The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC) is the first multilateral treaty banning the production and use of an entire category of weapons. It was established as the result of prolonged efforts by the international community to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol, was opened for signature in 1972 and entered in force in 1975, with South Africa ratifying the same year.States Parties to the Convention are obligated not to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or obtain microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; not to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or obtain weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict; to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes (not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention) all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery; not to transfer to any recipient, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery; to take necessary measures to prohibit the above within their own territories.
Much of the work that has been undertaken by South Africa in the context of the BWC, especially since 1994 has been clouded by the public debate surrounding the pre-1994 Government's defensive chemical and biological warfare programme and the involvement of Dr Wouter Basson, who was in charge of the biological programme of the former South African Government. These issues were also the subject of the hearings by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and of a subsequent court case. The finding that the activities undertaken within this programme had not been for the purposes of developing a weaponised biological and chemical weapons capability is internationally accepted and is understood to have been the subject of two verification visits by combined high-level delegations from the United States and United Kingdom . While possible criminal activities may have been conducted under the mantle of the programme, and while this may still be the subject of debate in South Africa, South Africa's reputation as a State that is in compliance with its obligations under the BWC is accepted by the international community at large. South Africa has successfully established its international reputation as a reliable possessor of advanced technologies.
South Africa's active participation in the context of the BWC commenced in 1992 when an expert from the South African Military Health Service participated in the second to fourth meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Government Experts (VEREX) that met in Geneva. The task of VEREX was to identify possible verification measures for the Convention. The participation of the South African expert laid the foundation for the country's active involvement in subsequent meetings and negotiations in the context of the BWC. An initial focus for South Africa in VEREX was to ensure that the issue of the alleged use of biological weapons was adequately addressed. This initial participation by South Africa culminated at the 1994 Special Conference of States Parties. Despite the resistance from many delegations, South Africa was able to ensure that the issue of “alleged use” was incorporated in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties that was established by the Conference to negotiate a draft protocol to strengthen the implementation of the BWC. Agreement on this was only achieved at the 11 th hour due to the insistence of the South African delegation with the late support of the delegation of Iran . The South African position was founded on the fact that while the BWC prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and calls for their destruction, it does not explicitly ban the use of such weapons. As a result of the South African endeavours the concept of “alleged use” is an intrinsic part of the BWC that needs to be addressed in any consideration of the Convention. This is now generally accepted and was in fact formally recognised at the 4 th Review Conference of States Parties in 1996.
South Africa followed on its active participation in the VEREX mechanism and in the 1994 Special Conference with enhanced participation in the Ad Hoc Group. During the course of the seven years of negotiations that took place, the South African delegation established itself as one of the most active and substantive. South Africa in fact submitted more working papers on substantive issues than any other single or combination of delegations. 1 During this period South Africa also co-ordinated the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and other States Group in the context of the BWC. The NAM 's participation was also enhanced and it contributed on several substantive issues.
Most of the South African working papers that were utilised during the negotiations were prepared by a sub-committee of the Non-Proliferation Council, the Biological Weapons Working Committee (BWWC). These working papers were especially noteworthy due to the fact that they concentrated on the verification measures for the draft Protocol and were consequently able to balance proposals from countries from the developed world, which also focussed on these key elements. This approach altered the nature of the participation that had generally been followed by developing countries in negotiations for disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. A traditional focus for developing countries had been the technical co-operation and assistance measures and on the more organisational aspects. The verification measures in these types of negotiations were generally left to the participation of delegations from more advanced countries that had the technical expertise to undertake such negotiations. It is apparent that the South Africans had identified the fact that it is the verification aspect of any such agreement that defines the other elements included and that this was therefore the area where the primary focus should be.
Like many other non-proliferation and disarmament treaties the BWC requires that Review Conferences be held every five years and as the Third Review Conference was held during 1991, the Fourth Review Conference was the first Review Conference attended by a South African delegation. The Conference reviewed the provisions of the Convention article by article, but it mainly focused on the work of the BWC Ad Hoc Group with a view to intensify the negotiations for a compliance protocol to the Convention.
South Africa successfully accomplished its two main objectives at the Conference, i.e.
- To have the use of biological and toxin weapons recognised by State Parties as being in violation of Article I of the BWC; and
- To call for the endorsement and intensification of the work done by the BWC Ad Hoc Group to establish a regime to strengthen the implementation of the Convention and the intensification of these negotiations so as to move to a negotiating format ('rolling text') as soon as possible.
The Conference also decided to call on the Ad Hoc Group to intensify these negotiations with a view to completing this as soon as possible before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference and it encouraged the Group to review its method of work and to move to a “rolling text” in order to fulfil its mandate.
As a consequence of the level of its participation South Africa was invited by the Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Group to serve as the Friend of the Chair on the Investigations Annex. This work was successfully undertaken and the elements of the protocol that dealt with these issues were largely agreed to and were subsequently included in the Chairman's text of the draft protocol that was presented to the States Parties in 2001. In this context, the Chairman of the negotiations, Ambassador Tibor Toth ( Hungary ) approached the South African and United Kingdom delegations to assist him in the final drafting of the compromise text (Chairman's text) that he tabled at the culmination of the negotiations. The preparation of this text took place during the period of April 2000 to June 2001 and was undertaken at meetings between the individuals involved in Vienna , Geneva , Pretoria and Budapest .
The efforts of the States Parties and the negotiations that had spanned a period of more than seven years, however, came to nought with the rejection by the Bush Administration in the United States of the Chairman's text as well as the whole process that had been undertaken. The United States made this announcement at the Ad Hoc Group meeting in Geneva on 25 July 2001. Extensive efforts were made by other States Parties, in which South Africa played a leading role, to save the work that had been done. United States pressure and its ability to influence the positions of particularly its military and political alliance partners, however, prevented those delegations who wanted to continue to see if an accommodation could be reached from achieving this goal. Due to the position adopted by South Africa and the NAM, this last meeting of the Ad Hoc Group was unable to formally close and a final report of the Group was therefore not adopted. In the diplomatic niceties that govern disarmament negotiations this outcome technically means that the Ad Hoc Group and its mandate remain in existence and this work can be resuscitated at a more favourable time.
The differences between the United States and its alliance partners, as opposed to the supporters of the Protocol, came to a head at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2001. At this Review Conference the United States endeavoured to enforce an agreement to formally end the work of the Ad Hoc Group and to reject the draft Protocol. The other States Parties rejected these overt tactics of the United States and based on a suggestion by South Africa suspended the meeting of the Review Conference without any further consideration of the issues before it. The Review Conference reconvened in November 2002 and without concluding its work agreed on a further programme of work to enhance, as opposed to strengthen, the implementation of the Convention. It is noteworthy that even this limited outcome of the Review Conference did not address the Ad Hoc Group nor the outcome of its work.
The limited work that was agreed to by the Review Conference addresses the following issues:
- Holding three annual meetings of one week duration in 2003, 2004 and 2005 “to promote common understanding and effective action” on the following topics:
- The adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation;
- National mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic micro organisms and toxins;
- Enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease;
- Strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants;
- The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists.
- Each of the annual meetings are to be preceded by a two week meeting of experts, whose task it will be to prepare possible proposals for the consideration of the States Parties.
- The Sixth Review Conference (in 2006) will consider the work of these meetings and decide on any further action.
In addition, South Africa, on a voluntary basis participates in the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, and in terms of UN General Assembly resolution 46/35A provides such information and data in conformity with the standardized procedure to the UN Secretary-General on annual basis before 15 April of each year.
Nationally, the BWC is implemented in South Africa in terms of the Act on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and regulations that have been issued by the Minister of Trade and Industry. This compliance mechanism is constantly under review and has been improved and updated on a number of occasions. The list of controlled items that is used by the Council to implement the Act is based on the list that has been issued by the Australia Group.
South Africa 's commitment to the BWC has been clearly demonstrated since 1994 with an important investment to the international community's disarmament goals in terms of the intellectual contribution made and the endeavours of its delegation. Despite the setbacks that were confronted as a result of the United States rejection of the Ad Hoc Group negotiations, the foundation has been laid not only for a continued high-level of contribution by South Africa in the context of the BWC, but also for the future achievement of the international community's goals in this regard.
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