Bilateral, Political groups and International interaction
The issue of IraqIn February 2003 President Mbeki requested seven disarmament experts 1 to visit Iraq on a peace mission in an attempt to avert impending war. The experts were tasked to impart the manner in which South Africa had undergone its own disarmament process through co-operation and transparency with the international community, and the manner in which it had developed policy and gained the world's confidence as a responsible producer, trader and possessor of advanced technologies. It was hoped that Iraq could be persuaded to open themselves to full co-operation with UN weapons inspectors and thereby remove the basis for intervention as a perceived “imminent” threat to international security due to their possession of weapons of mass destruction.
The team travelled to Iraq with the full support of the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and a tacit positive nod from Prime Minister Blair and the Bush Administration. The team were given high-level access to Iraqi politicians including Deputy President Tariq Aziz and the full co-operation of the leading figures in their weapons programmes. While the South African team did not have a mandate to act as weapons inspectors – nor tried to do so - – they had an opportunity to sit face-to-face with those individuals that had developed Iraqi programmes and had supposedly destroyed all facets of their weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The South Africans visited destroyed chemical and biological plants and sites where more than 50 tonnes of the chemical agent VX had been dumped. The Iraqis had been negligent in their destruction processes by not keeping records – documentation, photos and videos – and often carried out the destruction at night in stealth operations involving handfuls of trusted officials. However, interviews with officials involved and discussions concerning the amounts, methods, procedures, equipment involved and problems encountered gave a reasonably clear picture of the Iraqi capabilities and disarmament work undertaken.
During their visit to Baghdad the South African team had tried to persuade the Iraqis to forfeit their missiles and destroy them. This was an outstanding issue on the list of non-co-operation by Iraq for UN Chief Inspector, Hans Blix. Iraq had transgressed the limitations placed on it after the Gulf War regarding missiles – size and range capability – and they themselves admitted to the team that their missiles had major guidance failures and could not be delivered with accuracy. It is hard to say what impact the South African team had on this issue but three days after their departure the Iraqis conceded on this issue and started dismantling and destroying their missiles.
On return to South Africa the team presented a report to President Mbeki – which was subsequently made available to Kofi Annan – in which it was concluded, within the limits of the team's mandate and task – that Iraq had undergone a considerable disarmament process and conceivably did not possess any weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to international security. The report acknowledged that Iraq still had the scientists and therefore intellectual capacity to restart the chemical and biological programmes but that their ability to acquire the necessary materials was severely limited and that there was, based on the information available to the team, reasonable grounds to accept their claims of disarmament. Furthermore, the Iraqis had requested South Africa 's technical assistance to prove the types and quantities of prohibited substances that had been dumped. South Africa had advised that it was willing to undertake this assistance, if requested to by and under the supervision of the United Nations.
The pre-emptive and preventative action on Iraq underlines the confidence South Africa has acquired in dealing with its inherited past and the ability to utilise this experience to contribute to international peace and security. The acceptance by the key players of world politics that South Africa has the technical capacity and political standing to play a peace role and encouragement to do so emphasises the country's status and reputation as an influential, credible and honest broker in an area traditionally reserved for major powers.
The OAU/African Union
South Africa was initially treated with considerable circumspection by African and Non-Aligned countries on the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.
The expertise and ability of South African diplomats to participate in detailed technical negotiations; to take on the major players from other continents; and the organisational ability, fervour and depth among civic society was soon welcomed as an asset to African efforts. This was particularly the case on the issue of anti-personnel mines and small arms where South Africans worked with great passion to forge common African positions and to keep Africa at the forefront of negotiations. The manner in which African States supported Ambassador Selebi, as chair of the Oslo negotiations to finalise a total ban on anti-personnel mines, as well as the solidarity displayed in upholding the Bamako Declaration at the 2001 UN Conference on small arms represent the best instances of joint action and common purpose.
Non-Aligned Movement
The Non-Aligned Movement viewed South Africa 's initial participation in its deliberations with even greater circumspection than fellow Africans. The high moral ground which South Africa commanded due to its action and progressive policies on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control presented a real challenge and threat to the big players who had managed to drive this issue through the active participation and co-operation of less than ten countries, followed by the tacit consent of the rest of the ninety odd countries. The agenda was dominated by weapons of mass destruction issues, particularly nuclear weapons which were seen as its highest priority. In 1997 South Africa started to introduce language into NAM positions and documents that would give more emphasis to conventional weapons, initially anti-personnel mines and later small arms. South Africa took up the reins of the Chair of the NAM in 1998, soon after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan . These tests had a devastating effect on the NAM and its stated positions on disarmament and non-proliferation. Nevertheless, South Africa showed great resolve in ensuring that the NAM retain its principled positions and that the weapons resulting in the greatest number of deaths among developing countries, namely landmines and small arms, be reflected in greater depth and balance to the weapons of mass destruction component of NAM documents and positions. South Africa , as Chair of the NAM was also responsible for leading the Group's position on certain issues like the negotiations to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. South Africa , as mentioned previously, was the most active delegation in these seven year long negotiations and therefore brought the same expertise to the NAM deliberations and positions on the issue. This permitted the NAM to play an active role as an equal negotiating partner to the Western and Other Group, a position rarely achieved in technical negotiations of this nature.
Bilateral and other arrangements
Nuclear Weapon States
The role played by South Africa and its interaction with key players during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference provided an opportunity to continue engaging important States, particularly the nuclear weapon States, individually or as a group. Individual bilateral engagement from 1996 through to 2000 resulted in annual bilateral meetings with senior officials from the United States , Russian Federation , United Kingdom and France and also occasional meetings with China . These meetings took place in either Pretoria or the capital of the host country and permitted a frank interchange of ideas on the most vexing international and bilateral issues in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. It also gave further credence to the capacity South Africa had to build bridges between the developed and developing world and to seek workable, achievable solutions that benefited all.
As stated in the introductory section, much of the diplomacy is conducted in “smoke filled rooms”. This is where personalities engage and get to know each other over years. Institutional knowledge as well as the capacity to hold ones own on the technical aspects and provide something of worth to both sides is part and parcel of the formula that makes the “diplomatic world of disarmament go round”. These bilaterals were marked by professionalism and mutual respect for each other and gave South Africa a rare view of the disarmament diplomatic “big game” where deals are brokered by a small number of individuals and then “sold” to their own national constituencies and political groups and where naked “power play” is clearly demonstrated and used to great effect. It also set the scene for later accomplishments at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
New Agenda and developing world partners
South Africa had since 1998 been operating as one of the seven founding partners of the New Agenda Coalition, which had managed to capture the imagination of the international community on nuclear disarmament and also became the only credible group that the nuclear weapon States were prepared to sit down with and bargain with at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
Unfortunately, the changing international landscape in disarmament began to wane by 2001 as unilateralism came to the fore and the world attention was diverted in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA . This had a “knock-on” effect and gradually the bilateral interaction between South Africa and the nuclear weapon States moved to less frequent meetings to discuss disarmament.
Besides the nuclear weapon States , South Africa experienced a flurry of interest with other States where common positions where shared. In August 1996 President Mandela and Prime Minister Jim Bolger of New Zealand signed a Memorandum of Co-operation on Disarmament and Arms Control. This Memorandum deepened links between the two countries on this issue and importantly provided one of the first boosts to international government action by a “call for the world-wide elimination of anti-personnel landmines”. In October 1996, South Africa and Sweden also agreed to closer co-operation on disarmament matters following Foreign Minister talks in Cape Town .
South Africa and New Zealand together went on to become part of the core group of ten countries that led the Ottawa Process resulting in the global Mine Ban Treaty in September 1997. Ireland and Mexico also formed part of this core group and together with South Africa and Sweden were also part of the seven partners that formed the New Agenda Coalition.
South Africa had also found a natural affinity with Brazil on disarmament issues. Brazil is not a member of the Non-Aligned Movement but has observer status, allowing Brazil to participate fully in the deliberations of the NAM as a political group. This is an important factor as Brazil had, due to its own historical experience and aspirations in the nuclear and missile field, also become a member of some of the export control regimes – Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Together Brazil and South Africa were thus the only developing countries that participated in control regime arrangements. This coincidence and sharing of other problems in the disarmament field, particularly its own problem with small arms and light weapons, resulted in South African and Brazilian positions being very similar and complementary. Brazil was therefore a natural partner for the New Agenda Coalition.
South Africa has also co-operated with many other countries on the disarmament field in the context of broader bilateral commissions or arrangements. Most of these bilateral interactions, encompassing all facets of foreign policy and trade, are with developing countries and include some of the most important and active players in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. For instance India , Egypt and Nigeria , to name a few, are among those with special bilateral arrangements. Egypt , as a leading player in Africa and the Middle East with a particular concern regarding Israel 's nuclear weapons programme, also had an affinity with those wanting to promote nuclear disarmament and therefore is also a member of the New Agenda Coalition.
The New Agenda Coalition of Brazil, Egypt , Ireland , Mexico , New Zealand , South Africa and Sweden spans the globe with representation in Africa, the Americas , Europe and the Pacific. Slovenia had initially been a partner representing Central and Eastern Europe but withdrew early supposedly due to pressure from the US . In an attempt to obtain an Asian partner, the NAC had initially also approached Malaysia . Unfortunately Malaysia was too involved with its resolution at the United Nations on the International Court of Justice decision on nuclear disarmament and therefore declined. Japan had also been considered along with Canada , but both had internal problems regarding their association and protection under the US nuclear umbrella.
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