at Rooi Els. implementation of the agreement. US State Department and intelligence agency officials verified the destruction of the programme . With all the requirements of the agreement being met Subsequent to the destruction of these programmes , the Department of Foreign Affairs formally submitted South Africa 's membership application to the MTCR in June 1995 and for the first time attended the September 1995 Plenary meeting held in Bonn , Germany .
The agreement also contained a very important “sunset clause”, which stipulated that the agreement would be terminated once South Africa became a member of the MTCR. Since the MTCR does not prohibit the development of space launch vehicles or ballistic missile programmes, this means that South Africa could, if the Government so decides, restart a space programme.
South Africa 's role in international efforts to address missiles
United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles in All its Aspects
There is no existing international instrument that addresses missiles. Iran has since 2000 initiated a United Nations General Assembly resolution entitled “Missiles in all its aspects” which has been adopted with wide support from the developing countries and despite opposition from western and NATO alliance countries. These resolutions called for the negotiation of a legally binding multilateral instrument addressing the issue of missiles in all its aspects at the Conference on Disarmament and decided that an UN Panel of Governmental Experts should convene. As in the case with other issues that make it onto the international agenda, the expectation exists that UN Panels will make recommendations that can then be taken further and hopefully end in the negotiation of a legally binding instrument addressing the issue. Regretfully the first UN Panel, that concluded its work in 2002, could not produce a consensus on a possible course of action nor on the actual nature of the problem. On the positive side, the Panel can at least be given credit for highlighting the issue as a concern and elaborating on the facets and complexities of the problem. The second Panel of Experts will continue its deliberations during 2004 but there is little hope that they will come to any further conclusions than their predecessor.
South African representatives on the first Panel focussed on ensuring that the linkage with missiles and delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, would be correctly reflected. Peaceful uses were also an equal focus where language was hard fought to craft wording that would underline the rights of States to reap the benefits of the utilisation of space for peaceful purposes. States tried to insert language that negatively portrayed the peaceful pursuit of space technology as a concealment for missile programmes for military purposes. South Africa provided most of the drafting language on these issues and with strong support from Non-Aligned Movement Member States managed to obtain compromise language that reaffirmed the rights of States to pursue space technology for peaceful purposes without the negative “criminalising” language some sought.
Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)
The HCOC was adopted at an international conference in The Hague on 25-26 November 2002. It had its genesis in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and can be seen as supplementing the efforts of MTCR partners by broadening participation in a so-called “multilateralising” process. Meetings open to participation of all States - excluding Iraq due to UN Chapter VII sanctions - were held in Paris and Madrid during 2002 to work on a text. Denmark , as chair of the European Union claimed to have consulted widely on the final text that was adopted in The Hague . States are politically bound under the Code to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles and to exercise maximum restraint in developing, testing and deploying such missiles. Transparency measures include annual declarations and pre-launch notifications regarding ballistic missile and space launch programmes.
The Code does provide a first step in addressing the issue but is no substitute for an effective, verifiable international instrument or regime. Moreover, the Code represents an “NPT on Missiles” as it contains no disarmament perspective and through this discrimination acknowledges possession of ballistic missiles by some States while aiming to discourage others from obtaining them, irrespective of their reasons for doing so. While more than a hundred countries have accepted the politically binding terms of the Code, States with well-developed missile programmes like China , India , Israel , Pakistan and Iran have not bound themselves.
South Africa had openly expressed its dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency and the so-called (but flawed) “multilateralisation” process arguing that it would not result in bringing the major missile possessors or aspirant possessors on board. Despite this South Africa , as a promoter of international non-proliferation efforts, played a highly active role in trying to broaden international participation by encouraging developing States to participate in the negotiations and to try and strengthen the text of the Code.
South African diplomats see the issue of missiles as a long term objective and have prepared to continue pushing the issue through improvements and strengthening of the HCOC while at the same time supporting efforts to negotiate a legally binding multilateral instrument that would contain disarmament and non-proliferation obligations.
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