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About the Author

Thomas Markram is a Senior Analyst in the Disarmament and Arms Management Unit at SaferAfrica.

He was previously a Director at the Department of Foreign Affairs where, since 1995 he was directly involved with the management, development and implementation of South Africa 's policy on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Tom was also South Africa's Deputy Permanent Representative at the United Nations, International Organisations and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva from 1999-2003. He was also part of the seven person team of disarmament experts sent by President Mbeki on a peace mission to try and avert war in Iraq in February 2003. He played a leading role in the Ottawa Process for a global ban on landmines and has also served on the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles.

Foreword

The intent of this study is to provide a summary of the achievements and the evolution of thought and action on the issue of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in South Africa from 1994 to 2004. The study has been undertaken as a contribution and tribute to the ten year anniversary celebrations of a democratic South Africa. Issues like disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control are of national, regional and international importance, but are in their conceptual form often seen as being too esoteric and therefore receive scant attention in the media and public eye. While they seldom capture attention except in times of crisis when repercussions can be dramatic and far reaching, their consequences have very real implications on the daily lives of people around the world. This is most clearly demonstrated in the negotiations to ban anti-personnel mines and the work being undertaken to gain control over the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons. International work on these issues sometimes does make headline news and has in several instances been the focus of heated international debate and public attention, as was the case for the reasons purportedly justifying the war and the invasion of Iraq. More often than not the work being done takes place in the classical perception of diplomatic negotiations, that is to say in smoke filled rooms, out of the public eye and with little recognition of the significance of the achievements being accomplished and the efforts being undertaken to alleviate the misery that weapons cause in everyday lives.

The coming to power of the democratic Government of National Unity in 1994 set in motion new policy development, direction and management in all aspects relating to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Massive arms production, a chemical and biological warfare capability and a nuclear weapons programme, along with a deliberate policy of destabilisation, characterised the period up to 1989. The FW de Klerk presidency from 1989 to 1993 brought some respite with the destruction of the nuclear weapons programme, accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the beginnings of a process to unwind the elaborate facets of the apartheid military and armaments fortress. Today South Africa enjoys an enviable reputation around the world and has the standing of a major player in disarmament, nonproliferation and arms control issues, actively promoting peace as well as regional and international security. This has resulted from the deep commitment of the leaders and individuals involved, the principles and experiences borne from the liberation struggle and the historical legacy left by the previous apartheid regime. South Africa and its disarmament diplomats have been instrumental in establishing a new approach characterised by dealing with previously intractable issues from a pragmatic perspective, seeking realistic and achievable solutions. They have also been at the forefront of recognising the role that civil society can play in partnership with the governments of the world, especially in the context of seeking solutions to the divergent views that characterised international negotiations on anti-personnel mines and small arms and the support that could be given to achieving the objectives of the New Agenda Coalition on nuclear disarmament. A central aspect of these achievements has been the positioning, policies and action reflecting South Africa’s sovereign independence as a nation and African country, part of Southern Africa, along with wider responsibility in the Non-Aligned Movement and the international arena.

This study aims to record and give a brief insight into the most important developments in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and to present it in a manner that is understandable and informative. The study provides limited comment, analysis and supporting documentation as the subject deserves a more in-depth approach to do it proper justice. The few documents that have been included have been selected to assist readers by providing important indicators on the issue. I am grateful to all those who have provided inputs, guidance and insights from their own perspectives. Recognition should also be given to those individuals in the Department of Foreign Affairs and other government departments and nongovernmental organisations that have contributed so much to the development and implementation of South Africa’s policy on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. They include Virginia Gamba, Peter Goosen, Bennie Lombard and Jean du Preez. The deductions, assessments and comment that do appear in places are entirely my own.

I would like to express my appreciation to SaferAfrica for affording me the opportunity to undertake this study and hope that it will make a contribution to the impressive array of achievements and progress we have experienced as a nation since 1994.

Tom Markram
19 June 2004

Introduction

The threat of weapons of mass destruction

The understanding of the threat that weapons of mass destruction pose to all peoples around the world, and which had been the cause of massive demonstrations organised by peace movements of the1960s and 70s, dissipated after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Without the daily reminders of the massive arsenals of the United States and Soviet Union that could have destroyed the world many times over, people fell into a false sense of security, as if these weapons had disappeared and the threat of their use was no longer contemplated by those that possessed, or aspired to possess them. Developments in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the attempts by terrorist groups such as 1 Al Qaeda and the 2 Aum Shinrikyo cult to obtain these weapons, and the new doctrines that were developed by Generals who saw the utility of their weapons being questioned, have again forced the debate on weapons of mass destruction to the forefront of the international agenda.

The dangerous difference between the debate that raged between such groups as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the United Kingdom and the military alliances of the Cold War, and the debate that we are witnessing today, is the recognition during the Cold War that security would only be achieved through a combination of the elimination of these weapons and the prevention of their proliferation. Today's debate has far more dangerous consequences because the possessors and aspirant possessors of these weapons refuse to acknowledge the threat that they pose and are determined to only focus on counter-proliferation. The concept that weapons of mass destruction, or weapons of murder as they were defined by President George W Bush in his address to the American Defence University on 11 February 2004, are acceptable in the hands of those that possess them and that they are only a threat in the hands of their enemies, defies the logic of human experience. This was reinforced by President Thabo M Mbeki at the Nigerian National War College in Abuja on 8 December 2003 when he stated that “the horrors that are inherent in the (mere) existence and threat of the use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are threats that confront us all” and when he made it clear that all Africans are all opposed to weapons of mass destruction calling on the African continent to “continue in its efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology, to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving complete nuclear disarmament.”

The growing threat of conventional arms

During the Cold War, regional conflicts and civil wars mostly found their origin and supply of weapons in the ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a consequence the supply of weapons, feeding these conflicts, came from the sponsors of the opposing forces. In the post-Cold War era, however, the supply of conventional weapons, particularly small arms and light weapons, has become much more diversified with supplies coming from redundant weapons of Cold War arsenals and from the illicit circulation of weapons from one conflict to the next.

The images that have spread around the world of the brutality and inhumanity that has been inflicted on innocent people, especially the poor, the weak, women and children, have forced the issue of conventional weapons onto the agenda of the international community. It has resulted in a growing international emphasis being placed on conventional armaments in all disarmament fora with specific reference to the consequences of the use of landmines and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace in 1995, when it was believed that the end of the Cold War would usher in a new era of security, stated that, "Progress since 1992 in the area of weapons of mass destruction and major weapons systems must be followed by parallel progress in conventional arms, particularly with respect to light weapons." In this Supplement he also concentrated on "micro-disarmament", sometimes referred to as "conventional disarmament". By this he meant practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, which are killing people in the hundreds of thousands. According to the Secretary-General there are two categories of light weapons that merit special attention. The first is small arms, which are predominantly responsible for most of the deaths in current conflicts. The causes of their proliferation and availability are many, the earlier supply of weapons to client States by the parties to the Cold War, internal conflicts, competition for commercial markets, criminal activity and the collapse of governmental law and order. Secondly, there is the proliferation of anti-personnel landmines, which has attracted world-wide attention specifically regarding the banning of such landmines.

South Africa has promoted the need at all disarmament fora and in the Non-Aligned Movement for equal attention to be given to disarmament, non-proliferation, and the control of the proliferation of conventional weapons as has been given to weapons of mass destruction. These conventional weapons, particularly small arms and light weapons, are responsible for the daily death and devastation wreaked on people, many innocent civilians, women and children. The previous Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr AB Nzo stated the following in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1996:

"It is not just the threat posed by all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery that is of serious concern to my Government, but also the build up of conventional weapons beyond a level which can be considered legitimate for the purposes of self-defence."

The major instruments and regimes for disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and the South African view of them

The current international legal and other regimes that provide the framework for combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the potential basis for the elimination of all these weapons includes a number of multilateral treaties and bodies to regulate and establish norms and guidelines aimed at disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The most important multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction treaties and international instruments focussed on by South Africa as it moved to establish its position on these issues were:
  • The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
  • The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);
  • The negotiation of a treaty on the fissile material essential for nuclear weapons;
  • Various nuclear weapon-free regional zones with particular emphasis on the establishment of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty);
  • The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); and
  • The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).
The significant multilateral conventions dealing with conventional weapons that were focussed on were:
  • The Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW); and
  • The Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Mines.
Further important instruments that are politically binding but where the issues may not have matured enough to conclude legally binding treaties are:
  • The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; and
  • The United Nations Programme of Action on illicit small arms and light weapons.
Many of these treaties were negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the international community's primary negotiating forum for non-proliferation and disarmament related issues.

The international community has also established, or is in the process of establishing a number of multilateral organisations to implement these treaties and to verify States' adherence to them. The most important are:
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
  • The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW);
  • The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO);
  • The First Committee (Disarmament) of the United Nations General Assembly; and
  • The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC).
Since the end of the Cold War era, there has been growing international concern that a number of countries were attempting to develop programmes to produce weapons of mass destruction. To address these concerns and to prevent the spread of the relevant technologies, material and equipment, a number of international measures were taken through the introduction and creation of non-proliferation regimes and controls. As certain advanced technologies can be applied for both aggressive as well as peaceful purposes (known as dual-use application technology), non-proliferation control groups/suppliers groups consisting of a small group of countries with advanced technological capabilities were established to control the transfer of these dual-use materials and technologies. The following are currently the most important for South Africa:
  • The Zangger Committee (Nuclear direct use technology and equipment);
  • The Nuclear Suppliers Group (Nuclear direct use and dual-use technology and equipment);
  • The Australia Group (AG) which covers both chemical and biological weapons related agents and equipment);
  • The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which controls equipment and technology used in ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction delivery systems; and
  • The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) which controls both dual-use equipment and technology used in weapons of mass destruction as well as in conventional weapons systems.
The South African Government's general policy approach

3 The South African Government has since its inauguration in May 1994, committed itself to a policy of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control which covers all weapons of mass destruction and extends to concerns relating to the proliferation of conventional weapons. This policy forms an integral part of its commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection. In order to implement this policy, the South African Cabinet on 31 August 1994 accepted a proposal by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that South Africa should:
  • Be an active participant in the various non-proliferation regimes and suppliers groups;
  • Adopt positions publicly supporting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with the goal of promoting international peace and security;
  • Use its position as a member of the supplier's regimes and of the Africa Group and the Non-Aligned Movement to promote the importance of non-proliferation and to ensure that these controls do not become the means whereby developing countries are denied access to advanced technologies required.
A primary goal of South Africa's policy is to reinforce and promote South Africa as a responsible producer, possessor and trader of defence related products and advanced technologies in the nuclear, biological, chemical and missile fields. South Africa in so doing promotes the benefits which disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control hold for international peace and security, particularly to countries in Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement.

South Africa is regarded as a major role player in this field and has the standing and capacity to promote dialogue and interaction with the developed world on the one hand, while on the other, promoting and addressing the concerns of the developing world so that they can acquire the technology they need for their development. South Africa therefore, supports all bilateral and multilateral initiatives to prevent the proliferation and development of such weapons and at the same time promotes total disarmament of these weapons.

South Africa is fully committed to its international obligations as a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). South Africa is an active member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) where these treaties were negotiated. South Africa is also a member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, South Africa is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Zangger Committee, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. South Africa has not joined the Australia Group but applies all its regulations. South Africa has repeatedly stated its desire to join the Wassenaar Arrangement and is hopeful that obstacles currently placed in its path among members can be overcome to permit membership as soon as possible. As the only international arms control regime that addresses conventional weapons, the Wassenaar Arrangement would provide South Africa with a critical opportunity to influence the regulation of the arms trade especially in the context of its concerns about the role that this trade plays in feeding the conflicts spread across the African continent.

The regulation of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction capabilities in South Africa

Soon after the dismantlement of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme, and the steps that were taken to establish effective controls over the activities of the former South African Government in the areas of biological, chemical and missile capability, legislation was promulgated to ensure that the remaining capabilities could not be used to proliferate weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Act on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Act No. 87 of 1993) and subsequent amendments provides for a wide range of powers on a variety of related issues, but is primarily focussed on the regulation of dual-use technologies, equipment and material that can be used in the development of these weapon systems. Section 4 of the Act establishes a Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction that is administered by the Minister of Trade and Industry. All transfers of listed technologies, equipment and material require permits issued by the Council, although the Minister of Trade and Industry has the authority to declare non-listed items as being controlled under a “Catch-All” regulatory provision on the advice of the Council. Such a “Catch-All” declaration would make the items identified subject to the same control mechanisms.

The mandate of the Non-Proliferation Council (NPC)

4 The Council implements national measures in line with South Africa 's undertakings regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by:
  • Setting up the necessary national systems and measures to implement the guidelines of:
    • The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) regarding certain missiles, missile systems, technology components;
    • The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) regarding nuclear related dual-use equipment, materials and related technology items;
    • The provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC); and
    • The provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC);
  • Implementing control structures and mechanisms to demonstrate national compliance with international guidelines and undertakings;
  • Ensuring that the activities of the Council, including the evaluation criteria applied to control measures are transparent;
  • Ensuring that the integrity of the Council is beyond reproach, inter alia by adopting specific measures regarding the confidentiality of information obtained by the Council;
  • Encouraging understanding, acceptance and support from industry to comply to regulations in this regard;
  • Introducing optimised control measures, in order to:
    • Streamline processes;
    • Limit detrimental effects on commerce; and
    • Ensure cost effectiveness;
  • Protecting the right of South Africa to develop, maintain and promote, subject to its non-proliferation commitments:
    • Conventional defence capability;
    • Conventional military capabilities not dependent upon any toxic, ineffective or nuclear effects as a means of warfare;
    • Capabilities in respect of industrial, agricultural, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful research, development or production purposes;
  • Appointing knowledgeable persons from industry and other institutions to committees to assist and advise the Council in its duties;
  • Formulating and implementing policies on any of its duties and functions, as may be necessary, regarding the manner in which such duties and functions will be performed.
Committees of the Council

Three working committees support the Council:
  • The Biological Weapons Working Committee (BWWC)
    This committee is comprised of representatives from research institutes, government departments and other bodies involved with virology, plant pathology, veterinary and other medical research institutes as well as representatives of the Surgeon-General's office, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Non-Proliferation Council's secretariat and the biotechnological industry. The chairperson, as appointed by the Non-Proliferation Council, is a member of the Surgeon-General's office. This committee has provided the technical input for working papers that have been used by South African delegations participating in negotiations in Geneva on biological weapons issues, particularly the work undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
  • The Chemical Weapons Working Committee (CWWC)
    This committee is comprised of representatives from the chemical industry, research institutes, government departments (including the South African Military Health Services and the Department of Foreign Affairs) and the Non-Proliferation Council secretariat. The chairperson, as appointed by the NPC, is a member of the Surgeon-General's office. The task of the committee is to advise the Council on issues relating to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.
  • The Nuclear and Missile Dual-Use Committee (NMDUC)
    This committee is comprised of representatives from the aerospace industry, nuclear industry, government departments and NPC secretariat. The Council appoints the chairperson and the committee's task is to advise the Council on issues related to nuclear and missile related dual-use goods.
The Non-Proliferation Council was thus designed to ensure that all relevant government departments and other affected instances are represented in its decision making and in the implementation of its responsibilities. The Council has proven to be an effective instrument of government policy and its powers have been used to deny exports to destinations that were believed to be of proliferation concern. As in the case with all regulatory frameworks, including the non-proliferation control mechanisms in other countries, the Council does not provide a guarantee that persons or companies acting outside the law would not be successful in circumventing the provisions of the Act. The Council and the relevant enforcement agencies in South Africa have, however, demonstrated their ability to act against violators.

The South African National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC)

The NCACC was established in 1995 to exercise political control over arms transfers – the import and export of conventional weapons and their transit through South Africa . The establishment of the NCACC resulted from the outcome of the Cameron Commission of Enquiry into a consignment of weapons, supposedly ordered by Lebanon , which was subsequently found to be destined for Yemen . The Commission maintained that 5 “Armscor is a product of the apartheid era … but unlike other institutions – such as Parliament, the SABC and the police … had not been subject to a transparent process of transformation in keeping with our new democracy”. The Commission further severely criticised the operational systems and organisational culture which represented the “conventional arms control system” that had been in place. It inter alia criticised the bureaucratic maintenance of lists of countries to which conventional arms could be transferred, the control of the system by bureaucrats who dealt with the issues in a routine manner without looking at the particular circumstances of each export, the undue role that was being played by government departments and institutions that had vested interests in the matters under consideration, and the lack of political level consideration. As a consequence it was decided to centre conventional arms control in a committee of Ministers that became known as the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC). It was decided that the NCACC, which is effectively a subcommittee of Cabinet, would be chaired by a Minister that had no direct interest in foreign relations, defence or the sale of South African equipment and that the committee would consider each application separately and on its merits. The NCACC also established a set of criteria that would guide it in its decision making, which related to issues such as human rights, conflict situations, internal suppression, legitimate defence needs, international norms and arms embargoes.

Prof Kader Asmal, the Chairperson of the NCACC, and then Minister of Water Affairs underlined the major shift in thinking and policy at a defence industry information session in May 1996 when he pointed out that “Restraint must, indeed be the new watchword in the new, democratic South Africa's arms dealings with the world…How can one accept the notion that South Africa should be unconcerned about inflicting on other countries the pain and destruction that it endured over past decades? Arms transfers have moral implications and entail moral choices on the part of supplier States… we have no choice but to be highly selective and circumspect. The country that did away with its nuclear warfare capacity, the death penalty and corporal punishment cannot be the country that allows its arms trade to flourish uncontrollably…. A responsible arms transfer policy is one in which humanitarian, ethical, political, legal and strategic reasons for exercising restraint take precedence over the economic and commercial motivation to export arms.”

Since the initiation of new policy by the South African Cabinet in August 1995, time, experience and international positioning have resulted in a regularisation of the legislative powers of the NCACC with the promulgation of the National Conventional Arms Control (NCAC) Act (Act No. 41 of 2002) and subsequently the regulations in terms of the Act, in May 2004. The new legislation recognises best international arms control practices and enables the NCACC to ensure the implementation of a legitimate, effective and transparent control process, which would foster national and international confidence in the control procedures.

The new Act has laid down a set of guiding principles and criteria to be used in the assessment of conventional arms transfers. These guiding principles and criteria are based on internationally accepted norms and, inter alia, include consideration of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the adherence to international treaties and agreements as well as UN Security Council decisions relating to arms embargoes. The Act makes provision for four levels of responsibility. These include a technical processing level, which is carried out by the Secretariat of the NCACC, a multi-departmental review process, a departmental scrutiny process and finally a control, policy and decision-making authority, which is embodied in the NCACC.

Provision is made in the new NCAC Act for:
  • An independent inspectorate, which is tasked to ensure that trade in conventional arms and services is conducted in compliance with the Act.
  • Stiffer penalties for offenders than was the case under previous legislation.
  • Quarterly r eporting to Parliament.
The detailed regulations for the implementation of the NCAC Act are currently being prepared and will be published in the South African Government Gazette as soon as they are completed. These regulations are based on the Wassenaar Arrangement controls. Besides controlling conventional arms and services, the Act also regulates military dual-use goods. This brings the Act into line with international arms control practices such as the Wassenaar Arrangement. Another important aspect that the Act regulates in the trade in conventional arms and services is controlling brokering and freight forwarding services. The regulations will furthermore contain a “catch-all” provision.

The Act has extra-territorial powers designed to control trade in conventional arms and services abroad by South African nationals and by foreign persons registered in South Africa in terms of the Act.

Particular control measures exercised in terms of the NCAC Act are through the issuance of the following permits:
  • Armaments development and manufacturing permit;
  • Marketing permit;
  • Contracting permit;
  • Export permit;
  • Import permit; and,
  • Conveyance permit.
Non-binding advance marketing authorisation is also given by the NCACC in order to assist South African companies in their planning for marketing.

Summary of significant accomplishments by South Africa

1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was able to achieve a successful conclusion on the basis of the proposals made by South Africa 's then Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo. South Africa had proposed that the indefinite extension of the NPT should be based on an agreement amongst the States Parties on a set of principles that would provide a set of yardsticks for the accomplishment of the Treaty's objectives and provisions. South Africa had also proposed that the Review mechanism for the Treaty should be strengthened.

The success of South Africa 's diplomacy and approach at the Review and Extension Conference brought South Africa directly into the limelight of the international disarmament and non-proliferation arena. South Africa had made its mark and would from this time onwards play a significant international role, “punching way above its weight class” in an arena dominated by big powers and nuclear-weapon States.

The Pelindaba Treaty - 1995

The decision to dismantle South Africa 's nuclear weapons and its accession to the NPT opened the door for the successful conclusion of a Treaty on an African Nuclear- Weapon-Free-Zone (AFNWFZ). The negotiations of the Treaty were successfully concluded at a meeting of OAU and UN experts in Johannesburg in June 1995. The name "Pelindaba" was particularly appropriate when the draft was adopted as the name originates from the Zulu words "phelile indaba", which roughly translate into "the matter/discussion is closed/settled". The headquarters of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) envisaged by the Treaty is to be situated in South Africa .

1996 Expansion of the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

South Africa brokered a solution that permitted the deadlocked expansion of the CD in Geneva on 17 June 1996, permitting a further 23 countries to join the then 38 country membership. The CD is the sole multilateral negotiating body of the international community on disarmament treaties.

1996 Chairing of the first Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Preparatory Committee

Recognition of South Africa's growing role and the success of its approach on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament was acknowledged with the invitation to Ambassador JS Selebi, South Africa's then Permanent Representative to United Nations, International Organisations and Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and now National Commissioner of Police, to preside over the first session of the Preparatory Committee to establish the CTBT Organisation.

1997 Convention banning anti-personnel land mines

South Africa was one of the ten core group countries that established the so-called Ottawa Process that promoted the ban on anti-personnel landmines. This Process culminated in the diplomatic conference held in Oslo , Norway , in September 1997 where South Africa 's growing stature on disarmament issues and the personal diplomatic skill of Ambassador J S Selebi resulted in him chairing the final negotiations.

Jody Williams , Nobel Peace Prize Laureate (1997) and leader of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines maintains that “without the absolutely pivotal role played by Ambassador Jackie Selebi in the actual negotiations themselves in Norway in September 1997, we might not have the treaty we have”.

1998 Establishment of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)

The NAC was established as a result of the simultaneous release of a Joint Ministerial Declaration on 9 June 1998 by the Foreign Ministers of South Africa, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, Slovenia and Sweden. The Joint Ministerial Declaration called for a new international agenda to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, through the pursuit, in parallel with a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels. Slovenia withdrew from the NAC in November 1998 following extreme pressure from the United States .

The NAC was established as a consequence of the frustration that had developed as a result of the deadlock in the international community on the nuclear disarmament debate and also because of the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament following the end of the Cold War. The NAC has been remarkably successful since 1998 in redefining and moving the nuclear disarmament debate forward as a result of its focus on achievable goals.

1996-2002 Negotiations to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)

South Africa has played a leading role in the efforts of States Parties to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. During the seven years of negotiation of a Protocol in this regard, South Africa produced 17 percent of the working papers and proposals, considerably more than any other participating country or group of countries. South Africa will also be chairing the meetings of States Parties of the BTWC that will take place in 2004.

2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference

South Africa and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) played a decisive role at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference by ensuring that the Final Document of that Conference substantively addressed the nuclear disarmament issue and that a series of measures aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons could be agreed to. The critical role of South Africa and the NAC at the 2000 NPT Review Conference has been widely recognised and acknowledged by the international community.

2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trafficking in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

South African diplomats and civil society were at the forefront of efforts to bring international recognition to the global small arms problem and to promote an agenda which would provide for action to be taken at international, regional and national levels to combat the proliferation and circulation of small arms. South Africa was a member of the two Panels of Experts that deliberated on the issue and recommended that the UN hold an international conference to address it. South Africa in June 1998 initiated the 6decision by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to focus on the issue of small arms and light weapons that consequently led to the common African position on this issue contained in the Bamako Declaration. This position greatly strengthened the ability of African diplomats and civil society organisations to effectively participate in the July 2001 UN Conference held in New York . The Conference adopted a Plan of Action which clearly detailed national, regional and international responsibilities and action over the next five years setting in motion the first solid foundation and building block upon which this extremely vexing and destructive issue could be addressed and combated on a global scale. The bulk of recommendations in the Bamako Declaration were incorporated into the UN Programme of Action.

South Africa 's role as initiator of United Nations General Assembly disarmament resolutions

South Africa is the main sponsor on four United Nations disarmament resolutions. Since 1996 South Africa has drafted and consulted on the text of the resolution on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba) which is then put forward on behalf of the Africa Group at the First Committee of the General Assembly. Since 1998 South Africa has put forward as main sponsor a resolution dealing with small arms trafficking which has since been amalgamated with another resolution on small arms into the only resolution dealing with the “Illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects” on a global basis. This resolution is now jointly put forward by South Africa, Japan and Colombia and the resolution adopted at the 58 th Session of the General Assembly in December 2003 7 (A/Res/58/241) sets out the international agenda on small arms for the period 2004-2006. South Africa also puts forward two resolutions dealing with nuclear disarmament issues in a joint effort with its six other New Agenda partners, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden. These resolutions: “Towards a world free of nuclear weapons: a New Agenda” 8 ( A/Res/58/51) and “ Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons ” 9 (A/Res/58/50) have redefined the debate on nuclear disarmament issues.

Footnotes

1. Al Qaeda is an international terrorist group led by Osama Bin Laden.They were responsible for the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States and it is believed may also have been responsible for the February 2004 attacks on trains in Madrid.
2. Aum Shinrikyo is a religious doomsday cult obsessed with the apocalypse.They were responsible for the release of sarin into the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 which killed 12 people and hospitalized 5000.
3. See pages 7-9 of South Africa's policy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction:The role of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
4. See Non-Proliferation Council – Procedures and Information, document NPC06-004 of 22 April 2002
5. Cameron Commission of Enquiry First Report
6. CM/Dec.432(LXVIII), see documentation for details of the decision
7. See documentation for the details of the resolution
8. See documentation for the details of the resolution
9. See documentation for the details of the resolution



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