Conventional disarmament, Non-proliferation and Arms control
The Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)The newly elected South African Government was, given the past indiscriminate and irresponsible use of mines in Southern Africa, concerned about the problem of the high loss of civilian life and casualties as well as the inhibiting result on the socio-economic development of many States, particularly in Africa . In this context, the Government initially supported the ultimate goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel mines and the implementation of responsible international arms control policies to achieve this goal.
In this regard, South Africa deposited its instrument of accession to the CCW on 13 September 1995 and became a State Party to the CCW on 13 March 1996. At that time the CCW was the only international instrument that dealt with the issue of landmines, and in particular anti-personnel mines. South Africa's accession to the CCW emphasised the Government's commitment to promote international peace and security, to limit and alleviate the suffering caused by war and armed conflict, and of its responsibility to implement humanitarian and arms control policies to this end.
The Convention, which was concluded in 1980, was opened for signature by all Member States of the United Nations for a period of twelve months from 10 April 1981 and entered into force on 2 December 1983. The objective of the Convention is to prohibit the use of the above-mentioned weapons, which have indiscriminately caused death and injury to millions of people world-wide, including innocent civilians.
The Convention includes the Treaty and five Protocols entitled respectively:
- Protocol on Non-detectable Fragments (I)
- Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices (II)
- Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Incendiary Weapons (III)
- Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (IV)
- Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) (V) (Adopted on 28 November 2003, and yet to enter into force)
The Review Conference of the CCW, which took place in Vienna in September / October 1995 ended with the adoption of a new Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons but failed to reach agreement on a revised Protocol II on mines, booby-traps and other devices. It was consequently decided to suspend the Conference and to hold resumed sessions in Geneva in January and April/ May 1996. South Africa attended the first two sessions of the Review Conference as an observer and the final session in April/May 1996 as a State Party. On 3 May 1996 Protocol II as amended was finally adopted and included some significant advances. Although the results were the maximum that could be agreed, and represented a delicate and necessary compromise, many States including South Africa were not fully satisfied.
Many States Parties to the Convention, including the United States of America , China and the Russian Federation , still viewed anti-personnel mines as a legitimate weapon of war and would thus not consider a prohibition on the use of anti-personnel mines other than those not being detectable. Therefore, during the Review Conference, South Africa pursued a principled and progressive approach with regard to the ultimate goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel mines and settled on trying to obtain achievable objectives. Furthermore, it was considered important that the amended Protocol II should be stronger, not weaker, in its prohibitions and restrictions on mines, booby-traps and other devices than the original Protocol II, as an incremental step towards the ultimate goal of the elimination of anti-personnel mines.
Realising that the amended Protocol II would leave room for improvement, South Africa supported proposals for regular review conferences to evaluate the progress achieved in implementing the Convention. This would ensure that any perceived weaknesses in the Convention could be addressed and that the possibility of an international prohibition on anti-personnel mines be kept on the "agenda". South Africa also supported proposals to introduce effective provisions concerning technological co-operation and assistance in mine clearance, which would assist States Parties to meet their obligations under the Convention. South Africa also made a proposal for the establishment of an effective system of compliance verification under the CCW.
At the conclusion of the first Review Conference on 3 May 1996, South Africa made a statement that outlined a shift in its position on the issue of anti-personnel mines. This shift in position, after being criticised in the South African media for not supporting a prohibition on anti-personnel mines, moved South Africa into the camp of those like-mined countries that would later become the core group of countries supporting such a prohibition. In terms of this statement South Africa 's position on landmines was:
- a suspension of the operational use of anti-personnel mines and in this context the re-evaluation of the future military utility of anti-personnel mines by the South African National Defence Force;
- a prohibition on the export of all types of mines; and
- supporting efforts to achieve an international prohibition on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of all anti-personnel mines.
South Africa has actively participated in the subsequent annual Conferences of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, held in Geneva from 1999 onwards as well as the Second Review Conference of the CCW, which took place in December 2001.
Since 1999, South Africa 's position on the CCW comprised the following elements:
- Importance of the universal adherence to the CCW and its annexed protocols;
- Strengthened regular meetings of the CCW States Parties;
- Strengthened mechanism for the CCW to facilitate the clarification of compliance issues;
- Supporting those proposals that would further restrict or prohibit the use of certain conventional weapons that are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.
The Second Review Conference set up a Group of Governmental Experts to discuss issues related to explosive remnants of war, mines other than anti-personnel mines and compliance. Subsequently the meeting of States Parties, held from 12 to 13 December 2002, approved the continuation of the Group of Governmental Experts with the mandate to negotiate an instrument on ERW and to continue to discuss issues related to mines other than anti-personnel mines and compliance.
Having not banned anti-personnel mines, the United States of America had already as early as the first annual conference of States Parties of Amended Protocol II of the CCW, held from 15-17 December 1999, indicated that this Protocol needed to be strengthened in regard to its obligations on remotely delivered mines, mines other than anti-personnel mines and compliance. These ideas of the US were later expanded upon in subsequent meetings as well as at the Second Review Conference itself.
Within the Non-Aligned Movement, which South Africa chaired from late 1998 until early 2003, there was opposition to the re-opening of Amended Protocol II and to have an intrusive compliance mechanism for the CCW. To counter proposals to re-open this Protocol, which mainly came from the US , the NAM adopted a common position indicating that it would be premature to amend this Protocol. As a result, the US proposed the negotiation of a separate protocol on mines other than anti-personnel mines.
To date discussions have been ongoing in the CCW on the merits of such a separate instrument on mines other than anti-personnel mines. South Africa has been supporting these discussions so as to determine what further work needs to be undertaken on mines other than anti-personnel mines.
Furthermore, as most States Parties to the CCW have already banned anti-personnel mines in terms of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), it became clear that the annual meetings of Amended Protocol II, which was a mechanism agreed to at the First CCW Review Conference, to further enhance work on mine clearance world-wide, was not achieving much success, as the work of the intersessional work programme of the MBT became the focus area of mine action. South Africa therefore proposed at the Second Review Conference of the CCW that the annual meetings of Amended Protocol II be merged with more regular meetings of the CCW as a whole.
The negotiations on an instrument on ERW were completed on 28 November 2003 with the adoption of an Additional Protocol on ERW that mainly dealt with post-conflict remedial measures. In terms of this new Protocol V, States Parties have an obligation to clear ERW in post-conflict situations. Given the situation in Africa with many countries being affected by ERW, South Africa was a strong supporter of the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on ERW. In particular, South Africa circulated a working paper on victim assistance, which proposed that certain obligations to provide assistance to the victims of ERW be included in the instrument. This was partially included in Article 8 of Protocol V, dealing with assistance and co-operation.
In terms of South Africa's commitment to the elimination of the suffering which is caused by war and armed conflict the CCW remains an important instrument of international humanitarian law in so far as it is the only instrument that deals with, and potentially can deal with any future conventional weapon which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.
The campaign and negotiations to ban anti-personnel mines
Prior to 1994 there had been no coherent South African Government policy to address the problems caused by mines, no export prohibition or restriction on the use of mines other than through military doctrine and a government decision not to use mines as a border protection measure on South Africa's borders. In compliance with the UN General Assembly Resolution 48/75 (K) of 16 December 1993, the former South African Government had announced a moratorium on the marketing, export and transit of all types of mines. No further restriction was, however, placed on the use of mines. In 1995 the Government of National Unity decided that the landmine problem could only be addressed in a comprehensive manner restricting the availability and use of mines and alleviating the suffering caused by indiscriminately emplaced mines. In this regard approval was given for South Africa's accession to the CCW and the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs co-ordinated South Africa's national landmine policy and its position at the 1995 CCW Review Conference as well as what contributions could be made to international demining efforts.
After the conclusion of the First Review Conference of the CCW on 3 May 1996, the stage was set in South Africa among a small circle of Foreign Affairs staff, diplomats stationed abroad and military officials, with backing from leading figures in government, to align national policy with the rising sentiment among some like-minded countries to promote a ban on anti-personnel mines. A concerted and effective campaign by civil society, particularly by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, had highlighted the issue internationally and moved the debate from a disarmament issue to that of a humanitarian and developmental related issue. Their efforts, along with their national subsidiary partners, like the South African Campaign to Ban Mines, had brought about a growing realisation by the South African Government and some other States that the limited military utility of anti-personnel mines far outweighed the appalling humanitarian consequences of their use in actual conflicts.
South African policy and international efforts to raise support for a total ban on anti-personnel mines received a major boost on 8 August 1996 when the then President Nelson Mandela and New Zealand Prime Minister James Bolger signed a Memorandum of Co-operation on Disarmament which was widely publicised. The following quotation from the Memorandum deals with mines:
"In view of the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines to civilians, we call for the world wide elimination of anti-personnel mines. In alleviating this suffering we are committed to reinforcing international co-operation for mine-clearance and the development of national capacities for mine clearance in mine infested countries. We also support the development of effective demining and landmine detection capabilities."
Canada 's Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy took the bold initiative at an international strategy conference in Ottawa in October 1996 to issue a challenge to 50 self-selected States, including South Africa , to consolidate their shared commitment and jointly sign onto the Ottawa Declaration calling for a global ban on anti-personnel mines and to deliver thereon within one year. Ambassador JS Selebi, then South Africa's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, participated in the Ottawa meeting and firmly set South Africa on the path to taking a leading role in the fast track so-called Ottawa Process. This Process was to be led by ten core-group countries - Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland – where this new approach to diplomacy proved that medium sized countries could achieve the support of the majority of the international community despite the desires and concerted opposition of superpowers and their allies.
In December 1996 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "An international agreement to ban anti-personnel mines". This resolution was supported by 156 countries, no countries voted against and only 10 abstained ( China , Cuba , Israel , Belarus , Pakistan , North and South Korea , Syria , Russia and Turkey ). South Africa was among the original co-sponsors of the resolution.
Negotiations on banning anti-personnel mines, however, developed along two tracks:
- The first involved those States committed to the Ottawa process which followed an agenda involving international and regional actions culminating in a reunion of Ottawa delegates, plus additional supporting States, in December 1997 to sign a treaty. This process was premised on speed versus numbers aimed at reaching a treaty quickly, irrespective of the forum or venue.
- The second track was those States which promoted the idea of a broader-based treaty involving a greater number of States to be negotiated at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) despite the fact that no consensus among the members of the CD existed to negotiate the anti-personnel mine issue. Moreover, the CD has a limited membership with only some of the countries affected by anti-personnel mines represented there.
After the decision by the South African Government to prohibit anti-personnel mines, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs took the diplomatic initiative to advocate the prohibition of anti-personnel mines and the conclusion of an international legally binding instrument to this end, at various meetings organised in terms of the “Ottawa Process”. In this regard, at meetings held in Maputo , Vienna , Harare , Bonn , Kempton Park and Brussels from February until June 1997, South Africa clearly outlined its position, which included the following elements:
- To strive for the universal banning of anti-personnel landmines by following a twin-track approach of encouraging universal adherence to the CCW and negotiating a treaty banning anti-personnel landmines outside of, but complementary to, the CCW.
- To work together with other like-minded countries to ensure the earliest possible conclusion of a legally-binding international agreement to ban in unequivocal terms, the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines by the end of 1997.
- To alleviate the suffering caused by emplaced landmines by the further development of effective demining and landmine detection technology and to co-ordinate demining activities to ensure that landmines are removed in a cost-effective manner and in the shortest possible time.
- To prioritise the treatment and rehabilitation of the victims of landmines.
- to stress the need that the problem be addressed in a co-ordinated and multifaceted manner banning comprehensively anti-personnel mines and intensifying efforts with regard t mine clearance and mine victim assistance;
- to adopt as a goal the elimination of all anti-personnel mines in Africa and the establishment of Africa as an Anti-Personnel Landmine-Free Zone;
- to end all deployments of anti-personnel mines and to establish national prohibitions such as those already adopted on the African continent, on their use, production, stockpiling, transfer and their destruction;
- to urge all States to participate in the Brussels Conference, 24-27 June 1997 and the Oslo Conference in September 1997, which were both integral to the process leading to the negotiation and signature of a legally binding international agreement to ban anti-personnel mines in Ottawa in December 1997.
The subsequent International Conference for a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines held in Brussels in June 1997 brought together the “building blocks” approach that had been followed by the International Conference to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Ottawa Process formula. The outcome provided a clear self-selection process where the States and civil society organisations from the various regions could pool their collective desire together and move the momentum forward to a diplomatic negotiating conference based on the essential elements incorporated into the “Brussels Declaration”. This Declaration was signed by 97 of the 156 States that participated in Brussels and affirmed the need for a comprehensive ban on the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines; the destruction of all stockpiled and cleared anti-personnel mines; and international co-operation and assistance in the clearance of mined areas. However, the importance of international co-operation and assistance to mine victims had not been included. South Africa took umbrage and refused to sign the Declaration after stormy discussions between the Belgian Foreign Minister and Ambassador JS Selebi failed to result in the inclusion of new language. South Africa had already agreed and Ambassador Selebi had been nominated to chair the final negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference to be held in Oslo in September 1997 and therefore, as a compromise, associated itself with the Brussels Declaration to qualify for participation. This was done only after extensive discussions between South African and Belgian diplomats resulted in the closing statement of the Conference including a reference stating that the victim assistance issue would be addressed in Oslo .
Ambassador JS Selebi consequently chaired the three week long Oslo negotiations which ended successfully on 18 September 1997 with the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. 89 States attended as participants and 32 States attended as observers. Few believed that a total global ban without exceptions could be achieved.
The United States tried to exert tremendous pressure on its NATO and western allies but failed to sway some important players. The tragic death of Princess Diana, who was supposed to have participated in the opening of the Conference, effectively gave the United Kingdom little space to manoeuvre. The French had made up their minds to throw their full weight behind a total ban only weeks before and were not to be deterred under the wilful presence of their CD representative, Ambassador Joëlle Bourgeois.
The Canadian delegation was apparently undermined in the end game when their Prime Minister and Foreign Minister succumbed to American pressure by forcing them to introduce an amendment calling for a deferral until 2006 for the ban to be effected.
However, the unity of purpose amongst the 26 participating African countries – born out of the solidarity generated at Kempton Park – and the grim determination of Ambassador Selebi and the South African delegation who had been rather isolated in the final days of the end game, ensured that a Convention without reservations or exceptions was adopted. This was despite attempts by the United States to obtain a deferral and a geographic exception for the Korean peninsula, fruitless telephonic discussions between Deputy Presidents Al Gore and Thabo Mbeki and an early morning call from President Bill Clinton to an unsympathetic President Nelson Mandela, urging the South African Chair and delegation to show some flexibility. When it was clear that putting the draft treaty to a vote would be easily carried by the majority in favour, the leader of the American delegation – Eric Newsom - – gracefully conceded and allowed the adoption of the Treaty to be gavelled by Ambassador Selebi.
Although there had been some support during the negotiations to try and have the long title of the Convention given a short title, like the Ottawa Treaty, this dissipated with Canada's last ditch attempt to appease the Americans. There was actually a suggestion from the floor to have it called the Oslo Treaty but the humble attitude of Norwegian officials not to upset the Canadians and to obtain their support for the prestigious head of the World Health Organisation post for the previous Norwegian Prime Minister, put paid to this. While Canadian officials have done a tremendous job in popularising the Convention as the “Ottawa Treaty”, many of the hardened officials and members of NGOs from the Oslo negotiations always use the short title “Mine Ban Treaty (MBT)”.
The momentous accomplishment of the Mine Ban Treaty under the chairmanship of Selebi rivalled the glory that Alfred Nzo had basked in at the NPT Extension and Review Conference in May 1995 and marked the zenith of democratic South Africa 's achievements in the international disarmament arena.
Jody Williams , Nobel Peace Prize Laureate (1997) and the leader of the International Campaign to Ban Mines has contributed the following comment on South Africa 's role on the issue of anti-personnel mines:
“When the International Campaign to Ban Mines was recognised with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997, one of the reasons given by the Nobel Committee for that recognition was the new model of diplomacy that evolved in the process leading up to the Mine Ban Treaty. That new model was an open partnership between civil society and governments to bring about rapid change to a global landmine crisis. South Africa was one of the most important governments in that partnership. Without the close co-operation between the ICBL and South Africa and other core States, we would not have succeeded. In particular, without the absolutely pivotal role played by Ambassador Jackie Selebi in the actual negotiations themselves in Norway in September 1997, we might not have the treaty we have today – a treaty that is marked by tremendous progress as we continue to move forward our goal of the total elimination of antipersonnel mines. South Africa continued to play a key role in the ongoing implementation phase of our work, being actively involved in the Intersessional Standing Committees and the Annual Meetings of States parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. The partnership in the lead-up to the negotiation of the Treaty, as well as the continuing work to implement all aspects of the treaty, is a true example of what governments and civil society can do to address human security issues. South Africa has played a key role in that partnership.”
On 30 October 1997 South Africa destroyed the last of its stockpiled anti-personnel mines. On 19 November 1997 the Cabinet approved the signing of the Convention which was held in Ottawa , Canada , from 3-4 December 1997. South Africa was the third country after Canada (as initiator of the challenge and host) and Norway (as host of the final negotiations) to sign the Convention.
At the signing ceremony South Africa 's then Minister of Foreign Affairs, the late Alfred Nzo stated that:
“The fact that we meet here today having attained our objective is a tribute to the lobbying, campaigning, negotiating and commitment of our leaders, civil society, diplomats, the military, landmine survivors and so many others who made this Convention a reality. We in Africa , recognising the human destruction which these weapons are causing on our continent, moved quickly to the forefront of the support for the goal of a total ban and took active measures to address this scourge. The countries represented here have accomplished, what was regarded as impossible, in a year. We chose the fast track process with only one aim - to ban anti-personnel mines so as to stop the killing and maiming by these indiscriminate weapons and to do so as quickly as possible. Today as we stand here we should also honour and remember the tens of thousands of mine victims and affirm that their needs will not be forgotten. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production, Transfer and Stockpiling of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction is a good treaty. It represents some of the best news in the field of disarmament as it abolishes an entire range of conventional weapons. Early Entry into Force of the Convention must be a top priority to make our new international norm against anti-personnel mines legally binding.”
The Mine Ban Treaty was the result of the determined efforts of governments, NGOs, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), regional and international organisations working closely together during 1997. The Convention is a clear and precise international instrument and has established a new international norm against anti-personnel mines by:
- banning the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines;
- obliging States Parties to destroy their stockpiles within four years;
- committing States Parties to remove and destroy anti-personnel mines in mined areas within a ten year period - with provision for extensions, if necessary.
- The Convention also recognises the enormous challenge faced by mine-affected States in meeting the commitments under the treaty and so provides a political framework for international assistance and technical co-operation in the field of mine clearance, stockpile destruction, mapping and marking of mined areas until they are cleared.
- As well, for the first time, the need for special attention of the victims of anti-personnel mines - from rehabilitation to effective long-term social and economic reintegration - is recognised explicitly in an international treaty.
Implementation of the Treaty banning anti-personnel mines
South Africa has participated actively in the Intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva and the annual meetings of States Parties to the Convention. South Africa co-chaired the General Status and Operation of the Treaty segment of the Intersessionals in 2001, and is currently co-rapporteur of this Standing Committee.
Negotiators had in Oslo decided not to venture into protracted deliberations on a secretariat in order to avoid this from becoming a stumbling block and to ensure that the maximum expenditure would go into demining and victim assistance. However, as the MBT entered into force and implementation started taking place it became obvious that States, especially developing countries, needed assistance in the co-chairing of Standing Committees and in performing the obligations the presidency of meetings of States Parties brought. South Africa proposed the establishment of an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and managed to sell the idea at the Third Meeting of States Parties held in Managua in 2002. Today the ISU provides the backbone of secretarial and technical support to those involved in implementation of the Treaty and is funded by donors on a voluntary basis. The ISU is situated at the International Centre for Humanitarian Demining in Geneva where South Africa is a member of the Executive Council of the Foundation's Board.
South Africa , being recognised as a country possessing advanced demining technology, has offered its assistance bilaterally and through the United Nations (UN) to other States to help solve their landmine problem. At a UN International Meeting on Mine Clearance held in Geneva in July 1995, South Africa pledged assistance to the UN Stand-By Capacity for mine clearance for training programmes (demining management, mine lifting and mine awareness) by covering personnel costs to the value of R600 000.
Regionally, South Africa signed in 1995 a Declaration of Intent with the Government of Mozambique whereby both governments agreed to co-operate in demining efforts in Mozambique . South Africa 's Department of Foreign Affairs in 1997 funded a R 12 million demining project in the Maputo province of Mozambique . South Africa is also assisting the Angolan Demining Institute with the training of, inter alia, deminers. Mechem, a South African company specialising in demining, was involved in demining activities in Angola in co-operation with the United Nations as well as the Maputo province demining project. South Africa 's contribution towards global demining efforts can thus be based on training and medical expertise as well as technical supervision and advice, depending on specific situations.
Since 2001 South Africa , through the Department of Foreign Affairs, also provided approximately US $121, 285 to the ICRC for landmine victim assistance programmes in Southern Africa .
To facilitate national compliance with the MBT, the South African Defence Secretariat, with the assistance of the ICRC, and in co-operation with various government departments and relevant non-governmental organisations, drafted South Africa 's national implementation legislation. The Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act (Act No. 36 of 2003), is regarded as a model legalisation and international best practice to be followed by other countries.
to top
home
search